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Chapter — I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Voluntarism vs. Determinism 
Free-will and predestination are the central problems of many 
religions. These have been important concepts in philosophy of religion as 
well in the history of philosophy. There have been several theories 
pertaining to problem of free will, such as determinism, fatalism, 
voluntarism, predestinarianism and so on. 
Several questions arise in regard to this concept. The fundamental 
question pertains to morality but it also has bearing on one's view of 
religion as well as science. Is man a free agent ? Are his actions 
predetermined by mechanical laws by way of cause and effect relation? Is 
man responsible for his good and bad actions ? If it were so, then supremacy 
of almighty God would be in jeopardy. If, on the other hand, man were not 
free then there would be no responsibility on man and no justification to 
reward or punish him for those actions. 
But before we proceed with this discussion, we should first clear the 
meaning of the expression `freedom of will'. Broadly, we can understand 
the meaning of freedom of will in two senses. First one is "Free will as 
freedom of choice", meaning thereby that one does freely whatever he 
wants. One has power to choose to do anything and he would be responsible 
for his action. This type of freedom of will implies responsibility for one's 
action that he performs whether good or bad. Another meaning of `freedom' 
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is `absence of compulsion and constrain'. This means one acts willingly or 
voluntarily though in accordance with what is determined by God or some 
supreme power outside him. 
The first meaning of freedom of will contrasts with determinism but 
not the second. The second meaning of freedom of will is not opposed to 
causality but opposed to constraint or compulsion. Freedom of will is not 
understood as freedom of choice but as voluntary necessity. 
"....where freedom means the absence of compulsion, 
necessary acts determined by God none the less can be 
freely done".' 
That means God-determined action has been done willingly or voluntarily. 
We observe that this voluntary necessity has been maintained by most of 
predestinarian theologians. They hold that these predestined actions are 
performed by human being and they do involve responsibility, although man 
has no power to choose his action. This voluntary necessity has historically 
been common place in Augustinian and Calvinistic theology in Christianity 
as well as in Islamic theology. To some extent it is found even in 
materialistic determinism. Thomas Hobbes, for example, thought that 
necessary acts were entirely voluntary and therefore man was responsible 
for his action. 
Besides these two broadly distinct meanings of freedom we can 
understand freedom in many other ways. Some possible explanations are 
given here below. 
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We may, for example, speak of freedom that can be understood as 
regularity in nature. That means every event in this world is occurring in an 
overall framework of cause and effect relation and that everything is 
happening spontaneously. One can be said to be free when there is no 
compulsion and constraint upon him.2 "Freedom" in this sense can be said to 
be present even in nonorganic things insofar as they act and interact under a 
self-regulated law. The animals are also free in this sense because there is no 
external compulsion upon them. Similarly, a faint person who has lost 
altogether his consciousness, might be called unfree because he lacks 
physical freedom. But a person would still be said to be free when his action 
is continuously performed without external prevention. Physical freedom 
depends upon circumstances. If there is more constraint upon someone by 
circumstances, and one's action does not continue then there would be less 
room for freedom. Furthermore, on account of physical freedom we can say 
that there is no meaning of morality or responsibility. 
In another sense, `freedom' means "freedom to do as one 
pleases".3  
According to this kind of freedom, if some one does not want to do 
something then no one can compel him to do that or if someone has desire to 
do a particular action then no one can stop him to do that particular action. 
This means freedom in this sense can be understood as lack of constraint. 
One can willingly do anything whatever he wants: no one can compel or 
order him to do or not to do something. One's freedom is inherent in his 
pleasure. This kind of freedom implies responsibility. If one's pleasure is in 
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doing good action then he gets reward and if one's pleasure or happiness is 
in doing bad action then he gets punishment. 
Another type of freedom is what may be called `ideal freedom'. 
This is the kind of freedom where "individuals and societies are said to be 
free "if they are not prevented from acting in accord with an ideal, whatever 
that ideal might be".4 
In this kind of freedom, one has an ideal and if one's action has 
been done according to his ideal then he is free, If an action is not performed 
by him according to his ideal then he is not free. An individual or society 
that is unable to act according to its ideal, will not be said to be free in as 
much as the ideal is something that is good or highest good. For example, 
St. Paul considered that a sinner is not free although he acts without any 
external compulsion. He acts according to his will but still he is not free 
because his ends and means are not good. St. Paul also held that Christians 
are free, because their redemption has been accomplished by Christ. This 
kind of freedom applies to community or society and individual's too. 
Another concept implying freedom is expressed in terms of "the 
emergence of novelty" .5 This type of freedom is related with creativity. 
According to this, an artist is free because his creative soul or mind is able to 
express new ideas rather than repeating the pervious ones. In this context, 
some philosophers hold the view that this world is not merely a spontaneous 
process happening under the law of cause and effect relation. It is rather like 
a process that is effected by an artist. Things keep appearing from time to 
time, changes happen and novelty emerges in this world. So we can say that 
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there is a room for indeterminism in this world. For those believing in God, 
God himself has free will to creativity and novelty. It is like when an artist 
creates a new thing through his imagination and his creative mind does so 
without any external compulsion and prevention. He is not determined by 
causal relation. He tries to create something that is new and does not repeat 
the previous idea. Similarly, God has free will and he creates new things in 
this world. 
Man is distinct from animal, because he has power to create while 
the animals have not. The animal spends its whole life through a regular 
pattern but man does't. Man always tries to do something new due to his 
curious and creative nature. In this sense, man has "freedom" to be a cause 
for the emergence of novelty. 
Yet another type of freedom is political freedom. There are two 
senses of political freedom. In one sense, political freedom means "a version 
of freedom to do as one pleases which applies to the nations".6 
According to this kind of freedom man feels himself in slavery of 
some other country and he detests this condition. He feels happy in liberty. 
He cherishes his personal freedom and strives for the freedom of his country 
too. A nation is said to be free when it is not ruled by another nation. 
In the other sense, political freedom also means "the participation of 
individuals in governing their own polity".7 In this view one is politically 
free if he participates in the matters of the governance of his nation. If one 
cannot participate in the political processes of one's country then he is not 
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considered as free. So in this second meaning of political freedom children, 
less conscious person or mad man is not free. 
Now, `freedom' as emergence of novelty is different from physical 
freedom, because physical freedom is that with which this world is going on 
spontaneously. Man performs action without prevention, without constraint, 
whereas freedom as emergence of novelty creates a new spontaneous world. 
Similarly, freedom to do as one pleases can be non-creative and repetitive 
because if someone finds his happiness in particular action then he would be 
repeating it, whereas freedom as emergence of novelty creates new desire in 
human and divine being. Same is the case with ideal freedom. If someone 
performed his action in accordance with his ideal freedom, then he is free. 
Otherwise he is not free. Whereas freedom as emergence of novelty creates 
a new ideal. 
Thus we see that the word `freedom' has several meanings and each 
is distinct from the other. Coming now to the mechanical-deterministic 
view, if our effort cannot effect our action, then it becomes absurd to 
understand ourselves being responsible for our action over which we have 
no control. We perform in accordance to mechanical law without involving 
our own choice. The self becomes an automatic machine. Just as machines 
are operated by external power and there is no option or choice before 
machine, there is no option or choice before human being, too. The morality 
and ethics in this situation become a fiction and delusion. Life would remain 
without morality. Materialism, biological science, even modem psychology 
have given their arguments in favour of mechanical laws involving cause 
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and effect. Mechanical determinism maintains law of causation. Generally, 
determinism keeps the meaning that "everything that happens is determined 
or predecided". That means whatever happens in our life is predetermined 
by some external force or power. 
"In the context of every day usage, `to be determined" 
usually means "to be resolved", as in "I was determined 
to arrive there on time no matter what the cost". But in 
the context of the problem of freedom, "to be 
determined" usually means "to be caused".g 
When we talk about determinism in the context of free will, our discussion 
is about our actions that are determined by invariable antecedents. In other 
words, everything that happens in our life has a cause whether we know or 
don't know what that cause is. Whenever we do something there is some 
cause behind our action. There is a link and unbreakable chain of causes and 
effects leading to our present action. "There are no `loose ends' no `gaps' or 
breaks, in the constitution of the universe; there is no broken links in the 
iron chain".9 
Although we commonly assume that men are capable to perform 
voluntary action, we also often observe that human behaviour is entirely 
governed by causal laws of physical universe. The philosophical problem of 
free will indeed arises as a result of clash between these two views. Early 
Greeks and also the later western thinkers had thought about "freedom" as 
denial of all external limitation and also as absence of compulsion or 
constraint in human actions. Although every action is caused, yet man is 
free. Nobody can compel man to do anything that he does want to do. 
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From Socrates to Epicurus to Kant and Berkeley, the philosophers 
have tried to find out the rational basis of freedom in their philosophical 
writings. Socrates attacks the materialistic attitude and objected to atomism. 
According to him, mechanism left no room for freedom of choice which is 
the basis of morality. Reason told him that mind was the controlling factor 
of action. He thought atomism leads to a world in which there is no value of 
morality and there is no use of human efforts, because man has no right to 
choose between the alternatives. 
Aristotle claimed that the power of free will lies in the capacity of 
thought to harmonize itself. It is not harmony with God but with the good 
and good life. According to him "To be free meant to be rational".10 He 
also said that if man has free will he can improve his conduct and character. 
Man has the right to choose a better alternative on the basis of reason. If 
there is no option before man to choose between alternative actions then he 
cannot improve his conduct and character. 
But while Greeks generally sided with the freedom of will, in the 
modem western philosophy there has been a struggle between divine fore 
knowledge and human freedom. Many however tried to solve this riddle on 
rational rather than religious grounds. 
According to Descartes, "to favour human freedom of will" is true 
and to reject human freedom of will" is false. Spinoza, on the other hand, 
r 
	 characterizes free will as self-determination. According to him, man is only 
free when his actions are determined by the inner tendencies or inner 
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consciousness of his being as a whole. For example, if someone wants to 
study philosophy rather than history then that is her or his personal decision 
which may otherwise be called as self-determination. 
Leibniz described free-will as "a form of uncaused spontaneity", 
which was later to be equated with "freedom from indifference"." 
According to him, everything happens spontaneously. The outcome of this 
view is that God could never be blamed for man's doings. In one sense we 
can say that Leibniz believed in physical freedom, according to which every 
event is determined and related with each other by the mechanics of natural 
laws. 
This conception of freedom of will was not found to be satisfactory 
by Locke who gave his arguments in opposition to Leibniz. He gave 
preference to cause. Being empiricist he held that everything that happens 
has a cause. Present effect is a result of the past antecedent cause. After 
Locke, Hume gave arguments to re-establish the possibility of free will. 
According to him, "free action is one that could have been avoided".12 
That means there is a choice before human being as he can choose either this 
or that when the options are available. He has a right to avoid unwilling 
action. 
For Kant, on the other hand, determinism is phenomenal and 
freedom is noumenal .... 1  
Hegel and his followers maintain that freedom and necessity are two 
sides of the same coin. These two ideas are dialectically related through 
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"knowledge" or "understanding". It means both can be understood through 
knowledge and understanding. 
The idealists of nineteenth century are called libertarians. They give 
more importance to "self'. According to them body ' is causal instrument 
while self is free from causation. 
It is clear from the above discussion that on the problem of free-will 
mainly two views were upheld viz, freedom as freedom of choice and 
freedom as voluntary necessity in one or another form and in different 
contexts. This discussion opens the door for further discussion of the 
concepts of choice, how to distinguish between good and bad action, 
problem of evil, determinism and voluntarism and so on. 
2. Arguments for Determinism 
Determinism and voluntarism are two theories that cannot be 
compatiable with each other. According to determinism everything that 
happens has a cause. If we accept that everything has cause or there would 
be always a cause behind our actions then we live in deterministic world and 
we can say that determinism is true. On the other hand, if man has freedom 
in some respect or other then determinism is false. To give here a more 
exact definition: "Determinism is the doctrine that for every event E there is 
a previous event or set of events D that guarantees the occurrence of E".14 
That means that each and every event has a particular cause. 
Nothing happens in this world without a reason and without cause. Now, if 
determinism means "to be caused", then question arises what is meant by 
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cause. In its simplest definition "To cause something is, to produce 
something, bring about something".15 To explain the idea further, we see 
in our daily life some events occur before and some after the other. For 
example, the smoke is always after not before the burning of fire. Now the 
question is whether burning fire is the cause of smoke or is it the burner that 
is the cause of smoke ? To say fire is the cause of smoke does not mean the 
cause precedes the effect. For many events occur before others without 
causing them. Moreover, many events seen by us occur independently of 
what we have seen to have preceded it. Suppose Mr. X starts his lecture at 
10:00 p.m. which is also the time of my entering the lecture hall, that does 
not mean starting the lecture is the effect of the fact that I entered in the 
lecture hall at 10:00 p.m. 
To understand the cause and effect theory or the precedence of 
cause to the effect, we have to understand necessary connection of the cause 
with the effect. 
According to rational view there is some kind of necessary 
connection between cause and the effect. It is because of the necessary 
connection that the effect always follows its cause. Whenever the cause 
occurs effect also occurs. Cause and effect are necessarily connected with 
each other and cannot occur apart from each other. There is unbreakable 
chain that binds the cause to its effect. 
But as is known, Hume does not accept this view. He did not 
believe in any necessary connection binding the cause with its effect. What 
is it, Hume asked, that entitles us to say that C causes E, that friction causes 
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heat, that lightening causes thunder, that windstorm causes trees to blow 
down? Empirical observation, he replied.16 
According to Hume, the claim that every consequent has antecedent 
is merely based on empirical observation. But this does not show that C 
produces E or there is a necessary connection between C and E. Now the 
question is if causality is not necessary then what it is ? Hume replied that 
we observe that many events occur in this world that admit the relation of 
being earlier and later. Thus, while some happen earlier, some do later and 
some simultaneously with each others. Hume said that what we observe in 
our experience is that a particular event is followed by another particular 
event. This arrangement of precedence and succession is repeated over and 
over again, once, twice, ten times, thousand times. We then conclude that 
this particular effect is produced by what has preceded it. And there is a 
necessary connection between them. We also link that one can not occur 
without the other. We can thus say with Hume that causality is constant 
conjunction among them.17 
Logically, instead of saying that X is cause of Y it is better to say 
that X and Y go together. They are constantly conjoined together. In other 
words, whenever the cause occurs the effect also occurs. The other 
important question to be asked in this context is whether volitions can also 
be considered as causes? For while it is true that in our experience we are 
not aware of the necessary connection between cause and effect, we feel 
certainly to be aware of a necessary connection between our volition and the 
acts that follow. But Hume did not accept it. According to him, the moving 
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of my arm is not different from any other experience in the world. He says 
that I can move my arm but I also cannot move my liver, or my car or the 
sun and so on. Moreover, if someone has paralysis he cannot move his arms. 
So the condition of moving the arm is my ability to raise the arm itself. The 
limbs should be in a good working state to enable them to raise the arm. It is 
therefore not the volition but the physical event of the movements of limbs 
that causes the arms to be raised. 
The above theory that was contested by Hume can be called 
physical determinism. But besides this one, there are other theories like 
Ethical determinism, logical determinism, theological determinism, and 
psychological determinism. In the following we have brief discussions of 
each of them. 
Ethical Determinism : This theory is most important among the five. It is 
supported by Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, St. Thomas Aquinas and 
many others. According to Socrates, every man chooses the best from the 
alternatives given to him. In other words, every man chooses what is best for 
him and avoid what is not best for him. No man will choose something that 
he thinks is going to do not any good for him or is going to produce great 
evil upon him. Plato also thought the same. According to him, no man 
would choose anything about which he knows that its goodness is uncertain. 
The conclusion drawn by Plato and Socrates is man chooses bad action 
either involuntarily or due to ignorance. He cannot choose bad action for 
himself voluntarily or knowingly. He commit mistakes due to lack of 
knowledge or due to some compulsion. 
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For example, a thirsty man will never choose a glass of water if he 
knows there is poison in the glass. If he chooses the glass of water 
containing poison, that must be either due to ignorance or under some 
compulsion. He cannot take anything which produced great evil voluntarily. 
That is why Socrates gave his doctrine "virtue is knowledge and knowledge 
is virture". According to both Plato and Socrates, if someone who knows his 
highest good, he will try to seek it. If he seeks anything else that can only be 
because of ignorance. In other words, we can say that such a person sees 
some apparent good in that other thing for which reason he chose it. Plato's 
conclusion on the basis of this discussion was that the state should be 
governed by philosophers. Because only a philosopher could intellectually 
distinguish between good and bad. It is clear that ethical determinism is here 
the ethical intellectualism which is the central idea of Plato's philosophy. 
For Plato, "Man's voluntary actions are invariably determined by an 
apparent good; all their actions are determined by this if by nothing else".18 
Man voluntarily chooses what seems to be best for him and rejects 
what is bad for him. This is a kind of self-determinism which enhances 
man's freedom rather than debases it. The philosophers who accept ethical 
determinism maintain man's freedom. The determination of the will or 
choice is nothing other than good. If some one chooses bad he is enslaved: if 
someone chose good he is free. The modem philosopher Descartes also said 
the same thing as he, too, believed that no man who knows his true "end" or 
highest good could reject it in favour of some other good. According to 
Leibniz, too, God guided man to do what was definitely good for him. He 
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surely knows of man's good and bad. He guides man towards the highest 
good. Furthermore, he maintains there is nothing to debase God's freedom. 
Moreover, if man's freedom of action is determined by God's will, that will 
be no determinism at all. On the contrary, "it is most perfect freedom to 
have one's will thus determined".19 
Aristotle however rejected ethical determinism. He held that 
sometimes man's desires or appetites conflict with his reason. Quite often 
man's desires are bad in spite of his knowing that his desire or his action 
produced great evil upon him. He clearly knows the evil consequences of it 
and yet he desires this particular thing. John Locke had thought in same 
way. A man knows drinking liquor is injurious to his lungs. But, in spite of 
knowing this fact, he drinks. So the mere knowledge of anything is not right 
way to self determination. The conflict between Socrates and Aristotle is the 
contradiction between rationalism and voluntarism. If we give supremacy to 
man's reason over will then there is difficulty to refute Socrates' idea of 
intellectual determination. If will is primary and reason is subordinate to the 
will, then there is difficulty to refute voluntarism. 
Ethical determinism is also refuted by philosophers such as Spinoza, 
Hobbes, William James etc. These philosophers hold that something is good 
for someone in which he takes interest or whatever he desires is good for 
him. Suppose someone wants to study philosophy, the study of philosophy 
is good for him. On the contrary, if one is interested in mathematics instead 
of philosophy then the study of mathematics is good for him rather than 
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philosophy. We conclude that man's good and bad depends upon his interest 
or desire rather than knowledge. 
In the light of such criticism, Socrates' doctrine would appear 
untenable. 
Physical Determinism : The theory of physical determinism has been 
developed in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was inspired by the 
physical science. By the phrase `physical determinism' may be meant "an 
extreme form of our ordinary conviction that events in the world are 
interlocked, so that nothing "just plain happens".20 
Our belief that every event has a cause is the basis of science. 
Scientists have also discovered that the motions of the heavenly bodies were 
not only regular but also "obeyed" certain laws which could be expressed 
with mathematical exactness.21 That means every event of the universe is 
governed by the natural law. Our physical nature is governed by universal 
physical laws. And since our bodies are part of the nature they cannot do 
anything against the universal and physical laws of nature. We find in our 
experience that our physical character and bodily activities are governed by 
biological laws, so we can conclude that there is no room for freedom. 
According to Hume, there is no immaterial soul or spirit in man. His 
view is identical with some other contemporary materialists such as J.J.C. 
Smart. According to them, human behaviour is the behaviour of matter, and 
can be understood with the help of general principles. According to Hobbes, 
whatever happens, whether in the realm of human behaviour, human 
thought, or elsewhere, is caused and hence causally determined by changes 
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of material particles. In other words, human conducts are also material. Like 
material things human behaviour, too, is therefore determined. Although 
Hobbes accepts complete physical determinism, yet, for him, the content of 
physical determinism is liberty. For him liberty means absence of 
compulsion, external restraint or impediment. He said that, "liberty is simply 
the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the 
nature and intrinsical quality of the agent".22 
Hence Hobbes concludes that any one who has external compulsion 
can still be said to be free, e.g. flowing water streams is free although it has 
no freedom to flow upward or it has no freedom to cross the river bank. 
Everything has some intrinsic qualities and these qualities are also found in 
man's nature. Sun rises every day from the east which is due to its nature. 
Whenever we throw something upward it always comes downward and that 
is also due to its nature. Flowing of the water, rising of the sun in the east, 
coming down of a thing when thrown upward — all these types of action can 
be said to be free in a certain sense. It is also supposed that heavenly bodies 
are same as other material bodies. They can therefore also be understood 
with the help of natural law or general principles. 
Now the question is, are our mental thinking or decisions also 
governed by natural laws and is our moral conduct same as the bodily 
conduct. There is a divergence of opinion among scientists about nature of 
mental and moral action. Einstein, Heisenberg and others held that there is 
looseness in nature. Different types of potentialities are found in nature. So 
it cannot be said that same laws govern the whole nature. Universal 
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determinism, then, is not uncontroversial among scientists even as a 
description of nature".23  
Bigger difficulties arise when human actions are sought to be 
described as mechanical actions. Anything which is mechanically moved 
and goes ahead step by step can be said to observe the mechanical rules. But 
these rules do not apply in human emotional relation, such as friendship, 
love, mercy, sympathy and so on. E.g. when Socrates was in jail, he refused 
the proposal to escape from the jail made by his friends. The reason behind 
his acceptance of his own execution was his sense of duty. He obviously did 
not take this decision due to physical laws. 
Psychological Determinism : Most of the philosophers distinguish between 
man's mind and body. They hold that men are not merely collections of 
mind and body. Descartes has also thought that mind and body are entirely 
distinct substances having different qualities. Neither body can think nor the 
mind has quality of extension. Although Descartes had to face criticism of 
most of the philosophers, he nevertheless preserved the distinction between 
mind and body. Contemporary philosophers did not accept mind and body 
as entirely distinct substances but they did accept "psychological" on the 
one hand and "physical" on the other. There are thus at least two ways in 
which we can understand determinism: psychological determinism and 
physical determinism. Both are interconnected. Both come under the 
category of "psychological determinism". But individually we can further 
divide psychological determinism into "motivational determinism" and 
"character determinism". 
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Motivational Determinism : This type of psychological determinism can 
be defined by saying that `every decision is the outcome of a set of motives 
given which no other decision could have been reached".24 That means 
motive is the cause of our motivational determinism, just as physical force is 
the cause of physical determinism. Our actions are determined by our 
motives. In daily life we take decisions according to our motive. But what is 
the motive ? Suppose we want to sit in an examination. We will study our 
subject according to syllabus and we will prepare notes and so on. Here we 
take decisions according to our motives or goal. We try to achieve our goal 
by taking appropriate decision. 
Character Determinism : Character determinism is based upon knowing 
someone's behaviour and predicting his action in a given situation. For 
example, I am sure about my friend's character that he or she will help me 
whenever I got stuck in trouble. I never suppose that he or she will not help 
me when I am facing problem. In a different kind of case, I may know on 
the basis of his past behaviour that when I need his or her help he would 
pretend to be helpless and would not assure me of any help. So, knowing his 
character I predict he might not help me when I am facing this problem. 
Now, if our decisions are determined by our character and our 
motives, then the question arises whether there is any freedom in our 
actions? The psychologist B.F. Sikinner offers on this an idea in his book 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity. He says that freedom is nothing other than 
delusion. He holds we should stop searching for freedom and that freedom is 
only myth. 
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Logical Determinism : Logical propositions are those statements which are 
either true or false. Logical determinism is that in which a statement that is 
true in future is also true presently and was true in past as well. For 
Aristotle, "The truth or the falsity of yesterday's proposition about today 
seems already to hold fixed so that nothing else could happen than what 
does happen".25  
Aristotle further said that every true proposition asserts that a 
certain event has really occurred at a certain time as stated and every false 
proposition asserts that the event really did not occur at the stated time. 
Suppose any event occurred yesterday, it entails that it was already true 
prior to yesterday. If any one denied this particular event had occurred 
yesterday, which has occurred, that means this proposition is already false 
prior to yesterday. 
Theological Determinism : Concept of omnipotent and omniscient God 
with a free will developed along with the development of Christian 
theology. God was not only all-knowing and all-powerful but also perfectly 
good and loving. Every thing depended on His existence and His will. This 
idea that everything depends upon Him, generates deterministic theories. 
Many philosophers and theologians support deterministic theory in different 
ways. Simply put, theological determinism states that all events or all 
actions are determined by almighty God. But the idea of a perfect and good 
God is inconsistent with the reality of his creation being good and not good 
at the same time. 
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Furthermore, if this world is created by God it seems to follow that 
this world was only a possible world, at the most only a best possible world. 
Earlier, the stoics also identified this world or nature with God or Zeus and 
also destiny. According to them, this world is only a possible world. This is 
not really different from what it appears to be. It was nevertheless good. We 
find same idea in Spinoza's philosophy. According to Spinoza, nothing is 
uncertain or contingent and that everything is fixed. He also held 
consequently that nothing is produced by God in any other manner. But 
although he holds that nothing is produced by God in the world, yet he 
accepts the goodness of God. 
After Spinoza it was Leibniz who tried to set quarrel between 
absolute goodness and existence of alternative possibilities related to moral 
determination of God's absoluteness. He thought necessity in two senses, 
which are called by him absolute and hypothetical. When he discussed about 
absolute goodness of God, he said that this world is only possible world, due 
to its necessity, that is, best possible world. He further said that it is only a 
hypothesis that God is good. Hence exclusive necessity of this world is only 
hypothesis. In absolute sense, he did not accept absoluteness of God. He 
holds that this world is the cause of many possible world which is unlike 
Spinoza's view. 
Now we come to the problem of omniscience and determinism. 
Many philosophers as well as theologians have thought that God is 
omnipotent and everything is determined by Him. Before Spinoza and 
Leibniz, St. Augustine and other theologians propounded the Christian 
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doctrine to the effect that God knows everything in advance including what 
is going on in this world, and also that man is going to commit sin. But if it 
is so then, how is it possible for man to perform action which God does not 
know. For example, when God created man He knew that he would commit 
sin and yet he allowed him to be a sinner. So how is it possible to give up 
sin or perform bad action for man. The difficulty comes in the following 
forms - 
(1) "If God knows that I shall perform a certain act at a 
certain time and (2) If I am nevertheless able to forego 
that act when the time for performing it arrives, then (3) 
It follows that I am at least able to confute an item of 
divine knowledge, whether or not I actually do so".26 
That means if God knew at the time of creation men would perform this 
action or that, and if in spite of this we have ability to do otherwise, then, we 
have ability to go against divine knowledge. Of course it is absurd. The 
second premise must be false if first is true. Carneales, who was pre-
Christian defender of self determination, said : "Apollo could not know in 
advance what men were going to do".27 
The view that God does not know about men's good and bad action 
is in contrast with Christian view and can not be accepted by a Christian 
thinker. According to St. Augustine, all events are foreknown by God. But it 
does not mean all events known by God must occur. He compared God's 
foreknowing and men's memory. As man has different things in his mind 
but not all those things really happen in his life, so is the case with God. St. 
Augustine said that there is no difficulty in the notion of God's pre-knowing 
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that someone will be happy and also thinking that he is happy without his 
will or against his will. We do many things voluntarily. No one can deny 
that we do many things voluntarily. A lot of things happen in this world 
which is known by God and they depend upon our will. That means both are 
necessary: God's fore knowledge as well as our own will. 
3. Arguments for Voluntarism : 
The term "voluntarism" comes from Latin word voluntas which 
means "will". It relates to any philosophical theory which affirmed that will 
is prior to reason or intellect. Voluntarist theory deals with various aspects 
of experience and nature related to the will such as appetite, desire etc. This 
theory may be psychological, ethical, theological or metaphysical. 
Psychological Voluntarism : 
"Voluntaristic theories of psychology represent men 
primarily as beings who will certain ends and whose 
reason and intelligence are subordinate to will".28  
Psychological voluntarism says that man has certain ends, which he strives 
to realize by his reason or intellect aided by his will. Thomas Hobbes, David 
Hume, and Schopenhauer are the chief representatives of this theory. 
According to Hobbes, all voluntary human behaviour or action depends on 
human drive or his aversion, which he brought together under the name 
"endeavour". His ethical and political theory was based on this claim. Hume 
held that reason plays no role in our voluntary action. We perform voluntary 
action in our daily life through will. Voluntarists gave priority to the will 
rather than reason. Reason, they say, ought only to be the slave of the 
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passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them".29 
Shopenhauer similarly believed that "Will is very nature or essence 
of man and indeed of everything identifying it with the "thing-in-itself' that 
underlies all phenomena".30 
The opposite theory of voluntarism is rationalism, as we find it in 
Plato's dialogues or Descartes' Meditations. Plato had thought that men 
perceive certain ends or goals by their reason and, for attainment those ends, 
they direct their effort through their will. That is why he thought no one can 
do evil knowingly. He also believed that the corruption of a man is the 
dominance of the will that is nothing other than man's appetites or desires. 
From his will, which is appetites or desires, he deviates from what is his true 
human nature. 
Ethical Voluntarism : It is clear that ethical voluntarism has a great 
importance in human behaviour. If ends and goals or entirely a product of 
will, if our nature is neither rational nor irrational, then end cannot be 
determined either as rational or irrational. This conclusion is drawn by 
Thomas Hobbes. 
"To say that something is good, he said, is to say nothing 
more than that it is an object of one's appetite, and to say 
that something is bad is only to say that one has an 
aversion to it".31  
According to Hobbes, goodness or badness depends upon man's desires. If 
someone has some need of something, that would be good for him. If 
someone is not interested in something then that would be bad for him. 
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Same ideas were defended by Socrates and Protagoras. Protagoras famously 
said "man is the measure of all things"32 and William James, a modern 
American philosopher, also held that same view when he spoke of it saying 
that 
"Things are good solely by virtue of the fact that they are 
"demanded", that is ... that such a demand might be for 
"anything under the sun".33  
This simply meant that according to William James whatever is good is 
good by virtue of its being a need of man. He said that except human 
demands nothing is useful in this world. So the question is not what is one's 
desire, rather, what satisfies one's desire. 
Theological Voluntarism : Theological voluntarism gives importance to 
divine will. Divine will is superior to human will. The exponent of 
theological voluntarism is Peter Damian (1007-1072). We find in his 
thinking extreme form of theological voluntarism. He holds that human 
reason or intellect is worthless in theological matters. The reason behind his 
thinking is that logical laws are invalid until they are vouched by the will of 
God. 
Chapter- II 
PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN JUDAISM, 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 
1. Concept of Original Sin in Bible 
Problem of free will is discussed in philosophy of religion along 
with the problem of original sin, problem of evil, creation of the world and 
human nature etc. All these issues are discussed both in the ethical as well 
as religious perspective. In religions, especially in Christianity, the 
question of the creation of world and of man generally provides the 
backdrop against which the problem of will as well as those other related 
problems are grappled with. The story of creation of mankind is one of the 
classical narratives of Biblical literature. The first part or the first chapter 
of Bible is Genesis which consists of two major parts. In the first part there 
is a story of the beginning of the world and mankind and in the other part is 
narrated the stories of Patriarchs. In Old Testament as part of the story of 
creation of man, is discussed man's disobedience to the command of God. 
God created Adam from the moist soil and then He breathed the soul into 
his body to make him a living self. Selfhood in the Bible is not mentioned 
as a separate entity but is called the result of union of body and divine 
breath. 
God created man in His image and gave him power over the fish, 
cattle and other creatures of the earth. 
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"So God created man in his own image; in the image of 
God he created him; male and female he created them. 
God blessed them and said to them. `Be fruitful and 
increase, fill the earth and subdue it, rule over the fish in 
the sea, the birds of heaven, and every living thing that 
moves upon the earth",' 
After creation of man, God planted a garden as a resting place of 
man. That place was garden of Eden. 
"Then the Lord God formed a man from the dust of the 
ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, 
thus the man become a living creature. Then the Lord God 
planted a garden in Eden away to the east".z 
God then taught Adam the names of those creatures. This act of 
naming suggests man's knowledge and authority. Accordingly, "man's 
place in the earth is incomparably higher than that of any other creatures, 
in the view of the priestly tradition".3  
But since all these living creatures could not remove loneliness of 
Adam, God created a partner of Adam. 
"And so the Lord God put the man into a trance, and while 
he slept, He took one of his ribs and closed the flesh over the 
place. The Lord God then built up the rib, which he had 
taken out of the man, into a woman" .4 
Adam gave her the name Eve and called her the bone of my bone 
and flesh of my flesh. At that time both were naked. They had no feeling of 
shame. They were ignorant. Adam and Eve lived together in the Garden of 
Eden. God then said unto them "you can have any fruit from any tree, 
except the tree of the midst in the Eden Garden". From here the problem of 
will started. On the one hand, God gave Adam and Eve freedom of will 
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asking them to take any fruit from any tree but, on the other, He forbade 
him to take this particular fruit from this particular tree. 
There was a serpent in the Eden Garden which the traditional 
Christianity identifies with Satan. In Hebrew tradition this Satan was 
already known as the power of evil though it should be remembered that 
this identification is not mentioned in the text of Genesis. The problem of 
sin started from the seduction of Eve by the serpent. 
"He said to the woman, `Is it true that God has forbidden you 
to eat from any tree in the garden? The woman answered the 
serpent, `We may eat the fruit of any tree in the garden, 
except for the tree in the middle of the garden; God has 
forbidden us either to eat or to touch the fruit of that: if we do, 
we shall die".5  
The serpent said to woman, surely you will not die but after taking this 
fruit your eyes will be open. You will gain knowledge of good and evil. 
The woman saw this fruit. She felt this fruit was very beautiful. It was 
pleasant for eyes. It was good for food. A desire arose inside her to take 
this fruit. Then she took it and ate and gave it to her husband. After eating 
this fruit their eyes were opened. Although before taking this fruit they 
knew they are naked but they had not feeling of shame. But now the 
feeling of shame arose. They then sewed cloth out of fig leaves to hide 
their shame. After this they heard the voice of God. Lord God said to 
Adam "where you are". Adam said to God, "I heard the voice in the 
garden. I was afraid and I hide myself because I am naked". 
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"God answered, who told you that you were naked? Have you 
eaten from the tree which I forbade you?".6 
Adam replied, "the woman gave me this fruit and I ate". "Then the 
Lord God said to the women, what is this that you have done'?"7 The 
woman replied, "the serpent cajoled me, I ate and gave to my husband". 
Then God said to the serpent, 
"Because you have done this you are accursed more than all 
cattle and wild creature. On your belly you shall crawl, and 
dust you shall eat all the day of your life". 
"I will put enmity between you and the woman, between your 
brood and hers. They shall strike at your head, and you shall 
strike at their heel".8 
And God said unto woman, 
"I will increase your labour and your groaning, and in labour 
you shall bear children. You shall be eager for your husband, 
and he shall be your master."9 
And God cursed man: 
"Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and 
hast eaten of the tree, of which I command thee, saying, thou 
shalt not eat of it: coursed is the ground for th4 i sake; in 
sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life". 
This was the fall of Adam. This is the story of sin or original sin that 
started from disobedience of Adam. The free will started from here, too. It 
shall be remembered sin and evil are not one and the same thing. Evil is the 
result of sin. We find the simplest relation between sin and evil in the 
saying that "God brings evil upon man as a punishment for their sin." 
2. Maimonides on Sin and Free Will 
Among the Jewish thinkers, Maimonides is most influential and 
profound in giving a philosophical interpretation of the problems of sin and 
free-will as presented in Bible. He discusses the concept of free will at 
length in the Mishneh Torah. Mainomides says that it is not necessary to be 
consciously aware of the fact that one has free will while observing the 
laws of Mishneh. Without such an awareness one can still be practicing the 
law. The ability to utilize our free will is instinctively with us and there is 
no need to include it as an additional principle. Without it there would exist 
only the power of the creator and as a result the entire world would be 
impotent and passive. 
It follows that it is in our hand which type of action we perform. The 
God of Jews is called a fiery God. The prophets throughout Jewish history 
exhorted Israel to mend their ways, to do good, to improve, to repent. How 
can Isreal be so directed if it is not in their power? The Torah tells us that 
even though we have ability to do evil, we should not do evil. The Torah 
also tells that we have the ability to do good with the help of God. This 
however does not mean that we have ability to do anything we want. Nor 
does it mean that God helps us in our every bad or good deeds. Sometimes 
we do good by our freedom of choice though, again, it does not follow that 
the result of this action would be good. For example: I work hard and plant 
30 
a field full of seeds by my free choice. But it is not necessary that planting 
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of seeds will be successful. Mostly the result of an action is going to be out 
of my hand, though not entirely. I can do merely whatever is necessary for 
its success. If I do work hard for the success, I can hope for a good crop. 
But I can not have guarantee of the success. That is up to the God. 
Maimonides explains the idea with the help of some verses. The first verse 
which he quotes is: 
"He said, the man has become like one of us, Knowing good and 
evil" '2 
This obviously means only man differentiates between good and evil. 
Maimonides holds that man has free will in choosing his good and bad 
actions. Moreover, he holds that God does not predetermine man's 
goodness and badness. He did not preordain that a certain man will be 
righteous or wicked. He quotes from Lamentation, 
"Do not both bad and good proceed 
From the mouth of the most High? Why should any man 
living complain, any mortal who has sinned? 
Let us examine our ways and put them to the best and turn 
back to the lord".13 
In other words, we can say that God is the cause of all humanity but 
not their sins. So, man should not claim that He is the cause of his sin. He 
should examine his deeds and repent and return towards God. 
Maimonides says that it would be illogical if mankind does not have 
free choice and is still responsible for his actions. Mankind in reality does 
have free will and so also has the responsibilities of his actions. 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that evilness 
and goodness do not come from God, but from the free will of mankind. So 
peoples should do good and not do evil. They should not complain to God 
that He made them fall and suffer. Yes, of course, He gives punishment to 
mankind but it was because of mankind's sins. 
Maimonides quotes next verse from Deut. 
"See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death 
and evil. In that I command thee this day to love the Lord thy 
God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and 
his statutes and his judgments, that mayest live and multiply: 
and the Lord thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou 
goest to possess it. But if thine heart turn away, so that thou 
wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other 
gods, and serve them; I denounce unto you this day, that ye 
shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days 
upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to 
possess it. I call heaven and earth to record this day against 
you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and 
coursing, therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed 
may live."14 
These verses clearly show that mankind has free choice to do good 
or evil deeds. Those who obey the commandments of God they will live 
and flourish and God will bless them. But those who do not obey the 
commandments of God, Lord God will punish them. 
Maimonides further quotes the verse: 
"Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse; A 
blessing, if ye obey the commandments of the Lord your God, 
which I command you this day: and a curse, if ye will not 
obey the commandments of the Lord your God, but turn aside 
out of the way which I command you this day, to go after 
other gods, which ye have not known."15 
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"For who is there of all flesh, that hath heard the voice of the 
living God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we have, 
and lived? Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God 
shall say: and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God 
shall speak unto thee; and we will hear it, and do it".16 
In these verses God said to Moses, it is my wish the mankind 
always obeys me, so that everything be good for them. But there is no 
guarantee that they will always obey Me and do only good things. It is 
implied in these verses that God has given humanity free will. If God has 
pre-ordained everything who shall be righteous and who shall be wicked, 
who shall obey and who shall disobey, then why did God tell Moses that 
there is no guarantee that man will continue to obey? Moreover, God may 
simply have ordered Israel to obey Him. Instead, God says that there is no 
guarantee they he will obey. 
3. Spinoza on Will and Desire 
In the first part of his Ethics, Spinoza deals with his own peculiar 
notion of God and in the second part he deals with man. He concludes both 
parts with the denial of divine will as well as human freedom of will. In the 
second part, in the proposition number 48 Spinoza speaks of the non-
possibility of human freedom: 
"In the mind there is no absolute or free will, but the mind is 
determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is also 
determined by another cause, and this again by another, and 
soon ad infinitum."' 
Mind has a certain determinate mode of thought. It cannot be said that 
mind is free cause of its own action or, in other words, it has faculty of 
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willing or not willing. It is determined by another cause and again by 
another and so on. 
But before the discussion of denial of divine will and the denial of 
human freedom of will we should understand first what is meant by `will'. 
Spinoza here follows the discussion of same problem by Aristotle. 
According to Aristotle, nature of will is determined on the one side by its 
relation to sensation and thought and on the other side it is related to 
desire. Neither sensation nor thought denies or affirms anything. Sensation 
merely asserts that there is an object and thought asserts that there is an 
image of object. Sensation is simple assertion or simple apprehension by 
thought. 
"Sensation, then," says Aristotle, "is analogous to simple 
assertion or to simple apprehension by thought," and "to the 
thinking soul images serve as present sensation." "The 
speculative intellect" he says again, "thinks nothing that is 
practical and makes no assertion about what is to be avoided 
or pursued".18 
Moreover, Aristotle says that simple assertion of the senses and the 
intellect is converted into affirmation and negation only through desires. 
Sensation or imagination determines whether a thing is pleasant or painful. 
The practical intellect determines goodness or badness of thing and the 
speculative intellect determines whether a things is true or false. He 
maintains the distinction between will and concupiscence. He holds that 
the rational part of the soul that is practical or speculative intellect and that 
determined whether a thing is good or true is called `will'. The irrational 
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part of the soul that is sensation and imagination and that determines 
whether a thing is pleasant or painful is called concupiscence. The 
irrational desire is contrasted with will which is rational desire. 
The reflection of this view of Aristotle is found in Spinoza's 
philosophy. Spinoza's utterances on will may be summarized into 
following three main assertions. 
t- There is a difference between will and desire. 
2- Will is only a universal concept and not a real entity. 
3- Will is identical with intellect. 
About the difference between will and desire, Spinoza says 
'"'The power to affirm and deny is called will," whereas 
"desire we have said, is the inclination which the soul 
has towards something which it chooses as a good"".19 
The will according to Spinoza is an affirmation or decision. The will is 
merely the activity of understanding. Through understanding we affirm or 
deny whether a thing is good or bad. While desire is inclination towards 
good or evil. 
Spinoza maintains the distinction between will (voluntas) and desire 
(cupiditas). He mentioned that affirmation or rejection of desire is related 
with what Aristotle would call the affirmation and rejection by the practical 
intellect. While affirmation and rejection or denial of the will are related 
with truth and falsehood or what Aristotle would call affirmation or 
negation by speculative intellect. 
Thus in lind part of Ethics proposition number 48, Spinoza says: 
"by the will I understand a faculty of affirming or denying, 
but not a desire; a faculty, I say, "by which the mind affirms 
or denies that which is true or false, and not a desire by which 
the mind seeks a thing or turn away from it X20  
When the affirmation or negation is related directly to the mind, Spinoza 
calls it will and when it is related at the same time with mind and body 
both, he calls it appetite. 
"This effort, when it is related to the mind alone is called will, 
but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and 
body, is called appetite...."Z1  
The will, according to Spinoza, is only a universal concept and not a real 
entity. He says that the will does not exist in the nature as other things. 
"In the mind there exists no absolute faculty of 
understanding, desiring, loving. These and the like faculties, 
therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are nothing 
but metaphysical or universal entities, which we are in the 
habit of forming from individual cases" 22 
In his third proposition, Spinoza maintains that will and intellect are 
not two different faculties in man. Descartes had held that understanding 
and will are necessarily and really distinct substances but Spinoza argues 
that it must be a third substance. He said it is seems impossible to make a 
clear conception about them. Will and intellect are not distinct but 
identical. "The will and intellect are one and the same" 23 
But although Spinoza denies free will in man, he says man would 
still be free if he is guided by reason alone. "A free man, that is to say, a 
man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone...."?" 
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Spinoza holds that a desire which arises from reason always follows 
good directly and avoids evil indirectly. But what is good and evil 
according to Spinoza? Spinoza says that knowledge of good and evil is 
nothing but merely an affect of joy and sorrow. 
"Knowledge of good or evil is nothing but an affect of joy or 
sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it "20 
Thus according to Spinoza evil is only an affect of sorrow or an inadequate 
knowledge. While good is adequate knowledge which is certainly useful to 
us. ` By good, I understand that which we certainly know is useful to us."26 
Spinoza holds that with the help of reason man follows the great good and 
avoids the evil, 
"according to the guidance of reason, we shall seek or follow 
the greater good only and the lesser evil."Z' 
If man was born free which means he had been following reason with his 
birth, then there would be no conception of good and evil. "If men were 
born free, they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they 
were free."28  
4. Free-Will in Christianity 
An intensive discussion on free-will in Christianity started with 
Augustine who held the view that man was created with free-will but after 
committing the original sin, he became bound by the effects of that sin. 
Now he cannot remove the consequences of his act just by being good. He 
needs the grace of God and faith in Christ to atone for his sin and for being 
good. 
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It was obvious that for Augustine human beings did not enjoy real 
freedom. Adam committed sin and due to this sin of first man all human 
beings lost their freedom. Man is thus essentially free, but existentially 
bound. 
St. Thomas Acquinas who came much later, famously developed his 
views by combining the traditional Christian theories with the views of 
Aristotle. For Aquinas action of human beings and animals is not only 
mechanical action. Their actions are for the satisfaction of their desires. 
Therefore, if our will is to get a particular aim, our desire will also be to get 
that aim. In this process of obtaining our aim, we are able to satisfy our 
desire. 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) holds that man's action and 
animal's voluntary actions are entirely different from the actions of non-
living things. Animal also has voluntary moving power though it does not 
have freedom of choice. For example, when the sheep sees the wolf, it 
takes immediate decision to run away. Fear is the cause behind sheep's 
decision. But this power is put in it by God himself. 
`Brutes', Aquinas says, `do not judge of their own judgments 
but follow the judgment imprinted upon them by God;' he 
holds that since they do not cause their choice, they do not 
have freedom of choice'.29 
In same situations, however, men and animals react in different 
manner. A frightened animal runs away in the face of a danger to its life, 
but not man. This is so because man has also the capacity for rational 
judgement. He exercises his liberty on the basis of this judgement. 
"The whole nature of liberty, Aquinas says, depends upon the 
mode of knowledge".30 
Aquinas considers human will as "rational appetite." "The intellect is the 
final cause of the will's action, ,31 says he. He also thought that evil will is 
irrational. No one wants to chooses what is evil. If some one chooses evil, 
it is only because of an error of judgement. Here Aquinas is entirely 
different from Plato and Augustine. Plato's conception of moral knowledge 
is very different from Aquinas' intellectualist conception. Plato holds that 
merely to know about goodness is not enough. He said that knowledge of 
goodness does not belong to the intellect but will. "For Plato to know 
goodness is to love it; thus knowledge in question belongs to the will, not 
to the intellect, Evil for him is thus failure of love, not of intellect."32 "One 
cannot know evil if one does not love the good."33  
Aquinas also held the view that we have moral desire and we try to 
seek it. We can be evil only because we understand evil will is desirable. 
Thus, according to Aquinas, man cannot choose evil knowingly he holds 
that for human being virtue and vices are voluntary, because it is in man's 
hand whether he acquires it or keeps away from it. 
5. Martin Luther & John Calvin on Free-Will 
Luther Martin (1483-46) and John Calvin (1509-1564), were the 
reformers of sixteenth century. Both denied the human freedom of will. 
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They pay great attention and give importance to God's grace. They 
borrowed their views from the Scripture and particularly from St. Paul's 
text. Paul emphasized the importance and efficacy of grace, the all-ruling 
providence of God, God's decrees of election or predestination and the 
feebleness of man. They did not accept man's will as master of his acts. 
They hold that human will is rigidly predetermined in all its choices 
throughout life. Further, they maintained that man is predestined before his 
birth. According to them, man has no real power over his own fate. As 
against Erasmus, Luther frankly stated that free will is fiction, a name 
which covers no reality. He says that it is not in man's power to think well 
or ill. Hence all events occur by necessity. Luther in is book "De Servo 
Arbitro", emphasizes man's helplessness and slavery. The predestination 
of all man's future action by God is so interpreted as to shutout any 
possibility of freedom. He says that an inflexible internal necessity turns 
man's will withersoever God preordains. 
Like Luther, Calvin also holds that God's preordination is even 
more fatal to free will. He says that man cannot perform any kind of good 
action until it is necessitated by God's grace. To resists is impossible for 
man. Further he says that it is absured to speak of the human will 'co-
operating' with God's grace. He says that this would imply that man could 
resist God's grace. 
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6. William of Ockham on Free-Will 
William of Ockham was a scholastic doctor of the thirteenth 
century. His time was (c. 1285-1349). He pays little attention to formulate 
a rational psychology or theory of the human soul. He holds that if matter 
has its own corporeal form like extended substance then soul would be 
distinct from this matter. The intellectual soul will reside in the body as a 
pilot in his boat. But the knowledge of ourselves as mind is the intuitive 
cognition of our own acts of thinking and willing. This type of knowledge 
cannot be apprehended directly as substance or form. Nor it can be 
apprehended with the distinction of active and passive intellects. As we are 
aware about our soul as a thing which wills and thinks, a person who 
thinks is not different from the person who wills. The terms "intellect" and 
"will" refer to same subject, not two distinct subjects. He says that if we 
know about our soul by intuitive cognition then we are aware of ourselves 
as intelligent being. It is only in this way that we are aware of ourselves as 
voluntary agent free to choose between opposite actions. For Ockham 
freedom is 
"that power whereby I can do diverse things indifferently 
and contingently, such that I can cause, or not cause, the 
same effect, when all conditions other than this power are 
the same".34 
Ockham says that this kind of freedom can be evidently known by 
experience. He holds that, 
"because a man experiences the fact that however much 
his reason dictates some action, his will can will, or not 
will, this act" 3s 
According to Ockham freedom of the will is the basis of human 
dignity, of moral goodness and responsibility and of power of thinking. 
Will and morality are mutually involved into each other. He says will itself 
is the seat of morality, 
"because every act other than the act of will, which is in 
the power of the will, is only good in such manner that it 
can be bad act, because it can be done for an evil end and 
from an evil intention".36 
According to Ockham, every action other than the act of willing 
itself, can be performed by reason of natural causes and freely. Further, he 
says that such kind of action either good or bad could be caused in us by 
God alone instead of by our will. As a result, the action is neither virtuous 
nor vicious except by determination from the act of the will. Hence 
Ockham accepts the total freedom of will and integrity of the human will. 
But Ockham has to face a lot of problem with regard to this acceptance of 
the total freedom and the divine foreknowledge of future contingent events 
in which the decisions of the human will must be counted. About the 
divine foreknowledge, Acquinas says that God sees every decisions of the 
each soul. Ockham does not accept this: he says that God's intellect is 
from different from His will and His omnipotent causality of all things. So 
according to Ockham, 
"either the determination or production of created will 
follows the determination [of the divine will], or it does 
not. If it does, then the created will acts just as naturally as 
any natural cause ... and thus, the divine will being 
determined, the created will acts accordingly, and 
consequently not act of the created will is to be imputed to 
it"" 
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Ockham says that it is an insoluble problem i.e. how God knows all 
future contingent events. Certainly, both the freedom of human will and 
the power of God to know all contingent events of created being are true. 
Moreover, Ockham will regard the Aristotelian concepts of natural good 
and virtuous choices in accordance with right reason, even as he was 
concerned with the theological norms of moral goodness which is 
expressed as God's commandment. It should be remembered that man is 
obligated to follow the commandments freely and not be coerced for it. 
"Thus, what God wills man to do of man's free will 
defines the right, and disobedience to God's will defines 
sin".38 
Ockham says that this thinking solves the old problem of evil or 
God as cause of the sinful acts of the man. He says that moral evil is the 
doing of the opposite of what one is obligated to do, but God is not 
obligated for any act. Acording to Ockham for God it is impossible to sin. 
Ockham raises an interesting paradox with regard to God's command for 
man to hate him. 
"To obey God is to love God, and to love God is to do his 
will; but if it is God's will that I do not do his will, I do his 
will if I don't and don't do it if I do".39 
Thus, according to Ockham, this type of command is impossible for 
a creature to fulfill. 
7. John Duns Scotus on Freel Will 
The time of Scotus was (c. 1265/1266-1306). He represents one of 
two main trends in scholasticism, the other being Thomism. He played 
great role in shaping of Christian thought. 
Scotus makes distinction between nature and will. He holds that 
there are two sources through which events or actions occur i.e. will and 
nature. Scotus, like other Christian thinkers, holds that God created this 
world without any necessity. Everything other than God himself is 
contingent and depends on His will. At first He created nature. As far as 
He preserves the nature in the being in the present system, some of the 
events become hypothetically necessary, for example the sun rising every 
morning. But the human choices are different from the supposition. There 
are the contingent. For the human freedom Scotus maintains that we are 
able to say either yes or no. He rejects the theory of determinism saying 
that choices are not determined by the chain of causes. He holds that 
human choices are an absolute beginning of whatever chain of effects 
follow from it. Moreover, he gives the concept "power for opposites". He 
holds that there are two powers: one is manifest and other is not. He says 
that we have to will to call heads for this throw and tails for the next throw. 
But there is also not so manifest power for opposites. For example what in 
one instance I call heads, I could call tails in the next moment. 
Further he says that opposite does not mean one has a power to 
perform two kinds of action at the same time. He says, if we says that 
Socrates is sitting but can stand up it obviously does not mean that he can 
stand up precisely while he is sitting. It means only that although he is at 
this time actually sitting, he is quite capable of standing up at any moment. 
Both powers, power to sit and the power to stand up are compossible 
powers. But the acts of these opposite powers are not compossible. 
Moreover, the act of one power is compossible with the act of opposite 
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power. We do not use power until or unless we exercise it. We can not 
stand while we are sitting. But we do have opposite choices. So, Scotus 
says that human free will is a power for opposites. Man is not free only to 
call successively head and tails but he has a power to call at one time heads 
and other time tails. He has no power to call both at the same time. We 
have simultaneously two opposites powers and can act according to of 
them at one time. 
Now, the question before Scotus was whether will is moved by 
choice or some other causes. According to Scotus, will will determines 
itself. Moreover, Scotus makes a distinction between nature and will. 
According to him will has a free choice between opposites but nature has 
not. Natural power acts in only determined way. Scotus refers to intellect 
as a natural power. But Aristotle called intellect as being against nature. He 
held that intellect and will together are on the opposite side of the division 
to nature. But Scotus explain Aristotle's thinking in his own ways saying 
that Aristotle means practical intellect, which involves will. It is on 
account of the freedom that practical intellect can be held against nature. 
For example a medical doctor can use his knowledge either to cure or kill. 
It is only because he can choose to use it one way or the other. 
8. Problem of Free Will in Islam 
Islam adopts intermediate position between two theories of 
determinism and voluntarism. On the one hand, Islam confirms God's 
ultimate powers. On the other hand, it accepts the partial liberty and 
responsibility of the man. Some verses of the Qur'an show man is 
46 
responsible for his action without offence to divine power. While some 
other verses confirm the absolutism of divine will. Some of the verses of 
latter type are as follows : 
"It is He who gives life and Death; and He has power 
over all things" .4°  
"And whom God shall please to guide, that man's 
breast will He open to Islam; but whom He shall please 
to make go astray, strait and narrow will He make his 
breast".41  
"Allah hath set a seal on their hearts and on their 
hearing".42 
"Allah is well acquainted with (all) that ye do".43  
Similarly, we find some verses in the Qur'an which show the 
freedom of choice and freedom of action and also show man's 
responsibility for his action. 
"Whosoever acts virtuously does so for himself, and 
whosoever acts viciously does so for himself'." 
"Whosoever gets to himself a sin, gets solely on his 
responsibilities".' 5 
"And when they (sinful) commit a deed of shame, they 
say: we have found that our father did so, and God 
obliges us to do it': say thou: surely, God requireth not 
shameful doing".46 
"Verily, God changes not what concerns my people, 
untill they change what depends on themselves".4 
 whoever follows the right path does so for his own 
good, and whoever goes astray, bears on himself the 
responsibility (of going astray)" ."8 
"And He is Allah in the heavens and in earth. He 
knoweth what ye hide, and what ye reveal, and He 
knoweth the (recompense) which ye earn (by your 
deeds)".49 
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Read together, the above verses suggest that God is the supreme 
sovereign, but human beings also have some power in shaping their 
destiny. Man has freedom of choice between good and evil, right and 
wrong. He is the maker of his fortune within the limited sphere. Therefore 
Islam accepts a middle position between two extremes viz, compulsion and 
absolute freedom. 
Due to this controversial problem, different schools of thought 
emerged in Muslim community. A great number of peoples including 
Arabs favoured fatalism. Ommayyads were also believers in determinism. 
They maintained that man is entirely helpless before God's will. So he is 
not responsible for his action. But others opposed this view and stubbornly 
defended man's freedoms of choice. On the basis of above mentioned 
thinking, two schools of thought came into existence. One was the school 
of `Jabr' (predestinarianism) and the other, 'Qadr' (libertarianism). Jabr 
school of thought was founded by Jahm b. Safwan. He said that man has 
no freedom of will. Man has no liberty, no choice of action. He is entirely 
helpless and does work as machine. So man is not responsible for his 
action. 
As against the Jabriah school of thought, the "Qadr" school of 
thought came into existence. The founder of this school was Ma'bad al-
Juhaini. As an exponent of this school, he taught that man has liberty and 
has freedom of choice. 
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Jabriyah : Jabr school of thought was very famous during the period of 
Umayyad dynasty. Common Muslims believe that God is the maker of 
destiny. He writes the destiny of a child even before its birth in the womb 
of mother or, perhaps, even earlier, in the Heaven itself. A number of 
verses support this common man's view. The Jabrites are divided into two 
groups, one of hardliners and the other of moderates. 
(i) the pure Jabriya do not ascribe any freedom at all to 
man, not even the power to act; 
(ii) the moderate Jabriya admit that man has power, but 
maintain that it is a power which is no way effective.46  
The hard liners deny any kind of power of man in choosing the 
action or its performance. They hold that all power rests in God. Man is 
only a tool in His hand. They maintain that Qudrah is one of His attribute 
and cannot be exercised by man. 
The moderate group of Jabriah maintained that man has power of 
choice but it is not effective. Again this means denial of man's freedom of 
choice. The distinction later became almost meaningless. There are three 
groups generally recognized among the Jabriya namely, (i) The Jahmiyah, 
(ii) the Najjariyah, (iii) the Dirariyah 
The Jahmiya: The peoples of this group are called hardliners. They are 
followers of Jahm b. Safwan. He does not accept the view that an attribute 
of God is also applicable in man because the view lies the sameness 
between God and creature. Jahm maintained that God is powerful agent 
and a creator, and no one can possesses the attributes of power, action and 
creation as possessed by God. On the question of creating power in man, 
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he becomes too rigid and says that human being does not have power over 
anything. Further he says that he does not have any capacity to action. Man 
is absolutely determined in his deeds. He has neither power, nor will, nor 
choices' 
The power of man to act was described by him in the likeness of 
tree bearing fruit. When the water rained, the grain and vegetables grew as 
a result. The reward and punishment came to man in the like manner. 
There is no room for freedom of choice in man. He is merely a tool in 
God's hand. 
Najjariya : The other group called Najjariya was known as a moderate 
group. It was founded by Hussain b. Muhammad al Najjar. It is further 
divided into various groups such as Barghuthiya, Za'faraniya and 
Mustadrika. Although Najjariya falls into various groups, yet they do not 
differ on the basic principles. They maintain that no one knows God's will. 
He knows his will only Himself. Like Jahm they maintain that God is the 
creator of all deeds of man, but man has some power of choice between 
alternatives as said by Ash'ari. 
"God is the creator of all man's deeds, good and bad, right 
and wrong: man on his part acquires these deeds. He 
further maintains that the created power has a certain 
effect on these deeds; this he calls acquisition, kasb, as 
Ash'ari does"." 
Dirariya : They are followers of Dirar b. 'Amr. They deny the positive 
nature of attributes. They hold that God is powerful means He is not 
ignorant and impotent. But man's actions are finally created by God. 
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"Man's deeds are in reality created by God and man in reality acquires 
them". 
But while Jabrites maintain that God is the originator of man's deed 
the Qadr school of thought represents the other side of the argument. The 
exponent of Qadr school is Ma'bad al-Juhaini. Juhaini accepts the power 
of choice of man. Man is responsible for all deeds that he commits either 
good or bad. Man is the maker of his destiny. His reason is the best guide 
for choosing between two alternatives. Further, both acquisition and 
completion are in man's hand. The followers of Juhaini were called people 
of divine justice and unity. They are therefore also known as 'Adliya. 
The problem of Jabr and Qadr is directly related to the problem of 
good and evil. The question arises, who is responsible for the creation of 
good and evil. The answer lies in three possibilities; firstly, God is 
responsible for the creation of good and evil. Secondly, good things are 
created by God and evil by man. Because He is all good. Thirdly, God 
created only things and they became good and bad in given circumstances. 
But these answers are hardly fully satisfactory. 
Quite often, the evil acts of man are made to be inspired by the 
Satan. For in Quran, the story is told that Adam and Eve sinned under the 
influence of Satanic seductions. But wasn't the Satan also a creation of 
God and his power to seduce man was also given to him by God himself. 
There are many things the satan himself can say in his defense. Like, 
firstly, if "God knew before he created me what I would do and how I 
would act, why did he create me? And what is his wisdom in creating me? 
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Secondly, if He created me in accordance with his will and pleasure, why 
did he command me to know and obey him? Moreover, since He does not 
derive any benefit from obedience, nor is he harmed by disobedience, what 
is the wisdom in this command? Thirdly, when He created me and 
commanded me to acknowledge and obey him, I adhered to this command 
and acknowledged and obeyed him. Why, then, did he command me to 
obey Adam and make obeisance to him? What is the wisdom in this 
particular command, since it does not add to my knowledge of him, nor 
increase my obedience to him? Fourthly, when he created me and not only 
commanded me in general, but gave me also this particular command, 
then, when I did not make obeisance to Adam, why did he curse me and 
cast me out of paradise? What is the wisdom in this? I committed no other 
evil than saying, `I shall make obeisance only to you'. 
Fifthly, when he created me and gave me both a general and 
particular command, and I did not obey him, he cursed me and drove me 
away. Why, then, did he give me access to Adam, so that I entered 
paradise a second time and deceive him by my evil suggestion? Adam 
consequently ate of the forbidden tree, and God expelled him from 
paradise with me. What is the wisdom in this? Had he prevented me from 
entering paradise, Adam would have eluded me and would have been there 
forever. Sixthly, after God had created me and given me both a general and 
particular command, after he had cursed me and given me re-entrance to 
paradise, where a dispute took place between me and Adam, why did he 
give me power over his descendants in such a way that I could see them 
but they could not see me? Why were my evil suggestions able to 
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influence them, but they had no power or influence of any kind over me? 
What is the wisdom in this? If God had created them and given them their 
nature with no one seeking to make them deviate from it, they would have 
lived pure, attentive and submissive life. This would have been more 
fitting for them and more in harmony with wisdom. 
Seventhly, I admit all this, namely, that God created me, that he 
gave me both a general and a particular command, and that when I did not 
obey him he cursed me and expelled me from paradise; also, that when I 
wanted to re-enter paradise he allowed me to do so and gave me access to 
it; that when I did the thing I did he cast me out but gave me power over 
mankind. Why, then, after that, when I asked him to give me respite, did 
he give me respite? I said to God, 'My Lord, respite me till the day they 
shall be raised; He said, `thou art among the ones that are respited unto the 
day of a known time'. 
What is the wisdom in this? If he had destroyed me at the time, 
Adam and the whole of mankind would have been beyond my power, and 
there would have been no evil in the world. Is not the enduring of the 
world in right order better than the world mixed with evil".53  
From these questions of Satan the problem of free-will becomes still 
more complicated. Jabr and Qadr schools of thought try to give some 
satisfactory answers. It was easier to give answers of those questions for 
Jabr school of thought. Because their discussion favours pre-
destinarianism which makes reward and punishment redundant. The 
answer of Qadr school of thought was, on the other hand, based on 
philosophical foundation. Early Qadriyah maintained that God is the 
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creator of all good things. Because by nature He is good. The creator of 
evil is either devil or man himself. This answer involves some difficulty. 
By this answer the possibility arises for other creator. It is supposed that 
evil has been created even without God's will. But later Qadriyah 
reformulated their doctrine. They said that man is the creator of his good 
and bad deeds. There is no other creator. They maintained that man's 
power is not identical with the power of God but a subordinate one. They 
said that man has power of creation of his deeds. But Ash'ari does not 
support this view and holds that God alone is the creator of fall things even 
action, too. 
There were various sub-sects of the Mu'tazilites as given below. 
(i) The Wasilia, (ii) The Hudhailiya, (iii) The Nazzamiya, (iv) The 
Khabitiya and Hadathiya, (v) The Bishriya, (vi) The Mu'ammariya, (vii) 
The Murdariya, (viii) The Thumamiya, (ix) Hashamiya, (x) The Jahiziya. 
Of these the first three are important. Their views are as follows 
1. Wasiliya : Wasil b. 'Ata' expounded at length the doctrine of Qadr. He 
held that God is wise and just and evil and injustice can not be attributed to 
Him. He maintains that man himself is the author of good and evil, belief 
and unbelief, obedience and disobedience. It is God who gives reward and 
punishment according to man's deeds. 
2. The Hudhailiya : Abu'! Hudhail Harridan b. al-Hudhail al-`Altaf was 
the follower of Mu'tazila. His views on qadr are similar to other Qadrites. 
But he differs from other Qadrites on the fact that he is a Qadrite in regard 
to this life but is Jabrite with regard to the next life. He holds that man 
does action either good and bad in this world according to his will and gets 
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everlasting abode of heaven or hell. But he has no power over his action in 
the next life. 
3. Nazzamiya : Ibrahim b. Sayyar b. Hari al-Nazzam is the followers of 
Mu'tazila. But on certain points he thought in different manner compared 
to general Mu'tazila position. Other Mu'tazilites maintain that good and 
bad belong to man. These cannot be ascribed to God. 
"In this he opposes his fellow Mu'tazites who maintained 
that God, indeed, has power over, them, but he is not their 
author because they are evil. Nazzam considers that as 
`evil' is an essential quality of the evil, and, therefore, the 
doing of it cannot be ascribed to God, the mere possibility 
of God's doing evil is also evil and is, therefore, not 
attributable to God, for we cannot attribute the power to do 
evil to the One who is just".54 
Ash'arism : Ash'arite school of thought is regarded as reactionary 
movement against Mu'tazilism. It developed during fourth/tenth and fifth/ 
eleventh centuries. The Ash'arites are the followers of Abu'l Hasan Ali b. 
Ismail al-Ash'ari, a desendent of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari. In his early youth 
he was influenced by Mu'tazila school of thought. He supported 
Mu'tazilite doctrine till the age of forty. But suddenly his mind changed. 
With regard to the problem of free will or on the ability of man to 
choose action, Al-Ash'ari took up an intermediate position between 
libertarianism and determinism as upheld by Mu'tazilites and Jabrites 
respectively. Jabrites maintain pure fatalistic view and hold that man has 
no power over his action. God has absolute power over every thing 
including man's will and his actions. On the other hand, Mu'tazilites and 
Qadrites maintained that man has power to create action and has complete 
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freedom of choice though this power is created bytiod- in'man. Ash'ari 
took a middle position. He makes distinction between creation (khalq) and 
acquisition (kasb) of an action, He says that God is the originator of man's 
action (Khaliq) and man is the acquirer of that action (Muktasib). 
"Actions of human beings are created (makhluq) by God, 
the creatures are not capable of creating any action. There 
is no creator except God and the actions of man are, 
therefore, His creation".55  
According to him the power (qudrah) is of two kinds: one is 
original (qadimah) and the other is derived (hadithah). The original power 
is effective but derived power cannot create anything. Man's power is 
derived power. While God's power is original. The true meaning of 
acquisition according to Ash'ari is that "the occurrence of a thing or event 
is due to derived power, and it is an acquisition for the person by whose 
derived power it takes place" .56 
Hence God is the creator of man's action and man only an acquirer. 
He does not create anything. God alone creates power in human being. He 
creates in human being the ability to perform action and creates the power 
in him to choose between two alternatives of right and wrong. Man is free 
only in making the choice. On the basis of this power of acquisition he gets 
reward and punishment in the next world, according to merit and demerit 
of the action. So in this sense, he avoids the position of determinism. 
Ash'arites introduced the conception of acquisition and maintained 
that man's limited freedom wit] bestows responsibility upon him. Man's 
freedom of will upheld by Mu'tazilites is not recognized by them. Man has 
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some derived power by which he acquires the action and has some share in 
the production of action. About voluntary action they say that there are two 
causes. An action is the effect of its real cause that is God and the choice 
of man lies only in being an agent of realizing the effect. 
"God creates, in man, the power, ability, choice, and will 
to perform an act, and man, endowed with this derived 
power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends 
or wills to do the action, and, corresponding to this 
intention, God creates and completes the action".57 
From this it is clear that according to Ash'ari man is not originator 
of his action but his intention takes part in performing action. So merit and 
demerit of the action are based upon man's intention. This position was 
stated by Ash'ari in his Maqalat in the form of the question raised by 
Mu'tazilites "whether God has power over that over which He has 
endowed men with power?" There are, however, two different versions of 
this question at two different places in his work. 
In one place he says all the Mutazilites upheld this view while at 
another place this view is ascribed to Ibrahim al Nazzam, Abu al-Hudhayl 
and all other Mutazilites and Qadrites except al-Shahhan. Ash'ari 
describes this view in the latter place as consisting of two parts. Firstly, it 
can be said that 
"God is not to be described as having power over a thing 
over which He has endowed men with power, and it is 
impossible that one thing should be the object of power 
of two possessors of power".58 
This means man has freewill which is given by God, and he 
exercises this will and God has no power over man's free will because two 
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possessors cannot be there of one object. Secondly, it may mean "God is 
not to be described as having power in any respect whatsoever over that 
over which He has endowed men with power".59 
As opposed to this, Ash'ari mentions the Shahham's view. 
"God has power over that over which He has endowed 
(akdara) men with power and that one movement, as an 
object of power, is the object of power of two possessors 
of power, namely, God and man, so that, if [God] the 
eternal does it (fa'alaha), it is by necessity (idtiraran) 
and if [man] the created does it (fa'alaha), it is by 
acquisition (iktisaban)' .6o 
So Shahham's view is quit different from the rest of Mutazilites and 
Qadrites. He believed that God has power over man's action. The power to 
act has two possessors i.e., God and man. Shahham says that one thing that 
should be remembered is that the power with which God has endowed man 
is only the power to act, it does not mean power to will to act, For even 
though both power to will to act and the power to act are given by God to 
man, God may deprive man of the power to act without necessarily 
depriving the power to will to act. Or, God may allow man to retain both 
these two powers. If God withdraws the power to act from man, then the 
action performed by man will not be out of his own free will. Further, if 
God does not withdraw man's power to act, then man would perform every 
act with that power which is given by God, which God has not withdrawn 
from him. Shaliltam calls this as acquisition. 
"if [God] the eternal does it, it is by necessity". But if 
God has not deprived man of the power to act, then 
every act is performed by man in virtue of that power to 
act which he has acquired by his having been endowed 
with it by God and of which God has not deprived him, 
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so that, again, as Shahhan puts it "if [man] the created 
does it, it is by acquisition' .b' 
So he used the term acquisition in the sense of man's free action. 
Before Shahham, early libertarians described the term in the sense that 
man does act with his own free will. They said that man's acts are free 
because of the power to act which is given by God. This view, as already 
seen, was held by pre-Mu'tazilites, Qadariyyah and their Mu'tazilites 
followers. Baghdadi ascribes to them the view that, "God is not the creator 
of the acquisitions (aksab) of men" and that "it is men who determine their 
acquisitions (aksab)".62 
The description of term `acquisition' as free action of man is based 
upon those Qur'anic verses which start by saying "whosoever does 
(ya'mal) evils63 and then go on to say "whosoever acquires (yaksib) a 
sin"64, or "whosoever acquires (yaksib) a fault or sin".65 Some other verses 
with the same idea are as follows : 
"Ye shall be recompensed only for what ye have been 
doing (Kuntum ta'maluna)"6' 
"Every man is held pledge [that is, responsible] for 
what he has acquired (kasaba)".67 
These verses show man's free action is acquired by him. 
Baghdadians believed in acquisition and they also believed that 
man's power to act, too, is given by God. God does not create man's action 
such as belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience. Acquisition is not 
created by God but man. This thing shows that Baghdadian Mu'tazilites 
use the term acquisition, but they did not follow Dirar. Dirar held that man 
is acquirer of his action but God is the creator of his action. They also did 
59 
not follow the Shahham's view. Shahham maintained that God may 
deprive man of his power to action which is given by Him. He creates the 
action for man. Like Nazzam and Abu al-Hudhayl they believed that all 
human actions are freely performed by man in virtue of power that is given 
by God. 
The Qadriyyah and Wasil also believed in acquisition in this sense. 
Ash'ari's conception of acquisition is fully in agreement with that of 
Najjar. According to him, 
"the acquirer acquires a thing because it takes place in 
virtue of his created power over it", it is God who 
simultaneously with the creation of the thing creates in 
man the power to acquire as well as the act of 
acquiring".68 
Ibn Rushd explains Ash'ari's views on acquisition in his book 
Tahafut a! Tahafut saying that man has acquisition (kasb) but both the 
acquired thing (al Muktasab) and acquisition are created by God. At 
another place he says that man has no acquisition (iktsab) and no action 
that means both act of acquiring and object acquired are created by God. 
Juwayni, an Ash'arite, started his discussion with the statement that 
all created things are created by the power of God. He does not distinguish 
between those with which human power is associated and the power in 
which God alone is associated. A created thing over which God alone has 
power is called by Juwayni "necessary movement". For example, the 
trembling hand. A created thing in which only man has power, is referred 
to by him as the movement which man has chosen and acquired. This is 
called "intentional movement". For example, movement of his hand. 
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Another proponent of the theory of acquisition is Kadi Bakillani, 
who was the follower of Ash'ari. Bakillani tries to show acquisition as a 
power in man. He distinguished in every man the generic subject of act 
and specific form of act. The specific form of effect may assume in any of 
its operation. He refers this operation as the mode (hal) of the act. For 
example, act of movement is said to be the generic subject of the act. But 
its actual operation of mode is sitting down or of standing up or of walking 
or of prostrating oneself in prayer. Further, he maintains that the moement 
itself is the generic subject of the act which is directly created by God but 
is acquired by the man. He insists that the essence of the act occurs by the 
power of God but its becoming obedience and disobedience is not power 
of God but power of man. Bakillani opened the door for human freedom of 
action. He explains man's free will with the help of motion of a wheel or a 
top. 
"The motion of the wheel or the top or the cylinder, he 
says, is undoubtedly caused by the man who propelled 
it, but particular form of rotation assumed by the motion 
is not caused by the man who propelled it but rather by 
the particular force (vita) and nature (natura) of the 
object moved"69  
Hence Bakillani holds that God directly creates movement in man 
but man by his own power determines what form of the motion should be. 
That means generic subject of the act is created by God but its mode of the 
operation is created by man. 
Al-Maturidi in his book Kirab al-Tm'h ' and Tawilat al-Qur'an 
discusses different aspects of this problem i.e. God's absolute power, 
creative act of God, existence of evil in the world, freedom of man, 
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religious obligation and responsibility and so on. Maturidi disagrees with 
the view of the Jabrites and the Mu'tazilites and also disagreed with al-
Ash'ari. Refuting the absolute determinism of the Jabrites, he says that the 
relation between God and man should not be considered to be the same as 
that between God and the physical world. He says free will is given by 
God with the reason. Through reason man can distinguishe between right 
and wrong. He also associates the free will with faculties of thinking, 
feeling, willing, and judging. God sent prophets and revealed books for 
man's guidance. Man's mind directs him towards those things which he 
feels are beneficial for him and restrains himself from what he thinks will 
be harmful for him. He chooses with the help of reason and thinks himself 
responsible for merit and demerit of his action. When man thinks, he has 
desires, power of choosing and power of inclination. He considers himself 
free and never thinks he is compelled by outside agency which compels 
him to do any thing. This consciousness of freedom is a reality. He says 
that the denial of freedom means that God is wholly responsible for all 
human actions and He is liable to blame or punishment for sin committed 
by men. In Qur'an, God is described as most wise. It is then quite absured 
to think that one who is most wise and just will give punishment for His 
own action. 
Hence, according to Maturidi, man's actions are created by God. 
But He is not liable for praise and blame. Because man performs action 
through the free exercise of his reason, 
"So nothing can happen in the world against or without 
the will of God. But, though God wills and creates 
human action, He is not liable to blame or accountable 
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for their actions, because divine will is determined by 
divine knowledge and He creates the action when a man 
in the free exercise of his reason chooses and intends to 
perform an action. Thus, God wills an action good or 
evil, which He knows a man will choose, and when 
ultimately he chooses and intends to acquire it God 
creates that act as a good or evil act for him".70 
The creation of evil act is not in contrast with His nature i.e. wise 
and justness. God creates evil because He wants man to use his free will or 
free choice. But in accordance to His nature He always prohibits man to 
chose evil. 
9. Rumi and Ibn `Arabi on Free-Will 
The controversies and disputes regarding the issue of free will was 
carried on by the latter generation of mystics and theologians. Among them 
the most prominent name is that of Rumi, the famous author of Mathnavi. 
`Man is the architect of his own fate', said he. He gave many arguments in 
favour of man's freedom. These arguments cover the whole field of that 
problem. He says that, at the time of creation, freedom of choice is given 
by God to man. Man's work is regarded valuable or invaluable because of 
this freedom of choice. If some work is done under compulsion, there is 
neither reward nor punishment for it. God bestowed His grace to man 
according to his effort. 
"Choice (free will) is the salt of devotion; otherwise (there 
would be no merit): this celestial sphere revolves 
involuntarily; (thence) its revolution has neither reward 
nor punishment, for free will is (accounted) a merit at the 
time of Reckoning"." 
Further he says that all worldly things can be divided into two types 
i.e. alterable and unalterable. As far as man is concerned he has both 
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unalterable as well as the alterable side. Rumi quotes an imaginary 
dialogue between the prophet and the infidels. The infidels say, "We are so 
constituted that no amount of preaching can alter us; the leopard cannot 
change his spots. The earth cannot become water and water cannot develop 
properties of honey".72 To this the prophet answers, "anything cannot be 
changed into any other thing but it is only man that is changeable and can 
be cured of his moral disease". 
Rumi says that predestination is true as a `law of God' but 
individual choice is not predestined. The truth and error are governed by 
the law. So if you choose the wrong path, this path would lead you into 
error. According to law thief shall be punished and the wine shall be the 
cause of intoxication and so on. 
But while this is so, man has still the power to chose from the 
alternative courses of action. Between man and nature, we fmd capacity to 
choose in the former and incapacity for the same in the latter. For example 
one has power to choose whether he will live in one place rather than the 
other. But he has no power whether he should work or fly. Everything in 
nature is regulated and controlled by forces that are outside of it. It is only 
man who carries his principles of life within himself. 
Rumi says that man struggles though that does not mean he is 
striking against fate. But to struggle is also the very destiny of man because 
"in this very struggle his hidden unrealised potentialities are actualised".73  
For Rumi freedom is not an end in itself. The end of freedom is self 
-determination. A man lives according to his higher goals. Hence the end 
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of all freedom is self-determination. Life starts with determinism at the 
lower plane, develops to the capacity of free choice in man in order to rise 
to higher determinism again, where man makes a free offer of his 
freedom .74 
Contrary to Rumi, Ibn Arabi, another great mystic philosopher of 
Islam, held the view that everything in this world is subject to rigid 
determinism. The exception is the man who is responsible for his action in 
the unique sense, i.e. that his actions springs directly from him and are 
determined by his own nature. These laws are unchangeable and 
immutable; even God cannot change them."What you are in your state of 
latency (thubut) is what you will be in your realized existence (zuhur)", is 
the fundamental law of existence".'S 
It is self-determination or, in other words, it is self-realisation. In 
this there is no room for freedom either for God or for His creature. God's 
part in this determinism is merely that He knows things in the latent stage 
and pre judges that they come into existence in the form in which He 
knows them. "So He decrees nothing which lies outside their nature. This 
is the mystery of predestination (sirr al gadar)".76  
Ibn Arabi maintained that man necessarily obeys the laws of his 
own nature. No one can disobey them. But the religious laws may be 
obeyed or disobeyed by the man. The first law is in accordance with God's 
creative will through which things come into existence. Obeying the 
creative commands is obeying to God's will. When Iblis refused the divine 
commands and deceived Adam, it was an act of disobedience from the 
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religious point of view. But, at the same time, he was obeying the creative 
command through which he carried out the God's will. Ibn 'Arabi's theory 
reduces obedience and disobedience in the religious sense to a mere 
formality. In this theory we find that man is responsible for his actions but 
inspite of this thing, he is not a fully free agent in performing action. For 
sure, the responsibility and complete absence of freedom cannot go 
together. We can say that there are different alternatives before man out of 
which man can choose best among them, but it is so merely theoretically. 
In actual fact, he chooses the only alternative which is predetermined by 
his own natural laws. "So he actually chooses nothing and has no more 
freedom than a stone falling down to the earth in obedience to its own 
law".77 
10. Indian Sufis's View on Free-Will 
Coming to Indian Sufis, one of the khalifahs of famous saint 
Moinuddin Chishti, named Shaikh Hamid-u'd-din wrote extensively on 
free will. He maintains that one individual is different from another in 
essence. We can explain the difference between individuals on the analogy 
of stone and earth. As stone consists of unpurified elements along with 
purified elements and earth consists of only non-purified elements 
similarly some men are created by purified elements, and some are created 
from purified and non-purified elements. The creation of all creatures in 
that order is in accordance with God's will. Nothing can happen without 
His will. The sovereignty of God permits only limited freedom for human 
being. In favour of this view he quotes the Qur'anic verses, "He cannot be 
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questioned for his acts, but they will be questioned".78 When it is said that 
men will be questioned for their actions that means some potentialities are 
given to men by God. The commandments and prohibitions of God in the 
Qur'an shows that man has freedom of will. If there was no absolute 
freedom of will for the individuals, then commandments and prohibitions 
become meaningless. Shaikh Hamid-u'd-din holds that human being is free 
only in his efforts. But his effort too, is ultimately connected with God's 
grace. He maintains that God's grace plays great role in Islam. 
"Islam undoubtedly supports that God helps the 
individuals in the form of grace (Tawfiq), guidance 
(Rusted), etc., at every step and without the help of God 
individuals can do nothing. But the help of God is only for 
those who help themselves" 79  
God's grace is eternal and man can obtain it through his efforts or 
according to his capacities and merits. 
Shaikh Nizam-u'd-din, another great name among the Chishtiya 
Sufis, follows neither Mu'tazilite school of thought nor the Ash'arite 
school of thought. He follows his own views which is based on Qu'ran. 
His view is very close to Rumi. He says that Mutazilites, by believing in 
absolute freedom of human being, imposed a limit on the supremacy of 
God. On the other hand, Ash'arites denied the absolute freedom of human 
being and stressed on sovereignty of God. Although they affirmed a kind 
of determined freedom, this kind of determined freedom was only a veil for 
pure determinism. In such kind of determined freedom there is no room 
for human personality or individuality. Shaikh Nizamu-u'd-din on the one 
side affirms the power of God, and on the other side he accepts the power 
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of man in shaping his destiny. He maintained that God granted 
potentialities for every soul according to its capacity. But these 
potentialities are limited in soul's nature. Man's effort, accordingly, is to 
realises his potentialities within their limitations. And until he realises his 
potentialities he is unable to receive the God's grace. He often said to his 
disciples that there are number of keyes through which man may unlock 
the grace of God. But since the exact key is not known by man he should 
try each key for gaining His grace. 
From above, it is clear that Shaikh Nizam-u'd-din advocated both 
sovereignty of God as well as the freedom of human will. God is sovereign 
as He provides the potentialities to mankind according to His own will and 
creates also the limitation in each potentiality. This means that by his own 
efforts man cannot acquire any new potentiality, and cannot cross the limit 
which is set by God. Man has power with some limitation. So his freedom 
is also limited. Man is free in his action because he realises his 
potentialities. God creates the power of realization in man. He creates the 
material for realising the potentialities of man, and prophet gave the right 
information of using it in harmony with the spirit of Qu'ran. 
Shaikh Nasir-u'd-din who is next in line, simply accepts the 
human responsibility. He says that human responsibility would be 
meaningless unless man has freedom of will, The Prophet says, "There is 
no alternative for a man but to reap the fruits of his own actions".80 In 
support of prophet's saying, he says that if man does good action he gets 
reward, if he commits sin he will be punished. Further he says that if a 
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saint attained his perfection, it will be result of his action. A saint acquires 
the perfection through his action. Perfection of the sainthood is a matter of 
acquisition. But the perfection of prophethood does not depend upon 
acquisition. It is rather a divine gift. For attaining perfection it is necessary 
to follow the shari'at. As there is no difference among the prophets on the 
basis of prophethood, they may differ only on the basis of grade. Similarly, 
all men are equal on the basis of their belief and faith, but they differ with 
each other in grade. The grade and position is gained through efforts. As 
Qur'an says: "And that man hath only that for which he maketh effort".' 
So the verse of Qur'an shows that man should make effort, and effort is 
possible only when man is free in his action. In this way, Shaikh Nasir-u'd-
din affirms the freedom of will in man. 
Shaikh Sharf-u'd-din was inspired by Shaikh Nizam-u'd-din 
Auliya. About man's freedom of will he said that some people assert that 
the destiny of man has been determined from the beginning. Whether one 
performs good or bad action, it is determined in the womb of mother, even 
prior to it. No change can take place later on. So man has no part in 
shaping his destiny. But Shaikh Sharf-u'd-din does not accept this 
erroneous view. He holds that human being should make efforts in the way 
of God. A man suffering from some disease will be cured only when he is 
given some medicine. A nutritious diet is necessary in order to attain good 
health. In the same way knowledge is necessary for getting salvation. 
Without knowledge salvation of man is not possible. 
Once some companions asked prophet, if we should have firm 
belief in fate, then we should refrain from the action. Prophet replied: "Do 
not withdraw yourselves from actions because if you have good fortune in 
store for you, your action will bring that fortune to you".82 Moreover, just 
as life of man depends upon taking or not taking food, in the same way, 
fortune and misfortune of human being depends upon obedience or 
disobedience of commandments of God. A man is mistaken if he thinks 
that there is no use of action for gaining good fortune, because good and 
bad fortune are predetermined. God has certainly imposed some limitation 
on the individual and no change can occur in it. But individual is also free 
within his limited area. Both good and bad qualities are given by God to 
man. It is man's effort how he develops his bad and good qualities. 
11. Mohammad Iqbal on Free-Will 
Sir Mohammad Iqbal has great position in the history of modem 
Muslim thought. He is regarded as best advocate of Muslim awakening in 
modem era. In Iqbal's philosophy man occupies the central position. He 
lays great emphasis on khudi (human ego). He says that true realisation of 
the human ego is in his moral and religious experience. The moral and 
religious experience leads not to self-negation but to self-affirmation. 
Through these experiences man gets his unique position in the world. 
"The moral and religious ideal of man is not self negation 
but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by 
becom-ng more and more individual, more and more 
unique.83 
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Creativity, tireless activity and the struggle against opposite situations or 
circumstances are considered by Igbal as vital modes of human life. These 
activities are proof of man's freedom. Freedom is the summum bonum of 
human experience according to him . He thought freedom as the source of 
all values such that life of ego is possible in freedom only. "In one word, 
life is an endeavour for freedom".84 
Iqbal's philosophical writings emphasise two modes of human 
existence namely, freedom and creativity. Man is free in his will to make 
or mar his life in this world. He creates new things and makes his life as he 
wants. 
"Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of 
free choice, and that is why, according to the Quranic 
narration, Adam's first transgression was forgiven" .85 
Man's religious and ethical ideas must be judged from the viewpoint of 
human freedom. The goodness is not subject to compulsion. Man performs 
action, either good or bad, when he is free. If man is not free then his 
actions will be same as machine's actions. 
"A being whose movements are wholly determined like a 
machine can not produce goodness. Freedom is thus a 
condition of goodness" . 6 
Iqbal said that man is known through his activity and creativity. A perfect 
man is one who has ability to perceiving, judging and acting freely. 
"Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the 
ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging, and willing".B7 
Iqbal maintains that man makes the world with his free creative 
skill. All worldly objects are in the service of man. Man works on worldly 
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things and through this work he realises his hidden potentialities. Freedom 
is not merely a value or mode of human existence, but it is the life of ego. 
Freewill is an active principle of life. Man has power of free choice, But it 
can be gained only through struggle. Moreover, man has to face a number 
of obstructions in his way and it is only by removing those obstructions 
that he attains freedom. 
"The ego attains to freedom by the removal of all 
obstructions in its way. It is partly free, partly determined, 
and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the individual 
who is most free-God"! 
Igbal's conception of freedom of will is based on Qur'anic teaching. He 
does not accept notion of fate which is prescribed by orthodox Muslim 
thinkers. 
Chapter- III 
ST. AUGUSTINE ON FREE WILL 
1. The Fall of Man and Free-Will 
In Christianity the issue of origin of the world is discussed in the 
context of the fall of first man. God is sovereign good who made man not 
like a stone or animal. He created man in His own image. Man, 
accordingly, shares the nature and character of God. Augustine holds that 
wise souls are made wise and a thing which comes from beauty is 
beautiful. That is man's primary resemblance with his creator. Now what 
is `image? The image is an expression of likeness. "An image must be 
resemblance between a thing produced and the thing which produces it". It 
is like when man's likeness is seen in minor and is called his true image. 
Now God is not only a sovereign creator. He is also believed to be 
good and rational and intelligent. Man's likeness to God, therefore, means 
his having all these qualities which, then, make him a creature 
distinguished from and superior to all other creatures. 
"God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for 
him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he 
might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were 
not so gifted".' 
God gave form to man out of the dust of earth. He, then, breathed in him 
his spirit. This breathing made man a being with soul. Now the question is, 
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are we made up both of body and soul? Is, in other words, the man both 
soul and mind or he is the body only or he is the soul only? Obviously, 
without both of these two things the man could not be called man. 
Moreover, neither body would be there without soul, nor the soul without 
body. Then, what is the being that we called as man. Is man a simple 
combination of two otherwise disparate entities? Is he like a centaur, the 
famous mythological figure of half man and half horse? 
For Augustine, the body is a being that serves the soul. That means 
mind and soul are not just added upon each other to make the man just as 
horse-man does not mean part horse and part man. The horse-man is man 
who is riding over the horse. In man too, likewise, the soul rules over the 
body. The body is subject to disintegrations but soul is not. Further, soul is 
essentially reason or mind and is not subject to change but body is 
changeable because of its material and biological constitution. 
Moreover, he says the soul is better then our body, and it is also that 
which is greater than our body. The human body is mutable but soul is 
immutable. That which does not remain in same mode can not be 
immutable. In the rational soul there is no change or mutation. For 
example, two and two become four and that remains always in same mode. 
Four always consists of two and two. Four contains two but two never 
contains four. So we can say that two is not four. This type of reasoning is 
immutable. So on the basis of above discussion we can say that reason is 
immutable. 
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But even though the rational soul is immutable, it may still have 
different changing states. It is plain to see that there are many conditions 
which show that soul may have undergone changes. The soul is moved 
both internally as well as externally, according to Augustine : 
"For the soul is said to be changed either according to 
passions of the body or according to its own passions. 
According to the passions of the body, as through age, 
disease, sorrow, work, hatred, or carnal desires; according to 
its own passions, however, as by desiring, enjoying, fearing, 
warrying, striving, or learning".2 
All these changing feelings show the different changing states of the 
soul. The changing states are necessary proof of the changing nature of 
soul. If the process of change does not take place the soul would die. But 
we should understand that if subject is changed as a whole, all that is in the 
subject are also necessarily subject to change. That means, if whatever is in 
the subject altogether changes or if the whole soul is changed than changes 
occurs. But if only some part of the subject is changed then subject could 
not be said to have changed. If, for example, the wax changes into black 
from white, it remains nevertheless wax. Augustine says that, if some 
changes occur in the subject, it still remains same subject as it was. But 
when the subject is changed entirely, it does not remain what it was. 
God, being himself rational and also a creator of a rational animal, 
was entirely free in his creative act. He could have made man exactly in a 
form in which we find him now had He so desired. But the form in which 
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He did make man was too superior to his present form and conditions. God 
originally created Adam without natural imperfections. 
"Man's nature, indeed, was created at first faultless and 
without any sin; but that nature of man in which every one is 
born from Adam, now wants the Physician, because it is not 
sound" .3  
Man was created as a good and innocent creature. His nature was faultless. 
He was superior than other creatures because he gave names to other 
creatures. The act of naming shows the wisdom of man. All the good 
qualities which make up the life of man such as intellect, senses etc. have 
come from Creator and Maker. Therefore if some stigma attaches to him 
along with good qualities, it is not because of blameless Creator. It is only 
because of the original sin which is committed by Adam through will. Due 
to stigma of disobedience of man's nature, he has the need of illumination 
and healing. 
Augustine holds that this world was created by God out of nothing. 
Man's nature is corruptible because it is made out of that nothing. 
"Because therefore God made all things which He did not 
beget of Himself, not of those things that already existed, but 
of those things that did not exist at all, that is, of nothing the 
Apostle Paul says: "Who calls the things that are not as if 
they are".4 
God created all things from Him. But "from Him", does not have same 
meaning as "of Him". St Augustine holds that there is a difference between 
"from Him" and "of Him". He said that heaven and earth are made from 
him, not of him. Because they are not his own substance. To give an 
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example, a man begets a son and also makes a house. From himself is the 
house and from himself is the son. But we cannot say that both son and 
house are of him. Son is called of him and house is called from him. 
Because house is not made of his own substance but made of an external 
substance, such as wood and earth and so on. Man cannot make any thing 
out of nothing. He has the need of some external material. But God has no 
need of any kind of external material. 
"But this is so, because as a man he cannot make something 
even of nothing; but God of whom are all things, through 
whom are all things, in whom are all things, had no need of 
any material which He had not made to assist His 
omnipotence".5 
God knew all things. He was not ignorant. He knew that man would 
commit sin or would fall. This is what we find in the verse, "God made 
man upright".6 It means God created man with good will. Augustine says 
that if He had not good will, then He would not have made man upright. 
Therefore the good will was in God. He created man with good will. It was 
the work of God. But the first evil will which is the cause of all evil acts of 
human being, was not work of Almighty God. But it was the work of first 
man, who fell away from the work of God. The result of this act was evil. 
Furthermore, evil will would not be in harmony with the nature, but 
opposed to the nature. God created everything out of nothing including 
man's soul. He then joined the soul with the body when he made man. 
Although God permitted evil to exist in nature, the purpose of this act was 
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to demonstrate God's goodness. Because though evil canRO3 live without 
good, good can live without evil. So the will was truly free when it was not 
slave of evil or sins. And this was given by Almighty God. It becomes 
faulty by man's own decision. 
Man lived in paradise with earthly animals according to rules. 
Paradise was not only spiritual, nor only physical. Animal or serpent 
persuaded to bring down the human being from his superangelic nature. 
First he tried the woman. He assaulted the weaker part of human being. He 
thought that man could not easily be enthralled by him. Satan deceived the 
woman not the man and woman deceived the man. Hence Adam 
transgressed God's law and commandments after Eve, because there was a 
relation between them, the relation of husband to the wife and of one 
human being to another human being. 
"And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being 
deceived fell into transgression".7 
Woman accepted the truth that the serpent beguiled her, and man could not 
bear to refrain from her. Even though this involved being in sin as a 
partner. So Adam was not less sinner. 
`By one man sin entered into the world" B 
The falling away from the commandments of God was spontaneously. The 
will towards unchangeable good was not changed. It remained as it was. 
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"The wicked deed, then - that is to say, the transgression 
of eating the forbidden fruit — was committed by persons 
who were already wicked".9 
Now what is origin of evil will? The origin of evil will is nothing 
but pride. As it is said in scripture: "Pride is the beginning of sin".lo 
This pride was more damnable because it gives shelter to the other sins. 
This pride does not allow to accept the wickedness of the sinner. As 
woman's pride made her shift the blame on to the serpent, the man did the 
same to the woman for the same reason of pride. 
"The serpant beguiled me, and 1 did eat; and man said, 
"The woman whom thou cravest to be with me she gave 
me of the tree and I did eat"."    
This means sinner does not accept his or her sin. But this does not make 
their sin less. 
"For the fact that the woman sinned on the serpent's 
persuasion, and the man at the woman's offer, did not make 
the transgression less, as if there were any one whom we 
ought rather to believe or yield to than God".12 
Man sinned and therefore and he became a primordially sinner. Yet 
his original nature was good. "Every creature of God is good".13 
Whatever is created by God is good, even the forbidden tree. So the 
tree of paradise was not the tree of evil. It was good and man was also 
good. If he touched the forbidden tree it was not because of his evil nature 
but because of his striving to get better. But it was forbidden to him. God 
created man with free will, but he lost the free will after touching the 
forbidden tree. Due to Adam's sin the whole human community became 
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sinful. Agustine is critical of any view that does not accept the original 
sinfulness of man or the view that there were no effects upon human 
community of Adam's sin. In this connection, he mentioned Coelestius 
who is credited with the opinion that 
"That Adam's sin injured only Adam himself, and not to the 
human race; and that infants at their birth are in the same state 
that Adam was in before his transgression".14 
That means there is no effect of Adam's sin upon society or human race. 
St Augustine, on the contrary, holds that although man was free 
from any kind of stigma of sin before his transgression, his nature became 
corrupt after he ate the forbidden fruit. Certainly, due to this disobedience 
on the part of first man the whole humanity became sinful. 
In St Augustine's own time there was Pelagius who was a monk and 
who held a similar view as Coelestius. St Augustine states that there are 
three errors in the Pelagian heresy that are as follows. 
1 	They deny original sin. 
2. They say that "the grace of God whereby we are justified is not 
given freely but according to our merit. 
3. Forgiveness of sin is not necessary to him. 
Concerning original sin Pelagius held that we are born without sin. Sin is 
not transmitted to the whole human race by Adam's fall. If it remains or if 
it exists it exists by imitation, i.e. by imitating Adam's act of disobedience 
of God's command. He therefore said that infants are free from original 
sin. Since the actual sin has not transmitted from the first man to other 
persons by natural descent there was no qusetion that infant's original sin 
could only be remitted through baptisms. Pelagius firmly said that no 
original sin exists at all in people by their birth. 
The second error which St. Augustine finds in Pelagius view is 
about his claim that there were three possibilities for justifying baptism. 
Firstly that infants are baptized for sin committed since their birth. Second, 
baptism confers on us a higher stage of salvation. Third, baptism remits sin 
committed in some pervious existence. But all these possibilities are 
impossible to accept. Hence Pelagius does not agree to the view of original 
sin and he rejects the baptism for infants. But Augustine does not accept 
his view. He gives many scriptural proofs to shows human beings are all 
involved in original sin. 
"Therefore, as through one man's offense judgment came to 
all men, resulting in condemnation, even so through one 
Man's righteous, act, the free gift came to all men, resulting 
in justification of life".15 
For St Augustine, it is clear that we have all taken part in Adam's 
sin of which death is one of the results. He also uses infant's baptism as a 
proof of original sin. The second error in Pelagius thinking is that he 
denied the need of God's grace for salvation. Pelagius holds that we get 
salvation by our own merit. St Augustine proves from St. Paul that grace is 
not given to us according to merit. He says that it is only by the grace of 
God that I am what I am i.e. a being endowed with reason and free will. 
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Augustine points out that this free will was not taken away as man chose to 
work for the glory of God. Thus St Augustine will claim, we have to be 
careful of not maintaining grace by denying free will or vice versa. St 
Augustine agrees with Pelagious that freewill is inherent in man's nature, 
that our free will is so enslaved by sin that only grace can free it. 
Augustine had thought that although all things are from Him, and 
through Him, and in Him, it only means that things of nature naturally 
exist. But it should not be understood that sin has come from Him. Sin is 
that which vitiates the things of nature. Sin is not from the God, but from 
the will of sinning. That is why sin was result of man's freedom of choice. 
It is clear that God has done nothing but good. But disobeying act was 
turning away from God. It was man's decision. God is not ignorant and He 
knew that man would commit sin. So man could not disturb the divine 
counsel. In The City of God Augustine says that God has foreknowledge of 
what is going to happen. He also knew that a good thing will become evil 
by man. When scripture said: "God made man uprighf'16, it means that 
man was created with good will. So man had good will. Man's good 
nature, good will, was the work of God, which was good. But the first evil 
will was a kind of falling away from the work of God, which preceded all 
man's evil acts. 
Therefore, the resulting evil acts are not work of God, but of will 
itself or the man himself. Man's evil was bad. So evil tree would bring 
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only evil fruits. Evil will though is not consistent with nature but opposed 
to the nature. 
In other words, the author of this universe was not corrupt. He was 
good and created man upright. Man became corrupted through his own 
will. 
"For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man 
upright, but man, being of his own will corrupted".17 
The other peoples also become sinner from the first man's sin. In the case 
of latter, it was certainly the result of freedom of choice. 
"And thus, from the bad use of free will there originated the 
whole train of evil, which, with its concatenation of miseries, 
conveys the human race from its depraved origin, as from a 
corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death, which 
has no end, those only being excepted who are freed by the 
grace of God".18 
Augustine emphasizes the essential goodness of both creator and 
creatures but says that the two are not identical in all aspects. If the 
creature would be identical with creator, he will not remain creature. God 
created things out of nothingness. He constitutes the nature into three 
things namely measure form and order. If all these three are perfect in a 
thing it will possess high degree of perfection. The creature would in that 
case possess great good. If these three are mediocre the creature will be 
only a mediocre good. If none of them are sufficiently present the creature 
will be no good at all. 
``For all things in proportion as they are better measured, 
formed, and ordered, are assuredly good in a higher degree; 
but in proportion as they are measured, formed, and ordered 
in an inferior degree, are they the less good".19 
Further, 
"These three things, where they are great, are great goods, 
where they are small, are small goods; where they are absent, 
there is no good".20 
That means things that have higher measure, form and order possess a 
higher nature, while things of lower measure, form and order passess lower 
nature and those with no measure, form and order at all possess no nature 
at all. That means every thing whether spiritual or corporeal, is created by 
God through all these perfections. 
But if everything is good wherefrom comes the evil. To this, 
Augustine's answer is that evil can exist only by the corruption of one or 
the other of these three perfections. 
"When accordingly ...which is nothing else than corruption, 
either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to 
nature. Nature therefore which has been corrupted, is called 
evil, for assuredly when incorrupt it is good; but even when 
corrupt, so for as it is nature it is good, so far as it is corrupted 
it is evil''.2I 
If nature were not corrupted in its order, form and measure it would be 
good. If is corrupted it would be less good. Evil is only corruption of some 
good. Evil is privation of good, Augustine defines evil as "Privitio Boni," 
i.e. 'privation of good'. Privation of good does not mean according to St 
Augustine lack of goodness, for example, a tree lacking in spiritual 
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qualities. Evil indeed means having no positive nature. It is only the other 
name for the loss of good (amissio boni) 
"For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has 
received the name "evil".22 
So evil's nature is negative. It signifies a lack, a loss, a privation. 
"For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? 
In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing 
but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that 
does not mean that the evils which were present — namely, the 
diseases and wounds — go away from the body and dwell 
elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or 
disease is not substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance 
— the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something 
good, of which those evils — that is, privations of the good 
which we call health are — accidents".Z 
As disease is nothing but only absence of health, in the same way 
vices are nothing in the soul but the privation or absence of some natural 
good qualities. An evil exists in the soul until the good in the soul is not 
realized. When the soul realizes its essential good the evil cease to exist in 
the soul. 
Manichees were thus wrong to suppose that evil has an independent 
and separate existence. They thought that evil is being. But the fact of 
matter is that it is purely an absence of being. Evil has no separate 
existence apart from good. Whenever we speak about evil we also assume 
some good. Evil is merely a privation of good. No evil exists without good, 
but a good exists without evil and is called perfect good. 
"Accordingly, there is nothing of what we call evil, if there be 
nothing good. But a good which is wholly without evil is a 
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perfect good. A good on the other hand, which contains evils 
is a faulty or imperfect good; and there can be no evil where 
there is no goods24 
As St. Augustine holds that every nature consists of measure, order 
and form, he does not include in `nature' only material things. He also 
wants to apply the idea in the domain of man's voluntary action or 
voluntary evil that is called sin. He compares, man's voluntary act with any 
other substance. He maintains that an action of man is said to be perfect if 
it is found in perfect measure, order and form. If an action is not perfect in 
measure, order and form and is a determined act, then this action is not 
perfect. Moreover, as in other things where evil is nothing but only the 
privation of good, in voluntary free act where we also find evil, this evil is 
nothing but the privation or dispossession of the good act. 
So, as a corollary, we can say that evil will is good as will. But as 
dispossession of being it appears as evil. In other words, in voluntary 
action, as in any other case, evil cannot exist apart from good. For St. 
Augustine, then, the possibility of the presence of the evil in the world is 
real. But the private nature of the evil is also obvious. Privative nature of 
the evil exempts the good from creating evil in this world, because 
whatever thing is nothing, it is not created. 
2. Arguments for Free-Will 
St. Augustine holds that all the things of the world whether 
corporeal or temporal, consist of a hierarchy of lower and higher realities. 
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This hierarchy is called order. He says that nature is also governed by this 
order. God imposed this order as a force. In as much as human beings are 
part of nature, they are also subject to the divine order. There is no escape 
for him from this order of nature. But human being, as part of nature, is 
also ruled by divine law. St. Augustine maintains an important difference 
between human being and all the rest of things. The difference which 
distinguishes man from any other thing is that his action depends upon his 
will. Man's voluntary action which depends upon his will is not subject to 
divine compulsion. Man's voluntary action has a purpose. This purpose is 
nothing other than to realize the divine order. 
"With them it is not a matter of being subject to the law but of 
willing it and collaborating in its fulfillment".25  
St. Augustine accepts that man knows the law. To the further question, 
does man will it ?, St. Augustine answers that every decision depends upon 
will. In other words, it is will that allows or does not allow man to follow 
order. Man often sees this order as a thing which is imposed by God on 
him. But St. Augustine holds that the power which takes important 
decisions is man's own `will'. This power does not take part only in taking 
decision in the practical affairs, but covers almost every conative decision. 
Being based on reason in its theoretical aspect, it controls empirical as well 
as rational faculty. In respect to will, the division of empirical and rational 
does not matter at all. 
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"It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that as the will is, so is 
the man, so much so, in fact, that a will divided against itself 
is a man divided against himself .26  
Augustine accepts domination of the will over all the faculties. In order to 
clarify this he gives a psychological analysis of the will. He maintains that 
the movement of the soul may be reduced into four basic mental passions 
which are desire (cupiditas), joy (lactitia), fear (met us) and sorrow 
(tristitia). He says: 
"To desire is to consent to the movement whereby the will 
moves towards a thing; to rejoice is to take delight in the 
possession of a thing obtained; to fear is to yield to the will's 
movement in shrinking from a thing and turning away from it; 
to experience sorrow is to refuse consent to an evil actually 
being endured".Z' 
The soul inclines either toward acquiring good things or to keep away from 
evil things. Its free movement to either acquire or possess a tiring is due to 
the will itself. Hence, Augustine holds that every movement of the soul 
depends upon man's will. 
Further, St. Augustine said that it is not easy to prove whether will is 
the master in the case where knowledge is concerned. He says that if we 
choose any cognitive operation of the soul, it appears as subject to the will. 
If, for example, we take sensation, which is known as lowest of these, that 
too turns out to be the will itself. Because it is only so long as our will 
involved in a sense organ makes it focussed on its object, that its action 
will continue. So, on the basis of this, we can say that in every sensation 
`will' plays its role as an active force. He says that without will no 
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sensation can take place. Because without will no sense organ would be 
applied to the sense object. He says that sometimes it happens our sense 
organ is fixed on a particular object and the object gives information to 
mind in the form of its image. But sense organ does not receive the image 
and the object seems as if it was not present there. It is indeed a common 
observation that in our daily life a number of things are present before us. 
But we do not take them into notice. But if our will inclines towards object, 
then the sensation would take place. All the feelings, even whole body may 
be affected by it. Therefore, it can fairly be said that all depends on will. 
"If a person says something in our hearing while we are 
thinking of something else, we claim that we have not heard a 
thing. But this is not exactly the case. We have heard, but we 
do not remember anything because our will was distracted and 
did not fix the sound in memory as they struck our ear".28  
The role of the will in the case of unperceived impressions is more 
complicated. He says that will fixes on a particular sense organ or 
particular sense object. The will involved here functions into two ways. 
Firstly, our sense organ comes in the contact of the object and secondly, 
will impresses the recollection of the sensation upon memory. This 
happens only because of second operation of the will. Through this 
sensation becomes something conscious. 
From this we can conclude that sensation comes under control of the 
will. Further, St. Augustine describes the will's dominion over the 
memory. He says that memory is equally attached to all the internal senses, 
including the imagination. Our will possesses sensations and recollections. 
In spite of this, will also joins both together and separates the images. 
Hence, says St. Augustine, it receives and stores away and it uses them 
again as it likes in the most diversified combinations. 
"Thus, it combines as it likes elements borrowed from the 
knowledge of the sensible world to create an imaginary world 
according to its own fancy".29 
Now the question is, does will have domination over those matters which 
are beyond the sensible order, and these matters are subject to pure 
understanding? St. Augustine's answer is that there is no doubt about it. He 
maintains that will is the active force which is known as fourth sensation. 
Further, he says that will is the force that is known as cause of rational 
knowledge. We observe it in our daily life that man's rational truth lies 
within and its arousal requires the force of will. We have to desire before 
having the knowledge either rational or empirical. 
"But before we produce knowledge in ourselves, we have to 
desire it: we know because we want to know, and we only 
seek knowledge because we want to find it. If the desire for 
knowledge becomes strong, we call it research, the word itself 
denotingporecisely that passion for knowledge which leads to 
science".3 
Whatever kind of knowledge we gain, it originates from the will. So we 
can say that every operation of the soul depends upon the voluntary 
decision. To say, indeed, that the will is 'man himself', will be no 
exaggeration. Now the question before St. Augustine was what is the 
principle of the will. He maintains that, according to Greek physics, 
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specially Aristotle's, every body in the universe has a kind of natural 
weight through which it moves from one place to other. St. Augustine 
thinks about will in the same manner. He says that the `weight' of the soul 
is love which moves it to its place of rest. 
"In every soul, as in every body, there is a weight drawing it 
constantly, moving it always to find its natural place of rest; 
and this weight we call love".31  
"My weight is my love; by it am I borne whithersoever I am 
borne".32 
The `love' in this way becomes the defining principle of man himself 
"It is obvious that, if love is the inner force which moves the 
will and the will denotes the man, we can say that man is 
essentially moved by his love".33  
Love is not an additional quality of man but is his essence. Love is the 
natural tendency towards good. Its aim is to reach its goal. Its struggle to 
reach its goal continues till it finally attains it. St. Augustine asked the 
question if it is possible to think of love as lazy and idle? He replies, it is 
myth. Man's love is movable. It can never take rest. It always does 
something that is either good or evil. He holds that crime, adultery, 
homicide, lust, etc. occurs through love. Love is also, similarly, cause of 
pure charity and heroism. Love is indeed an inexhaustible source of action. 
"For good or ill, its capacity is unfailing; for the man it 
derives, it is an inexhaustible source of action".34 
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St. Augustine holds that it is worthless task of anyone if he stops someone 
from his love or tries to keep him away from making use of love. For this 
would amount to deny man his humanity itself. 
"This would mean separating him from himself and 
forbidding him to be what he is: take from a man the love 
which leads him from one thing to another towards some goal 
vaguely conceived and he will be worthless than a material 
body, which at least yields to the pull of its own weight".35  
Moreover, St. Augustine says that moral problem is not whether we should 
love or not love, but what we should love. He says that if you do not love 
anything, then you will be lifeless, dead, abominable, and miserable. One 
must love, but should be careful about what he loves. According to him: 
"Virtue, then, means to will what we should will, i.e. to love 
what we should love".36 
He says that the will is determined by love. Value of the will determines 
the value of the action which occurs by our will. It is said that, man's 
action occurs according to his passion. In other words, it can be said that it 
is direct manifestation of his love. 
"Therefore, if his love is good, his passions and his will be 
equally good; if it is evil, they also will be evil".37 
Hence we can say that the quality of the action depends upon the quality of 
will and the quality of will depends upon the quality of love. 
According to St. Augustine there is no doubt about man's freedom 
of will. He believes in the reality of freedom of will in human being. 
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He holds that man has capacity to choose his actions freely. He also 
says that divine commandments are proof of freedom of will. There are 
many scriptural verses which testify to man's freedom of will. To quote 
Augustine here : 
"Then again, there are so many commandments which in 
some way are expressly adapted to the human will; for 
instance, there is, `Be not overcome of evil", and others 
of similar import, such as, `Be not like a horse or a mule, 
which have no understanding," and, "Reject not the 
counsels of thy mother;" and, `Be not wise in thine own 
conceit;" and, "Despise not the chastening of this Lord;" 
and, "Forget not my law;" and, "Forbear not to do good 
to the poor;" and, "Devise not evil against thy friend;" 
and, "Give no heed to a worthless woman;" and, "He is 
not inclined to understand how to do good;" and, "They 
refused to attend to my counsel;" with numberless other 
passages of the inspired Scriptures of the Old 
Testament".38 
These verses show man's freedom of will. Indeed, only where there 
is free will, there can be the command of do this or do not do this. To ask 
to perform or to refrain from any action is by itself a sufficient proof of 
free will. When a man commits sin, he cannot blame God for it. He has to 
realize it as his own fault. St Augustine holds that a work is called good 
when it is done willingly and then alone it becomes worthy of reward. "He 
shall reward every man according to his work", says Matt. 16:27. 
Will, according to St. Augustine means ability to decide or act with 
intention and also to be responsible for the same. According to St 
Augustine, there is no doubt that man is author of his decisions and 
actions. 
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"That is precisely why I said that the reality of free will is our 
to own our intentions, to be the author of our actions, to be 
responsible for what we do, so that we can be praised or 
blamed, rewarded or punished for what we do".39 
If man is a creation of God, then free will is indeed the gift of God 
for man. Free will is given by God to man to enable him to have the 
capacity to choose between good and bad freely. From this gift of God man 
leads a moral life. In situations where there are many options before him, a 
man can choose right course of action in the light of his moral conviction. 
It is though also possible that one chooses evil instead of good under the 
influence of some or other temptations. Man has thus capacity to do both 
good as well as evil using his freedom of choice. 
"So with of the gift of free will God has given man the 
capacity not only to do good but also evil".40 
Now, the question is whether or not, God is also responsible for 
human evil? Because, if God has not bestowed free will to man, he would 
not have chosen evil. This problem of moral evil is very difficult to solve. 
A related question is why good and perfect God gave us freedom of choice 
with capability to choose evil? St Augustine says that free will is good as a 
number of other things, too, are good in this world. There are many things 
in the world which are good and necessary but through their bad use they 
becomes evil. So there is no reason for saying that God should not give us 
those things which could be turned into evil. Suppose, if one is deprived of 
his hand, this will no doubt be a serious loss to the person. This is so 
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because hands are good and necessary organ of the body. But if one has his 
hands and through his hand he commits crime, then it would be bad use of 
his hands. Similarly, a person without feet will be called imperfect. But if 
he has feet and by his feet he injures others, then again it would be bad use 
of a good and useful things. 
For same reasons, will is good, but through bad uses of it it 
becomes bad or evil. 
"In itself, the will is good, because without it no one could 
lead an upright life. It comes to us, therefore, from God, and 
we should find fault with those who use it badly, not with 
Him Who gives it to us" 41  
Will itself is good but its goodness depends upon its using. If doubt 
is raised whether or not by giving a capability of choosing evil deeds God 
has not given us a dangerous thing, Augustine's answer is that it is true that 
liberty is dangerous yet, he says, it is a necessary condition for attaining 
the highest good. 
"In itself, free will cannot be an evil; nor is it an absolute 
good like fortitude, temperance or justice, things we can 
not use for evil without destroying them in the process. 
Free will is an intermediate good: its nature is good, but its 
effect can be good or bad according to the way man uses 
it" 42 
Free will is, thus, according to Augustine, an intermediate good. 
Goodness and badness of man depends upon its use. Freedom of choice is 
under control of free will. Just as reason is the source of all kinds of 
knowledge and knows by itself and memory is the source of all 
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recollections and remembers itself, the free will is master of everything 
else as well as itself. It is our will that inclines us towards immutable and 
universal ideas in order to attain joy possess happy life, which is the 
supreme end of human life. But this happiness is not identical with 
universal happiness. It is the possession of only one individual. Because 
the happiness of one person cannot make another person happy. That is 
why every man must have a will, which is personal and free. One has 
freedom of will and is free to turn towards absolute good and get happiness 
and also free to turn away from God and turn towards lower good. These 
two acts of turning towards good and turning away from good are two free 
acts. 
But here the question is why does the will choose sin? God is the 
cause of everything. So He is also the cause of this act of choosing evil or 
turning away from God. Is He, then, the real cause of sin? If God is not 
cause of sin then wherefrom does the evil come? All good things come 
from God. Every thing has some good in nature. So good comes from God. 
When we see a being in proper measure and order without hesitation we 
accept God is its author. But if' we bare it of its proper measure and order, 
nothing could remain. But still a seed of goodness would remain through 
which we can bring it to its perfection step by step. 
"If an adumbration of being is a certain good, the complete 
deprivation of good is by definition equivalent to an utter 
destruction of being. Consequently, it becomes quite 
inconsistent to imagine a positive cause like God at the origin 
of the act whereby free will turns away from Him".43  
God created will as master of everything and will has capacity to 
turning towards absolute good and turning away from Him. Will is 
certainly created by God with power to separate itself from God. But it is 
his duty not to do so. The fall of Adam or first man was not same as the 
fall of stone which is necessary and natural and mechanical. The fall of 
man, on the other hand, was free. So the sin was a deficiency or a lack of 
order that came as a result of a lack of being. The source of original fall 
was nothing but nothingness. 
For example, silence is merely absence of sound, and darkness is 
merely absence of light. Similarly, we can say that sin in our will is merely 
an absence of love for God. St Augustine holds that our will is changeable 
because God created it out of nothingness. That is why it is also imperfect. 
Without help of God man cannot relieve himself from sin. God helps us is 
order do make us a being with perfect order and measure. 
"But, let us add, God helps us bring order out of the disorder 
for which He is in no way responsible; He extends his hand to 
fallen man to raise him from his fall and, through grace, 
restores the original order destroyed by sin".44 
Augustine holds that human beings have freedom to choose between 
good and evil and are therefore responsible for their good deeds and 
wicked actions. Their action deserves praise and blame and reward and 
punishment for same reasons. But in spite of this, they cannot and do not 
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choose always right action. This is because even the choice of right action 
requires help of God. God's help is a necessary factor in choosing right 
action and in avoiding evil action. This is as the scripture says: 
"Without Me ye can do nothing"  .45  
`By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of 
yourselves, it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man 
should boast".46 
From this the possibility arises that the good works are not necessary to 
those who believe, as the faith alone suffices for them for attaining 
salvation. But, then, does it mean God's grace debases man or man's 
freedom of will and free will and God's grace are incompatible? St 
Augustine's answer is no. He says that evil deeds like lust, greed, avarice, 
pride, and hates, compel man to lead evil life. But all these kinds of 
feelings are slave of will. So how they are free in their choice of evil. St 
Augustine proves compatibility of God's grace and man's freedom of will 
in terms of God's foreknowledge. He says God is omniscient and he knows 
everything. He knows things which are in people's heart, i.e. all their 
desires and then intentions. He knows also all that has happened and is 
happening and will happen. But if it is so, there would be no logical room 
to free will. So how is free will compatible with divine foreknowledge. 
Augustine says that although God's foreknowledge and man's freedom of 
will at first sight seem incompatable, this incompatibility is merely in 
appearance not in reality 
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First of all, we should ask what is meant by God's foreknowledge? 
This problem is stated by Evodius. He asked how can it be possible that 
God has foreknowledge of all events and yet we do not commit sin by 
necessity? For, after all, God must have known that man would commit 
sin. He knew sin would happen although sin by its very nature should be 
committed not by necessity but by free choice. How can free will remain 
when such type of necessity is found? St. Augustine's answer is that of all 
things that happen and do not happen some happened by necessity and 
some by will. God knows what I shall will before I have willed it. But His 
foreknowledge occurs when my will comes to pass itself. 
"God equally knows what we shall will, before we have 
willed it. Yet when what He foreknows comes to pass what 
comes to pass is my willing itself. His foreknowledge of what 
I shall do does not by-pass my willing it - my agency or 
authorship".47 
That means God's foreknowledge is about what and when I shall 
will. That means my authorship in my action is necessary. He said that 
God knows in advance what I shall freely choose. For example, I know 
about someone very well that this person is going to commit sin. But my 
knowledge does not itself necessitate that sin. My knowledge cannot force 
him to committing sin, although he was going to commit sin. St. Augustine 
says that even if we predict that a person will do such and such a thing, that 
does not mean he is bound to do it or that he is forced to do it. My 
prediction will not affect his power of choice. According to St. Augustine, 
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God does has not have knowledge of my doing a certain action but only of 
what would I like to do in that particular situation. In other words, He does 
not foreknow what I shall do, but merely what I shall wilt. For example, 
`what I decide' when I decide, God and other person knows what I have 
decided. But then I cannot decide any thing else. Augustine compares 
foreknowledge with memory. He says that foreknowledge does not 
necessitate what is foreseen. Furthermore, he says that my recollection of 
an event that happened in the past is no constraint to what happens or 
occurs now or in future. Similarly, God's foreknowledge of the future does 
not compel for an occurrence to take place. 
For example, my knowledge about you that you will keep promise is 
merely inductive although it comes with large amount of trust in you. But 
your promise to me that you will come to my house for tea is not inductive. 
Because only you know about your will or intention to do it. In this case, a 
possibility remains that in future and in certain circumstances you might 
have to change your mind. This change of intention will prevent you from 
doing that which you have earlier fully intended to do. Similar is the case 
with God's foreknowledge. When it is said that God sees into your heart 
what is meant is that you cannot deceive Him as you deceive your friends. 
But it does not mean that God knows telepathy. The statement `God knows 
what is in your heart', means you may have evil thoughts towards peoples 
but you hide your feelings from them. But you cannot hide that from God. 
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Peoples may have thought that you are a good person. But there is no 
escape or reward and punishment on account of your evil thought. You 
deserve a certain judgment. This judgment would be automatic. Here again 
God knows you deserve such a judgment Hence St. Augustine holds that 
he knows every thing and yet He does not force an action on you. 
3. God's Grace and Free-Will 
The next issue to discuss is the importance of God's grace in order 
to attain salvation and its relation to free will. God is the sovereign good. 
God is free in His creative act. He has created man in the form as we have 
him now. But He originally created man in a much superior state. God 
created man in a state of nature. It was indeed His divine grace through 
which God constitutes the original condition of nature. God created man 
with a changeable nature and in a state of complete subordination of body 
to soul. Augustine always insists that man was made good and that the 
original sin was a result of man's act of choice. God himself played no role 
in man's fall, but man fell by his own free will. He also said that if first 
man has not fallen then there would be no sin in this world. 
"Therefore, just as through one man sin entered the world and 
death throu~h sin, and thus death spread to all men, because 
in all s ned". s 
It was the personal decision of Adam that led to his voluntarily turning 
away from God. He disobeyed the will of God. St Augustine mentions two 
consequences that resulted after Adam's original sin. One is concupiscence 
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and the other, ignorance. Man's nature that was good was changed by the 
first man's evil will. Adam disobeyed only one time, but the evil 
permanently became nature of man through propagation. But we should 
not think that man's original nature is evil. Or that it was the result of 
God's will. It was for sure the result of Adam's will to disobey God. But it 
should be remembered that after his fall God did not leave man in dark. He 
desired the human nature to regain its pristine purity and attain salvation. 
Man can regain his original goodness only if God grants help, in other 
words, bestows Grace. It is a special gift whereby God restores to fallen 
man what he has lost by his will. 
"Although man was created by God in His image and 
likeness, he lost these superlative gifts through his own 
fault".49 
God's creation of man in His own image was already a gift and he 
lost this gift through His will. It was his voluntary decision. But if he wants 
to regain salvation or to regain the state of purity that was there before 
original sin, that would not depend merely on his will. Man cannot get 
salvation merely through his will. He is in need of God's assistance or 
God's grace. Furthermore, St Augustine holds free will is always identical 
with act of will. Voluntary action can never be without motive. Fore 
example: a falling stone does not fall without cause but it falls without 
motive. A falling stone has a cause but not motive. But `will' cannot be 
without motive. A `will' without motive would be impossible. We cannot 
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choose to do away with free choice without destroying will. This is so 
because free choice is identical with will. Augustine does not ask the 
question whether we have will or not. Because he knows we have will. 
What he wants to know is whether we have free choice or not. We for 
example that love of God is our free choice, so he does not want to know 
this. He wants to know whether love of God is in our power or not. He 
holds that the power to do what we choose is something more than free 
choice. This power to do what we choose is liberty. There is no 
contradiction between grace and free choice but there is problem in regard 
to relation between grace and liberty. To understand this problem, we have 
to understand or recall the Pelagius teachings. Pelagius doctrine was that 
sin is merely evil use of free choice. Sin does not debase either liberty of 
free choice or its natural goodness, or its ability to do good. Evil will does 
not vitiate the good nature of man. 
According to Pelagius man is in no need of God's grace. God does 
not give grace to make evil will good. So the free will remains as it was 
before fall. Every man comes in the world with the nature of Adam as it 
was before the fall. Pelagious also said that God does not pardon until sin 
is not committed. Pardoning is only remission of sin. Pelagious held that 
Christ's sacrifice was only demonstration of God's infinite goodness. So 
the conclusion from Pelagious' thinking was that grace was not required 
before committing sin; it was required only afterwards of committing the 
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sin. It was needed to wipe out the sin. The `will' is free in order to follow 
or not follow the laws. 
For St. Augustine, on the other hand, many people may have desire 
to do good but they are unable to carry out their desire in practice. In many 
other cases people know the law but have no will to observe the law. 
St. Augustine says that this kind of two fold omission goes along 
with liberty. He holds that we receive God's grace not according to our 
own merit as Pelagius had thought. Whether a man can receive grace 
depends entirely upon God's will. Inspite of this, we receive God's grace 
according to our own merit. And it begins at the time when we have 
received the grace. He further says that without grace our free will does 
nothing. It rather goes from one fall to other. The question that arises here 
is when everything depends upon God's grace, what is the role of human 
being? Augustine's answer to this is "it retains its free choice, and gains 
liberty".50 The retaining of free choice means man has free will although 
grace is granted by God. Free choice means man is free to receive grace or 
not. "What hast thou that thou hast not received".S' Meaning thereby if our 
free will does not want to receive grace, who would receive grace. 
Receiving grace means to accept, to consent, to act. 
"For receiving means accepting, consenting, acting; it means 
acting by willing, i.e. as a will should act, and following its 
own nature. But a will which acts like a will thereby bears 
witness to its free choice. Hence the well known words, ... do 
not deny free choice, but imply it".52 
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Augustine says that God makes our will to will and grants the grace 
it needs to do what He orders. It is also will which wills and does what He 
commands. God helps the man to activate the will through which he acts. 
He helps the man not to make him dispense with but to make him able to 
act. So free choice is always there. To the question, whether free choice 
remains with us even though God always grants grace only to those who 
He wants, St. Augustine replies that for the reason of psychology of human 
will, there is no doubt about it. According to him, will is essentially love 
or, in other words, it is delight. Will is a kind of inner weight just like 
physical things have weight. The movement of this kind of inner weight 
towards different sights or ends is its liberty. 
"Therefore, no matter what the object may be in which the 
will takes delight, it takes delight in it freely, and whatever the 
source of the attraction it feels for one end rather than another, 
the attraction cannot endanger its liberty because the 
attraction is the choice itself in which that liberty finds 
expression"53  
Now again question is what is the role of grace in one's exercise of 
liberty? The answer to this question is grace substitutes delight in human 
being i.e. delight in good for the delight in evil. 
Furthermore, the law or command which is not otherwise observed 
by a fallen man, is realized by him after having grace. Like grace charity, 
too, is nothing other than love of God. Through this love or charity he finds 
joy and delight in those things or laws in which he feels no attraction or 
feels these are the opposite of his nature. So, grace does not prevent man's 
work and does no harm to the liberty. When man does not have grace he 
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hates the law and falls into the sin. But how man can feel joy or delight in 
law through grace? Augustine answers: 
"He hears the call of grace; it even appears to him as a good 
which would be desirable to some extent; concupiscence, 
however, gives him greater delight and since delight is merely 
the will's movement towards its object, the man in whom 
passion holds sway infailingly prefers sin to grace".54  
Hence, on the basis of this, we can say that man performs those 
actions in which he fmds greater delight. But it should be remembered that 
this predominant delight does not abolish our free choice. It does not finish 
our free choice, but it is manifestation of it. The sinful delight, or good 
delight is not that which is added to my will. But it is only will's 
spontaneous movement. 
"Man is truly free when he sees to it that the object of his 
delight is precisely liberty".55  
In Augustinian system, liberty is not identical with animal volition. 
It is rather identified with free choice or, in other words, it is identified 
with a kind of volition which always supposes known object. A known 
object seeks his enjoyment in good or bad. St. Augustine says that we 
should clearly understand that God's grace works upon will and it confers 
liberty, not free choice. 
"Indeed, liberty (libertas) is merely the good use of free 
choice (liberu n arbitrium). Now if the will always remains 
free - in the sense of free choice — it is not always good, and 
consequently not always free — in the sense of liberty".56 
Further he says that if our will is good and remains good, then we 
find our will in both states i.e., the state of liberty and state of free choice. 
Now, sometimes it happens that our will falls into evil or it also happens 
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that our will is good but cannot continue long in this state. Then the 
question is what is the reason of this lack of liberty in free choice? St. Paul 
answered that it is sin, which is a fundamental failure of our will, So, 
whenever we raise the question, is it our free choice which has power or 
which carries for long our love of God, what we are asking actually is if it 
is human will which is equal to the task of restoring the order created by 
the divine omnipotence. Pelagius had said that human beings can do those 
things which would otherwise require divine power to create. 
"We can always fall without help, but we cannot always get 
up again without it. We can never get up again when our fall 
is an infinite one unless, of course, God Himself extends His 
hand and lifts us up again".57 
So it is God's grace that He bestows on us that sets us free. This 
grace rules over body and saves the will from destruction. It also makes 
will more good and more liberated. 
To sum up, according to Augustine, liberty is identified with the 
capability of free choice oriented towards good. This means liberty and 
grace though distinct from each other, are yet linked by the fact that grace 
enhances man's liberty. 
"Hence, the more the will is subject to grace, the healthier it 
is; and the healthier it is, the freer it is also".58 
Moreover, if we understand free choice as subject to God's will 
alone, this would be greatest possible liberty of free choice. St. Augustine 
maintains that true liberty lies in the service of Christ. 
"For when you were the servants of sin, you were free men to 
justice. But now being made free from sin you become 
servants to God" 59 
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St. Augustine describes this in words : "you will be free if you are a 
slave: free of sin, slave of justice".60 
"Therefore, my dearly beloved, as we have now proved by 
our former testimonies from Holy Scripture that there is in 
man a free determination of will for living rightly and acting 
rightly; so now let us see what are the divine testimonies 
concerning the grace of God, without which we are not able 
to do any good thing".61  
Hence, although will is good but man is unable to carry out his good 
will. St Augustine says that there is difference between those who are 
graced and those who are not graced. Those who do not have grace, cannot 
use this will in doing good although they have desire to do so. 
"The difference between the man who has grace and the man 
who does not lies not in the possession or lack of free choice, 
but in its efficacy. Those who do not have grace are 
recognized from the fact that their free choice is not used to 
will the good; or if do will it, they are unable to carry it out. 
On the contrary, those who have grace want to do good and 
succeed in doing it" 62 
So grace confirms the will to do good or the ability to carry it out, 
Now the question is does the grace abolish man's freedom of will? St 
Augustine proves through scripture that grace does not debase man's 
freedom of will; it rather enhances or reinforces man's freedom of will. 
"Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! 
On the contrary, we establish the law". °3  
He holds that no law is fulfilled without free will. Further, through law we 
can gain knowledge of sin but only through faith do we acquire grace to 
ward off sin. Through grace we cure soul from the disease of sin, through 
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health of soul we gain freedom of will, through free will we get love for 
righteousness and through righteousness we make and establish the law. So 
grace does not debase man's freedom of will, but it helps in making laws. 
"Accordingly, as the law is not made void, but is established 
through faith, since faith procures grace whereby the law is 
fulfilled; so free will is not made void through grace, but is 
established, since grace cures the will whereby righteousness 
is freely loved's' 
St Augustine said that we always have free will. But it is not always good. 
It may be good or bad. But God's grace is always good. And through 
God's grace man's will becomes good which, before grace, was evil. 
"There is, however, always within us a free will — but it is not 
always good; for it is either free from righteousness when it 
serves sin — and then it is evil — or else it is free from sin 
when it serves righteousness — and then it is good. But the 
grace of God is always good; and by it comes to pass that a 
man is of a good will, though he was before of an evil one".63  
So, according to St Augustine, man's evil will becomes good, when God's 
grace comes to pass. Moreover, St. Augustine says, when a man does not 
come under the grace of God, then sin dominates over him, although he 
were under the law. So man is not freed by the law but by the grace. 
"For sin shall have dominion over you; because you are not 
under law, but under grace" 66 
But it does not mean the law is evil. By grace man becomes able to 
follow the law. Without grace he becomes merely a hearer of the laws. 
"It is by grace that any one is a doer of the law; and without 
this grace, he who is placed under the law will be only a 
hearer of the law".67 
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As we saw before, St. Augustine accepted man's will in the face of 
God's fore knowledge. He says that God has fore knowledge. But He does 
not have foreknowledge about what I shall do. He has foreknowledge only 
of what I shall will. Further he said that without God's grace man cannot 
choose right action although he has the right desire to do it. So God's grace 
is a necessary factor in our doing good. 
On account of preceding discussion, it may be concluded that we 
are saved by the grace of God from the faith. Now the question is whether 
faith is in our self or it is gift of God. St. Augustine confesses that earlier 
he thought faith is not a gift of God, but it is in our self. But then he says 
he was in error and actually faith from which we believe God is gift of 
God, and it is not in our self. 
"I was in a similar error, thinking that faith whereby we 
believe on God is not God's gift, but that it is in us from our 
selves, and that by it we obtain the gifts of God, whereby we 
may live temperately and righteously and piously in this 
world. For I did not think that faith was preceded by God's 
grace, so that by its means would be given to us what we 
might profitably ask, except that we could not believe if the 
proclamation of the truth did not precede; but that we should 
consent when the gospel was preached to us I thought was our 
own doing, and came to us from ourself" b8 
That faith is not in ourself but is a gift from God is seen from the following 
quote from scripture 
`By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of ourself; 
it is gift of God".69 
Some philosophers like Pelagious hold that faith is given by God to us 
according to our merits. But St Augustine does not accept this view. He 
holds that scripture shows to us that God directs not only man's good will 
which He turns good from bad but also directs those whose wills follow 
God's commands. He turns man's will whenever He wants. God himself 
judges righteous way by the counsel to Himself. But it should be 
remembered that His judgments are always righteous. 
"...it shows as that not only men's good wills, which God 
himself converts from bad ones, and, when converted by 
Him, directs to good actions and to eternal life, but also those 
which follow the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, 
that He turns them withersoever He wills, and whensoever He 
wills — to bestow kindness on some, and to heap punishment 
on others, as He Himself judges right by a counsel most 
secret to Himself, indeed, but beyond all doubt most 
righteous"70 
In scripture the Lord said to Joshua the son of Nun, 
"The children of Israel shall not be able to stand before the face of 
their enemies".71  
What is meant by of this? Why the people of Israel were not able to 
stand before their enemies? Was it not of their own will that the enemies of 
the children of Israel fought against the people of God? St Paul says that it 
was the will of God that the children of Israel did not face the people of 
God. 
"It was of the lord to harden their hearts, that they should 
come against Israel in battle that, they might be 
determinated".72 
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Does the above not mean that God has the lordship over men's will? 
St Augustine holds that God operates men's hearts. The work of God in 
heart of man inclines his will wheresoever He wants. Sometimes He 
inclines man's heart towards good and sometimes towards evil. His 
judgment is sometimes manifest, and sometimes hidden, but it is always 
righteous. 
"From these statements.. .1 think, it is sufficiently clear that 
God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills 
whithersoever He wills, whether to good deeds according to 
His mercy, or to evil after their own deserts; his own 
judgment being sometimes manifest, sometimes secret, but 
always righteous".73  
So we should have firm belief in our heart that there is no 
unrighteousness attached with God. St. Augustine holds that we should not 
think that we gain grace according to our merit. If it was so, it would not be 
the grace. 
"Grace, however, is not bestowed according to men's deserts; 
otherwise grace would no longer be grace". 
Further he says that if faith is simply free will and if it is in man's 
hand, not given by God, why do we pray for those who do not believe. 
This is absolutely absurd if God does not have ability to turn our belief and 
also the ability of removing hardness from our heart. Did he not say to 
prophet: 
"I will take from them their heart of stone, and will give them 
a heart of flesh".75 
112 
Further God says to prophet Ezekiel; 
"I will give another heart, and I will put a new spirit 
within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their 
flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh; that they may 
walk in my statutes, and keep mine oridinomces, and do 
them; and they shall be my people, and, I will be their 
God, saith the Lord" .76 
So these verses of Scripture show that God has ability to turn our 
ability. He has command over our will. But He is always righteous. When 
we read in the scripture that men's hearts are blunted and hardened by 
God, does not that mean that some ill deserts have been done by men, so, 
they justly suffer all these things. We cannot fmd grace according to our 
own merit. It has been given us by grace. For, otherwise, the grace would 
be no longer the grace. Sometimes it happens that this grace is bestowed 
upon the children of unbelievers while on the other hand the children of 
believers fail to obtain this grace. It happens through the secret providence 
of God. But the judgments of God are good and unsearchable. 
"For as ye, in time past, have not believed God, yet have now 
obtained mercy through their unbelief; even so have these 
also now not believed, that through your mercy they also may 
obtain mercy; for God has concluded them all in unbelief, that 
He might have mercy upon all" ,77 
We have seen that God's grace may be obtained by unbelievers and 
those persons who do evil deeds. It is however astonishing that God might 
have mercy upon unbelievers, `as if doing evil that good might come'. The 
reason behind this thinking is that grace or commandment comes in this 
14 
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world at the time when disorder or sin spreads out in this world in 
abundance. 
"Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound; 
but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound" 78 
But ignorant persons are unable to understand, and they said 'let us 
do evil, that good may come'. But God forbid those who concluded that do 
evil and good may come. But the purpose of grace is that the peoples who 
did evil previously do not continue the previous acts in the present life. But 
perverse men do not understand that, and misinterpreted it; 
"Let us do us evil, that good may come;" but: "We have 
done evil, and good has come; let us henceforth do good, 
that in the future world we may receive good, for good who 
in the present life are receiving good for evil' .19  
So after receiving grace man should stop evil deeds. We should not 
think that if we commit sin in abundance the grace would also come in 
abundance. 
Augustine says that so many people hear the word of truth but only 
some of them are believers while others are not. We know this. No one can 
deny this. It is the will through which an individual's beliefs is repaired by 
the Lord while in others it is not repaired. We must be capable of 
distinguishing between God's mercy and His judgment or, in other words, 
what come from His mercy what from His judgment. In the context of the 
election apostle say that man cannot obtain God's grace but can obtain it if 
God elects man for His grace. God's grace is not common to all. Some are 
elected by God while some are not. 
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"What then? Israel has not obtained what it seeks; but the 
elect have obtained it, and the rest were blinded. Just as it is 
written: `'God has given them spirit of stupor, eyes that they 
should not see and ears that they should not hear to this very 
day". And David says: "Let their table become a snare and a 
trap, a stumbling block and a recompense to them. Let their 
eyes be darkened, so that they do not see, and bow down their 
back always".8°  
The difference between mercy and judgment is that mercy is the 
election of the God. God elects those persons whom He wants, but 
judgment of God is for the rest of people. They become blind by the 
judgment of God. So the mercy and judgment both depend on His will. 
Grace is given to us according to His will, not according to our own merit. 
"Even so then, at this present time there is remnant according 
to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no longer 
of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. But if it is of 
works, it is no longer grace; otherwise work is no longer 
work"81  
So man is saved by God's mercy or by His will, not by any other 
things. By His will all paths are full of mercy and truth. 
"All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth" 82 
But no one can know His ways. His ways are unsearchable. 
"Therefore the mercy by which He freely delivers, and the 
truth by which He righteously judges, are equally 
unsearchable" .83 
Now, Apostle said that we are justified by faith and not by work. He 
says that we cannot obtain grace through works. Apostle distinguishes faith 
from work. 
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"And he says that a man is justified by faith and not by 
works, because faith itself is first given, from which may be 
obtained other things which are specially characterized as 
works, in which a man may live righteously".84 
St Paul himself says in Eph: 
"By grace ye are saved through faith, and this not of yourself; 
but it is gift of God".85  
He said that man cannot be lifted up through his faith. It is God's 
grace which especially distinguishes one man from another. If some one 
holds that faith is in his hand he is absolutely wrong. St Paul rebukes those 
who take pride in the faith as of their own achievement or think that they 
are distinguished by their faith. He said it should be understood that man 
should not glory in man, but in God. The primary nature of man is 
bestowed to him by God, and is common to all. But one man is 
distinguished from another man by what they receive or not receive. 
"For who makes you differ from another? And what do you 
have that you did not receive? Now if you did indeed receive 
it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?" 86 
The first question is how do you differ? If one say, my faith makes 
me different from the others, the next question would be what is the thing 
that you have received or not received and also from whom you received 
that things to make you differ. Obviously, it is from God who makes you 
differ from another and it is He who bestowed on you that thing and to no 
others so that you differ, If you say, yes, I have received that thing by 
which I differ from God, then why you are boasting that faith is in yourself 
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and you have not achieved it by God's grace. It is grace by which you are 
distinguished from one another. It is grace which makes good persons 
differ from the wicked. It is not common to all persons. It is grace by 
which we are living as a rational creature, and are distinguished from the 
cattle in nature. It is grace by which handsome differ from ill-formed or 
ugly or intelligent from the stupid. St Paul does not make any difference in 
the primary nature of creatures. But he makes differences in saintly Life. 
Such life is good through gift of God. He rebukes the saint, and holy man, 
saying that he should not pride for being a distinguished man. When he is 
puffed up against the other he deserved to hear the rebuke. Although all 
men have capacity to have faith by the primary nature, which is also given 
by God, every man does not have not faith. "For all men have no faith's7 
St Paul says that the capacity to have faith, as the capacity to have 
love, belongs to man's nature. But to have love, and to have faith both 
belongs to God's grace. Thus the capacity to having faith is common to all 
men, which is given by God. And this capacity to having faith does not 
distinguish one person from another. But having faith itself distinguishes 
one as believer from being unbeliever. Therefore, if it is asked, who makes 
you differ? And what do you have that you did not receive, if one's answer 
is, `I have faith by myself', which I did not receive, he directly contradicts 
with truth. Man can not obtain God's grace, not because he has choice of 
will to believe or not believe, but because he is not elected by God. 
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In this context, the question also arises as to what is the difference 
between grace and predestination. St Augustine holds that in Christianity 
worthy person cannot remain without salvation and those who will remain, 
are not worthy of salvation. If it is asked, how can a man be worthy for 
salvation the answer is man can become worthy for salvation not by his 
own will but only by divine grace or predestination. 
"Moreover... "That the salvation of this religion has never 
been lacking to him who was worthy of it, and that he to 
whom it was lacking was not worthy"— if it be discussed and 
it be asked whence any man can be worthy, there are not 
wanting those who say — by human will. But we say, by 
divine grace or predestination".88 
The difference between predestination and grace is that 
predestination is the preparation for grace. And grace is the destination 
itself. Predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge, although 
foreknowledge may exist without predestination. God knows about those 
things which he is going to do. "He made those things that shall be" S9 
Further, it is said that He has foreknowledge even of those things 
which He does not Himself do. God knows not many of those things that 
are not done by Him but by man. Such as sin, corruption, pride and so on. 
Although sometimes it happens that God gives to man such type of mind 
through which he would commit sin. 
"God gave them over to reprobate mind, to do those things 
which are not convenient".90 
118 
But it should not be understood in such a case that the sin is God's. 
Sin is not of God but its judgement is. So predestination of God is good 
and is a preparation of the grace. We can say that grace is the effect of the 
predestination. Therefore when God promised to Abraham "I have 
established thee a father of many nations"91, and St Paul sys, 
"Therefore it is of faith, that the promise, according to grace, 
might be established to all the seed" 92 
God did not promise from the power of our will, but his own 
predestination. He promised what He Himself would do, not what man 
would do. Although men do those things which pertain to His worship, 
God makes them what He has commanded. It is not in man's power to 
fulfil the God's promise. If fulfillment of God's promise is in man's hand 
rather than God's then what was promised by God to Abraham would be 
given to Abraham by men themselves. But Abraham believed in God's 
promise that he is able to do what he did. He has no doubt about God's 
promise. 
"He did not waver at the promise of God through unbelief, 
but strengthened in faith, giving glory to God, and being fully 
convinced that what he had promised He was also able to 
perform" 93 
When he sys "He is able to do," then, he is not saying doings of 
others but he is speaking of his own. 
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Going back to the question of election by God, He does not elect 
those who believed, but in order that they may believe. God himself says 
that they have not chosen me but I chose them. 
"you have not chosen me, I have chosen you".94 
If it is so, did he elect on the basis of one's faith or because one has 
believed. Then every one certainly is first chosen by Him on the basis of 
his effort or his belief. It should be remembered that it is on the basis of 
their effort that they deserve to be elected. But this position is not possible 
when God says, "you have not chosen me," but, "I have chosen you". It is 
obvious that they themselves are chosen by Him when they believed in 
Him. There can be no other reason for saying, "you have not chosen me", 
"I have chosen you". 
"Whence it is not for any other reason..."Ye have not chosen 
me, but I have chosen you," than because they did not choose 
Him that He should choose them, but He chose them that they 
might choose Him; because His mercy preceded then 
according to grace, not according to debt' .9  
His mercy precedes the event of election. He chose out of the world 
those who were already chosen by Him before the beginning of the world. 
This is ultimate or changeless truth pertaining to predestination and grace. 
"As He has chosen us in himself before the foundation of the 
world".96 
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God elected them before the creation of the world, and He then 
called them with the special calling. God called them and fulfilled what He 
had predestined. 
"For whom He predestinated, them He also called, with that 
calling, to wit, which is according to the purpose. Not others, 
therefore, but those whom He predestinated, them He also 
called; nor others, but those whom He so called, them He also 
justified; nor others, but those whom He predestinated, called, 
and justified, them He also glorified; assuredly to that end 
which has no end".97  
So God Himself elected the believers. But He does not choose them, 
because they have believed, but because they might believe. God chooses 
them and makes them rich in faith as heirs of His kingdom. The Apostle 
James says: 
"Has not God chosen the poor in this world, rich in faith, and heirs of 
kingdom which God hath promised to them that love Him".98 
Chapter - IV 
GHAZALI ON FREE-WILL 
1. Nature of Man 
As the question of freedom of will arises only in human context, any 
discussion on this issue must start with grappling the question of human 
nature. The philosophy of al-Ghazali is a more or less full length 
interpretation of Islam and it is also a complete philosophy of man. Ghazali 
tries to explain the creation of human being with the help of Qur'anic 
verse, 
"And when I fashioned him (the human individual) I 
breathed (lit, blew) into him some of My spirit".' 
So, he explains the creation of man as a process in which in suitable 
condition matter receives the spirit. 
"Fashioning (taswiyah) is the process which occurs in 
matter to make it suitable to receive the spirit. This matter 
is the quintessence of clay in respect to Adam; it is the 
human germ cell (nutfah) in respect to his descendents. 
The germ-cell becomes what it is after passing through 
numerous stages, starting with clay. The clay is 
transformed into food (through plants and animals), the 
food into blood, and blood into a male's sperm and 
female's egg. The male's sperm then is united with the 
female's egg in a "receptacle sure". In the womb itself the 
result of this union goes through a long process of 
transformations until it finally achieves a harmonious 
constitution (jibillah) and becomes suitable to receive the 
spirit".2 
Before receiving the spirit of God man was only matter. This matter is 
inherent in the human being. Every individual receives the spirit from God 
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when the embryo is ready for receiving it. At the time when spirit unites 
with body a new creature in the form of human being comes into existence. 
There are two pre-conditions that are necessary for any individual being to 
come into existence. First one is the greatness and generosity of God, and 
the second is the particular constitution in the human being for accepting 
the generosity of God. Generosity of God is always needed for the human 
being to come into existence. The relation between God's generosity and 
matter's receiving of it are same as sun and the things that received its 
light. As sun gives its light to an object without giving up its own 
substance, so also the matter's partaking into the spirit of God does not 
affect or reduce God's original spirituality. When it is said "my spirit", it 
does not mean the human spirit is a part of God's spirit. This idea makes 
Ghazali differ from some other Sufis who spoke of the possibility of man's 
identity with God. Ghazali rejects this idea and maintains that God is 
essentially different from man and the world. The human personality and 
his characteristics are the result of meeting of the body and the spirit. 
"The characteristics of his body and all that is 
generated within the human personality, as a result of 
the meting of the spirit with its body, are all necessary 
accidents and are what they are in order to adequately 
serve the spirit in the fulfillment of its "Trust".3  
It is the combination of spirit and matter that constitutes the human self. As 
to the question, what is meant by "human self' (nafs), Ghazali says it is not 
easy to answer it in simple terms. If it is said that it is the spirit connected 
to the body and working with it, then a number of questions come to the 
forth. Like what is the nature of spirit itself? How is it connected with the 
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body? What attributes are generated as a result of this connection? How do 
these attributes assist or hinder the development of man and his ability to 
know reality? Why is man created in the fashion he is? And how can man 
utilize the whole of his personality in the fulfillment of his trust? 
Like any other Sufi Ghazali, too, speaks of a lower self of man and a 
higher self which, in other words, means man's having an animal self and a 
spiritual self. The nature of animal self is eating, sleeping and fighting. 
One who is completely under the domination of his animal nature is always 
busy in these activities. The higher or spiritual self, on the other hand, is 
what leads man to pursue God and the realization of His attributes. 
Corresponding to these two are the two kinds of natures namely, devilish 
and angelic. The devilish nature is to deceive or misguide others; if you 
have such nature, you are engaged in doing devil's work. Angelic nature is 
to contemplate beauty of God. Ghazali says, if you have angelic nature 
then you are searching out your original nature. 
A third way of describing the same duality is to call the two realities 
as body and soul. 
"The first step to self-knowledge is to know that thou 
art composed of an outward shape, called the body, and 
an inward entity called the heart, or soul".' 
But heart does not mean the physical heart. The heart or the spirit, which 
constitutes the human nature is called by Ghazali as "latifah rabbaniyah", 
which resides in the body. This latifah has different states according to its 
various activities and its life in the body. It is also beyond the 
comprehension of ordinary understanding. However, it has four terms and 
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each of them indicates the reality of spirit, and represents the various 
activities showing the relationship of the spirit to its body. Each term 
indicates a reciprocity of interaction between the latlfah and the body. The 
four terms are: 
i. Qalb (heart) 
ii. Ruh (spirit or soul) 
iii. Nafs (the self) and 
iv. Aqi (the intellect or intelligence) 
L Qalb (Heart) : The heart is the deepest basis of man's cognizant nature. 
The term heart in Qur'an is described as the seat of knowledge. According 
to al-Ghazali, Qalb has two meanings. In its first sense, it is apiece of flesh 
on the left side of the body to be literally called the heart. The second 
meaning of Qalb is soul that is 
"an immaterial thing or formless latifa or basic subtle 
element which has got connection with the material 
heart. It is just like unseen electricity".5  
The relation of the latifah with the heart is same as the relation between 
machine and the machine-man or a house and the person who resides in the 
house. 
"The galb (heart) "resides" in the physical heart and 
refers to the latifah in man while it lives in its body".6 
When a man disobeys the commandments, it is not the man but his heart 
that has rebelled against God. The heart is happy when near to God. It is 
disappointed and restless when man pollutes and corrupts it. 
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ii. Ruh (Spirit or Soul) : Like the heart, Ruh or soul also dwells in the 
physical heart. It has also got two meanings. In the first meaning, it'is 
"a material thing within the heart which vibrates the 
whole body like the current of electricity and which 
runs through the veins of the body. It is called 'life".7 
This kind of soul has the power of touching, hearing, seeing, smell and also 
the powers of other body organs. We can understand the effect of Ruh in 
body in the likeness of the candle in the room. 
"Without leaving itself, its "light" spreads life into the 
whole body. In its essential side, the ruh is the tatiifah, 
and therefore, is exclusively divine".8 
The second meaning of soul is "immaterial thing". Here it is called soul not 
life. 
iii. Nafs (self) : The nafs is etymologically related to a word whose root 
meaning is "breathing". In Arabic literature, it is used interchangeably with 
the words like "soul", "life", "appetite" and "worldly desires". It has also 
two meanings. The first meaning is passion or lower self and includes such 
proclivities as greed, anger, lust and such other evil attributes. The second 
meaning of nafs  is the same as that of the "divine subtlety". The latter state 
of self is the actual states which have developed from the previous state. 
"Thus it refers to actual relationships between the heart 
and the appetites of the body and the particular 
condition of the "divine subtlety" under these 
conditions" .9  
There are three stage of the nafs according to Qur'an: 
a) al-nafs al ammarah 
b) at nafs al-lawwamah 
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c) al nafs al-mutrnainnah 
(a) al-nafs at ammarah (The self that commands evil) : At the lowest 
level, self is slave of passion. This level Qur'an describes as, "Verily the 
self indeed commands to evil".10 This is wholly evil stage. It is 
overpowered by passions. It obeys the order of passion willingly. 
(b) al-nafs at lawwamah (The upbraiding self) : This is the struggling 
self. In this state, self is struggling against anger and lust. The Qur'an 
refers this state in its verse 
"And nay! I swear by the self that upbraids......tt 
This is an unsettled and confusing stage where the self is undecided in 
making choice between good and evil. 
(c) al-nafs al-mutmainnah : (The tranquil self): 
This is the highest stage of the nafs. Qur'an describes it as "0 
tranquil self return unto thy lord, well pleased and accepted".'Z This stage 
of the self is good and illumined consciousness. The self in this stage 
always acts according to the dictates of reason. Man can rise to this stage 
from the stage of al-nafs lawwamah by finally overcoming the dictates of 
oafs-ammarah. 
iv. Aql (intelligence) : This is the last term used by Ghazali in discussing 
man's nature. It has several meanings. But Ghazali has used only two 
terms to indicate its two meanings. For one thing, "Aqi is intellect with 
which true nature of things of this material world is known and its seat is 
in soul". The other meaning is that "it is power to understand the secrets 
of different learning".13 
127 
Now if we consider the four terms together, we fmd that the two of 
these viz. nafs (self) and aql (intelligence) refer to the actual states of 
human being. Ghazali says that the latifah has its seat in the physical heart 
and rules over other bodily organs. This is same as saying that God has His 
seat in heaven and rules over universe. Ghazali refers this relationship 
between the spirit and the body as "armies". He chooses the word `armies" 
because the relationship of the heart to the body is same as the relationship 
of the king to the kingdom. 
"For the carrying on of this spiritual warfare... the 
body may be figured as a kingdom, the soul is its king, 
and the different senses and faculties as constituting 
army. Reason may be called the vizier, or prime 
minister, passion the revenue collector, and anger the 
police officer".14  
The use of the word "army" is also for the reason of similarity that 
man has with the God. As man has sovereignty over his body so has God 
the sovereignty over the universe. The "armies" are of two kinds. First one 
is the army that is visible to our eyes while the second one is that which is 
not visible to our eyes but visible only to `heart'. The relationship between 
heart and body falls into three classes. First one is "intended to excite and 
urge the body either to obtain the useful and agreeable, such as appetite, or 
avert the harmful and disagreeable such as anger".15 This class is called 
"Will". 
The second is the `power' that moves body and its parts. The third 
class in which sense organs perceive the external things is called "sensory 
knowledge and perception". The main purpose of it is to maintain the 
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relationship between the body and the heart and to let survive a healthy 
body. 
After describing the human nature in terms of various latifah, Ghzali 
describes man's character as consisting of beastly, animal, devilish and 
angelic qualities. 
"There are four natures of man -(I) beastly nature, (2) 
animal nature, (3) devilish nature, (4) angelic nature".16 
Beastly nature of man shows the anger, hatred, rebuke and so on. The 
animal nature shows mainly his sexual passions. In the devilish nature we 
find the quality of deceit, fraud, conspiracy and so on. Lastly, in the anglic 
nature we find in the man divine service, worship of God, doing good to all 
etc. The root of man's nature is his soul. If he has lower animal nature, he 
becomes like a pig or dog. If he has devilish nature, he becomes a devil. If 
he has got divine nature, he becomes a truly wise man. It cannot however 
be said that an individual man has only this or that nature. Most men have 
all of them together. 
But the question that arises here is if man is created with animal, 
demonic and angelic qualities, then how can we say that the latter 
constitute his real essence, while the former are merely accidental and 
changeable. The answer of this question is that the `quality', either of 
demonic or angelic nature, is found in man in abundance. And it is through 
these that we determine the essence of man. 
"Thus the horse and the ass are both burden bearing 
animals, but the superiority of the horse to the ass 
consists in its being adapted for use in battle. If it fails 
in this, it becomes degraded to the rank of burden-
bearing animals".17 
129 
Same is the case with man. He has the highest faculty of reason. And it is 
through reason that he gets the knowledge of God. 
"As regard his mere animal qualities, man is inferior to 
many animals, but reason makes him superior to them, 
as it is written in the Koran: "To man We have 
subjected all things in the earth".18 
It is by rational soul that man has both knowledge and power. Through this 
power also man excels from other kinds of creatures. 
"The glory and dignity of man, by which he excels 
other kind of creatures, lies in his capacity to know 
God. This knowledge is his beauty, perfection and 
honour in this world, and his equipment and store in 
the world to come".19 
Man has capacity of both knowledge and will, which Ghazali calls "armies 
of the heart". These two armies of the heart i.e. knowledge and will 
distinguish man not only from animals but also children. As a child man is 
incomplete. 
A yet another way of the description of man used by Ghazali is to 
talk of what he calls various types of 'spirits'. They are as follows : 
i. The sensory spirit : This kind of spirit is recipient of information 
through senses. Its root and origin is animal spirit. It is found even in the 
infants and animals. 
ii. The imaginative spirit : Through this spirit informations are recorded 
by senses. It is not found in the infants. An infant wants to get hold of a 
thing when he sees it, and he forgets about it when it is out of his sight. If 
sometimes he wants to get that thing it is because its image is still with him 
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preserved in his imagination. The faculty of imagination is possessed by 
some but not all animals. That means some have power of imagination and 
recording while others have not. 
"for example, in the moth which perishes in the flame. 
[40] The moth makes for the flame, because of its 
desire for the sunlight, and, thinking that the flame is a 
window opening to the sunlight, it hurries on to the 
flame, and injures itself'.20 
The flame gives permanent pain to moth for which reason it should not go 
near the flame. But since it has forgotten the pain it goes near the flame 
again and again. This indicates that moth does not have the capacity of 
recording and imagination. On the other hand, dog has the capacity of 
recording or, in other words, it has power of memory. 
"the dog that has received one whipping runs away 
whenever it sees the stick again".21  
iii. The intelligential spirit : This spirit has special faculty through which 
one can apprehend ideas which is beyond the spheres of sense and 
imagination. This faculty found is specially in human being. It is not found 
in the lower animals, even not in children. 
iv. The discursive spirit : This kind of spirit collects the data, arranges 
them as premises and then draws the conclusion from them: 
"This takes the data of pure reason and combines them, 
arranges them as premises, and deduces from them 
forming knowledge".22 
v. The transcendental prophetic spirit : This kind of spirit is found 
among prophets and some saints. From this spirit they can gain knowledge 
of unseen world. 
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`By it the unseen tables and statutes of the Law are 
revealed from the other world, together with several of the 
sciences of the Realms Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-
eminently theology, the science of Deity, which the 
intelligential and discursive spirit can not compass".23  
By these kinds of spirit the existing things are manifested. Each has a light 
by which things are lighted. Ghazali symbolized these spheres of spirits 
with the help of famous Quranic verse. He symbolized sensory spirit as 
"Niche". Imaginative spirit is symbolized as glass. The intelligential spirit 
is symbolized as lamp and the discursive spirit as Tree and the 
transcendental prophetic spirit as oil. 
2. God's Will and Man's Will 
Ghazali's conception of soul was based on Qur'anic teachings and 
Hadith as well as the opinions popular among the Sufis. But the main thing 
about the soul according to al-Ghazali is that the soul shares its nature with 
God. He quoted the Qur'anic verse: "Man is made in the image of God and 
"Allah breathed into man of His own spirit".24 So, Ghazali says that soul is 
the reflection of divine spark. In other words, God and man share their 
nature such that knowing the nature of one helps in knowing the nature of 
other. 
"Not only are man's attributes a reflection of God attributes, 
but the mode of existence of man's soul affords some 
insight into God's mode of existence".25  
Furthermore, Ghazali maintains two types of world. One is world of 
command (amr) and other is the created world (khalq). The things that are 
devoid of quantity or dimension belong to world of command. So, the soul 
belongs to the world of command. The world of command rules over the 
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created world. This command is spiritual power which controls and 
regulates the created world. So Ghzali says that soul is spiritual unity and 
gives the life to the body and controls its actions. 
Now the most important thing that Ghazali maintains about the 
nature of God is that He is primarily and essentially a Will. This position is 
radically different from the philosophers like Farabi and Ibn Sina who said 
that God is primarily and essentially a thought or Intelligence. They 
maintain that God is a thought thinking thought, as Aristotle had said. The 
God Himself recognizes Himself as the first intelligence. 
Ghazali agrees with philosophers that God is the ultimate cause and 
ground of all beings. He is light of light, eternal wisdom, the creative truth. 
But above all these attributes, He is the eternal will. Ghazali differs from 
the other philosophers on this point. He maintains that God is not primarily 
a thought or intelligence, but He is primarily a will which is the cause of 
creation. 
"The first principle", be says, "is an omnipotent and willing 
agent. He does what He wills, and ordains as He likes, and 
He creates the similar and dissimilar things alike, whenever 
and in whatever manner He wills' .26 
So according to Ghazali Ultimate Reality is essentially will. 
"The Originator of the heavens and the earth when He 
decreeth a matter He said to it: `Be" and it is 27 
God created the world through His will and sustains the world through His 
will. The knowledge of God is subordinate to His will. It is not the other 
way round as the philosophers believed : 
133 
"According to the philosophers, God wills the world 
because He thinks of it. According to al-Ghazali, "God has 
cognizance of the world because He wills it ...28 
Ghazali holds that this world is created by God through His will. But 
philosophers maintain that this world is eternal. In favour of eternity of the 
world they give certain arguments which relate to the cause and will. These 
arguments are: (1) Every effect has a cause, (2) the cause must be the 
action of some external force other than the effect, (3) the cause or an act 
of will when executed must immediately lead to the effect. 
On the basis of these arguments it is said that there should be a final 
cause through which this world came into existence from non-existence. 
The final cause of world's coming into existence could not be a physical 
cause for a physical cause causing a physical event cannot be a final cause. 
But if world comes from an act of will of God at a particular time then 
God's will will also be determined by some other cause. God's causation 
of the world therefore must be from all eternity. And it must be so as an 
immediate effect of His eternal will. Ghazali accepts the view of the 
philosophers who maintain that He is the creator of the world from His 
eternal will though he says that the actual causation happened at a 
particular time which was also chosen by Him. Philosophers' assumptions 
that every effect has a cause and cause has necessarily its effect do not 
have a logical coerciveness about them. To believe that God's will does 
not have any cause or if it has then it has not come out from outside of His 
will, but in Himself, is not illegitimate. That an effect should follow a 
cause immediately is also not logically necessary. The notion of `delayed 
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effect' is not logically contradictory. It is quite legitimate to think that 
God's will is eternal and an effect of that will has occurred at some point in 
time. The distinction should be clear between eternity of God's will and 
the eternity of the object of His will. 
"God, for example, can eternally will that Socrates and Plato 
should be born at such and such a time and that the one 
should be born before the other".29 
So, to affirm the belief that God willed this world to come into existence at 
particular moment is not logically illegitimate. God chooses one particular 
moment for the world to come into existence. God's will is entirely 
undetermined. His will does not depend on anything outside of Him. 
Ghazali says that difficulty arises for the philosophers because they tried to 
understand God's will entirely in terms of man's will. But just as God's 
knowledge is not completely same as man's knowledge, similarly God's 
will is also not entirely same as man's will. 
While affirming God's primary attributes as Will and denying the 
eternal, unwilled causation of world, Ghazali's aim was to ultimately 
affirm man's own will and deny the necessary causation of his actions. But 
before doing this he had to deny the causality in general. Ghazali wrote his 
book Tahafutul Falasifah to attack the philosophers on twenty points, one 
of which was the problem of causality. He refutes the alleged necessity of 
the causal connection maintained by the philosophers between the cause-
event and effect-event. They held that there is a causal connection between 
two events and that connection is necessary. 
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But Ghazali does not accept this view. He rejects the necessary 
connection and holds that causal connection is not necessary. 
"We do not believe that the connection between the co-
called causes and effects is necessary".3o 
He says that in a cause-effect situation the affirmation of one thing 
does not imply the affirmation of the other and the denial of the one thing 
does not imply the denial of the other thing. "This is not `that' nor is `that' 
one 'this' ,,31 
So the existence of one thing and non-existence of that same thing is 
not supposed by the existence or non-existence of the other. He cited a 
number of actions which occurs in our daily life, which are visibly 
connected together but not caused. For example : 
"The satisfaction of thirst after drinking; the satisfaction of 
hunger after eating; burning after coming into contact with 
fire; appearances of light after the rise of the sun; death after 
cutting off the head; regaining health after taking medicine; 
loosing of the bowels after taking a purgative; and so on to 
all the phenomena visibly connected together in Medicine, 
or Astrology, or Arts and Crafts.32  
There appears to be a necessary connection in these cases. But in every 
case there is no necessary connection, and in every case one term does not 
logically imply the other. The apparent connections are not necessary 
causal relation nor conjunction, but is of the nature of succession. 
Philosophers claim that fire is the agent of burning and that it cannot 
refrain from its nature i.e. burning when it comes into the object. But 
Ghazali says that fire cannot be the agent of burning because fire is 
inanimate object and has no power to produce the effect of burning. 
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The necessary causal connection is valid in the case of logical 
relations such as identity, implication and disjunction but not in natural 
relations. There is a difference between order of nature and order of 
thought. In the order of thought we deal only with logical entities. They are 
related to each other in the mind. Moreover, things are not connected with 
each other, only their ideas are connected in the mind. He says that the 
relation between fire and burning is not necessary relation because there is 
a possibility that it may or may not happen. Ghazali says that when a thing 
appears in a certain way again and again, mind perceives it as a norm and 
thinks that one thing occurs as the effect of the other one. It also then 
comes to be believe that there is a necessary causal connection between 
things. 
Thus if we believe in the necessary relation between two things, it is 
only because the two terms which are in nature extrinsic to each other and 
because they repeat before us again and again, are conjoined in our 
consciousness. Causal necessity is nothing but a habit of our mind. It is only 
psychological necessity not a logical necessity. 
Hence Ghazali holds that to think about miracles such as the fire not 
burning the body of Abraham when he was thrown into it, is not impossible. 
It is because either the attributes of the fire had changed or the attributes of 
the Abraham changed. We can reject the miracles if we prove they are 
logically impossible. But such type of proof can not be found. So denial of 
the miracles is sheer ignorance. Here it is necessary to know the nature of 
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cause. For the understanding of the principle of causality and happening of 
miracles. Ghazali describes the composite nature of a cause and the plurality 
of causes. He says that an effect has different contributory factors. Some of 
them are positive and some are negative. All of which is considered in 
conjunction. Moreover, the relation between cause and effect is based on 
observation. Our observation does not rule out the possibility that some 
effect might follow some cause other than apparent one. We also experience 
that there are number of causes for the same effect. Even we can not limit 
the number of causes. 
"So there are many causes for the same effect and a cause is 
a sum total of many conditions".33  
Hence the negation of the one particular cause will not be the negation of the 
effect. For negation of the effect will require negation of all the various 
causes. For negation of all causes it is necessary to possess a complete and 
exhaustive knowledge of all the causes and their conditions. But such type 
of knowledge or knowledge of all causes can never be had by human being. 
Furthermore, Ghazali says that causes are only inert entities. Will and 
action are not attributed to them. Causes indeed act by the power and agency 
of God. That will is absolutely God's free will which works without 
constraint by any external law. 
"Thus, the things to which God's power extends include 
mysterious and wonderful facts such as "elude the 
discernment of human sensibility". Indeed, God's power 
extends to all kinds of logical possibilities such as turning of 
a rod into a serpent, or the revivification of the dead" 34 
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"No, the agent is He who creates the blackening, the 
combustion, and the extinction or turning into ashes of the 
piece of cotton set on fire. Fire is no agent, but a non-living 
thing; the action belongs to God who, 'bums' with or 
without the intermediacy of angel".35  
Even resurrection of the bodies after the death is not impossible. 
Further, all things which related to paradise and hell as mentioned in the 
Quran are possible. In support of life after death, Ghazali argues in the 
following manner. 
"Suppose a man is blind from birth, and has not heard of the 
difference between day and night. Now one morning he 
recovers his sight, and his eyelids open. It is quite probable 
that he will consider the opening of his eyelids as the agent 
of the forms of the colours seen by him for the first time. 
But better knowledge will come to him when the day is over 
and darkness approaches; then will he realize that seeing 
with the opening of the eyelids was not the whole of the 
matter and that the light of the Sun is the cause of the 
impression of colours on his eyes".36 
According to Ghazali, whatever happened in this world happened only by 
God's absolute free will. He is the only agent of all actions. So in the case of 
man's freedom of will we can say that his freedom of will for performing 
action is also regulated by God's will. All actions of man are created by God 
and his freedom of will is also created by God. Man is not creator of his 
actions. But the other way of arguing may be that since God wills and man 
shares his nature with God, he can also be said to possess will. 
It is clear that the affirmation of God's will can act both ways i.e. as 
an argument both for and against the idea of man being a free agent. When 
we talk about God's action one thing that immediately comes to mind is 
that everything or every event in the world is God's action either by way of 
139 
creation or invention. There is no other creator except Him. He is thus also 
the creator of man's action. He created man's actions without loosing His 
power. God's power is connected with movement of men. But though He 
is the creator of man's actions, He does not prevent him from his voluntary 
actions. God created for man power as well as choice. Power is an attribute 
of man, which is given him as a gift by God. Furthermore, motion is also 
created by God that is acquired by man on the strength of power. Motion is 
connected with the power. This power of motion can not be considered as 
matter of compulsion; nor is it completely a matter of volition. There must 
be a middle position relating to man's voluntary action. His actions are 
created by God but also by himself in so far as he has been given power to 
create his actions. In other words, man has a will that nevertheless, also 
comes under God's will. Everything happened in this world and out of this 
world according to His will. 
"Good or evil, benefit or loss, belief or infidelity, 
knowledge, or ignorance, success or failure, guidance or 
misguidance; in or virtue, shirk or Iman come from Him".37 
It is only God who guides us and misguides us and He is not responsible 
toward men but man is : 
"He guides whom He wishes and misguides whom he 
whishes. There is none to question Him of what He does, 
but the people will be questioned".38 
When it is said that all actions of men are creation of God, can it be 
concluded that the evil deeds are also the result of God's will? The 
question arises how God commands those things which He does not wish, 
and how He prohibits those things which He wishes. To this Ghazali's 
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answer is that there is a difference between command and will. He tried to 
clarify this difference with an example: 
"Thus if a master beats his slave, the ruler rebukes the 
master for beating his slave, the master shows reason 
that his slave does not obey him. As a proof he orders his 
slave to arrange the bridle of his horse before the ruler 
though he knows that the slave will not obey it. If he 
does not order him, his objection before the ruler does 
not stand and if he whishes that his order should be 
obeyed it amounts to his murder. It is impossible".39 
A basic principle related to God's action is that He is merciful to men 
when they find themselves in troubles. He is not such a being who imposed 
things on men. He only enjoins and prohibits leaving man free to follow or 
not follow. His compulsion on men is only about two things. One is about 
work which is obligatory. If I do follow it I will be rewarded and if I do not 
follow, I will be punished in my future life. Secondly, the negation of such 
a system of reward and punishment is impossible. God may indeed give 
punishment to men for the non-performance of an action that is beyond his 
capacity. If it were not so, then men would not pray to God: "0 Our Lord, 
lay not on us that for which we have no strength".4°  
God also does whatever He wants, and it is not incumbent on Him to 
do only what is good for man. God's dealings are not unintelligible to men 
because God is not questioned for His doing but men are. (On the contrary, 
Mutazilites maintained that it is incumbent upon God to do whatever is 
good for man as they also insisted that God can command only those 
actions which are within the capacity of man.). 
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3. Knowledge, Will and Power 
According to al-Ghazali an action can happen only under three 
conditions viz, knowledge, will and strength or power. As he says, "Action 
is not complete without three things - knowledge will and strength".41  
Knowledge is the basis of action. It comes before action. We can 
even say that action is the result of knowledge. A man can not perform an 
action without knowing about it. So knowledge is a necessary factor for 
performing an action. But it may also happen that one knows about a 
particular action, and yet he does not perform the action. The performance 
of an action also requires a will to perform that action. Again it can also be 
seen that although man knows about a particular action and he has the will 
to do it, yet he cannot perform that action if he has not the power or 
strength for performing it. So power or strength is also a necessary 
condition for performing that particular action. Hence, knowledge, will, 
and strength are all necessary conditions for performing any action. 
"Without knowledge of a thing , a man does not intend 
to have that thing . Without will or intention, there is no 
movement of physical organs to do that thing. So action 
is the fruit of will and will is the fruit of knowledge".42 
Knowledge comes along with thought and recollections. It is apprehended 
by heart. Ghazali says that whatever mind intends it comes first in the heart 
in the form of thought. So Ghazali maintains that the ideas are 
fountainhead of all activity. These ideas have a tendency to express 
themselves in the given situation. In present moment they first generate a 
strong inclination, which is called by Ghazali al-Raghbah. These 
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inclinations are necessary if any action has to occur. They are followed by 
conviction (i'tgad) and conviction is followed by the will to act. The will 
finally incites power and then an action takes place. 
Ghazali says that in this process the idea and inclination both are 
beyond complete control of man. So he maintains that the idea and 
inclination may come without man's responsibility, but his reason is free to 
take decision and his will is also free to accept the decision of reason. This 
means that in some vital respects human being is free to do what he wills. 
But he has not complete control over it. 
The ideas which are related to man's will are of two kinds. Either 
they lead to good action or lead to evil action. Those ideas which lead to 
good action are known as Ilham or inspiration. Those that lead to evil 
action are known as waswas, i.e. whisperings of satan that is seduction. 
These two kinds of ideas are found in man's nature due to two different 
elements that are ar-rabbaniya and ash-shaitaniya i.e. the divine and the 
satanic. These elements are in nature due to direct influences by forces of 
the cosmos that are themselves angelic and satanic. By divine influence 
man receives the good ideas called al-taufiq, the divine grace. But if man 
goes into opposite direction he receives the impact of the other forces 
known as al-khidhlan. The divine element is guided by ` al-a'ql i.e. reason. 
Satanic element is guided by `ash shahwah', i.e. apptition and al-ghadab 
i.e. self-assertion. Ghazali says that devil has many powers but the angel 
has only one i.e. reason. 
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In order to illustrate the whole process of how the occurrence of an 
action involves the four factors of knowledge, will, power and movement, 
he gives example of writing which he says is created by God in man in the 
form of a desire that arises in man to write down something. After that all 
the four things that are necessary for performing an act of writing begin to 
play their role. But though the four factors work in the order mentioned 
above their creation in man by God is in reverse order : 
"He created the strength of movement in the hand of a 
writer after creation firstly of an attribute named 
strength, secondly after creation in his mind a firm 
determination and thirdly after creation owing to his 
determination in mind understanding and fourthly 
knowledge of cognition".43  
It should also be remembered that these four things reside in man's body 
that is their "abode" having originally arisen from the invisible world: 
which is itself a great mystery unfathomable by man. 
According to Ghazali, the world consisted of three realities namely, 
the physical world (a'lam al-mulk), the mental world (a'lam al-jabrut) and 
the spiritual world (a'lam al-malakut). The spiritual world is beyond the 
physical senses and cannot be comprehended by general understanding. It 
can be apprehended only by those who are enlightened. For Ghazali the 
reality of spiritual world is known directly. A deep study of a'lam al-
jabrut i.e. the world of the human mind (reason, will and power) reveals 
that man is free. 
To explain and illustrate the problem of determinism and free will 
he narrates a parable in which he gives the details of long journey of a 
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devotee. The devotee sees the writing on white paper. He asks the paper 
that your face was white why do I fmd it now black? Paper answered why 
ask me this question? I have not made my face black but it is the ink that 
travelled on me and made my face black. Then he asked the ink about it. 
Ink answered you should not asked me. I lived peacefully in inkpot but it 
was pen who forcefully took me out and made marks on the paper. When 
the devotee asked this question to the pen, it answered why you don't ask 
about it to hand and finger? I was only reed. Hand cut me off from my 
parent body, severed my head and dived it into inkpot. When asked, the 
hand, too, answered, I am nothing but a piece of flesh with blood. Have 
you seen a piece of flesh moving independently? Can a body move itself? I 
am a vehicle of strength. He rides over me and orders me to do a thing. 
Ask the power why he makes use of me? Then the devotee questioned the 
strength. Strength answered, do you think I ordered the hand for 
movement. I do not move it, nor do I order it. A representative comes to 
me and he compels me to do a thing. He wakes me up from sleep and 
compels me to do an act. Then he asked the will. Will answered, I do not 
rise myself, I am raised by the intellect i.e. the messenger of knowledge. I 
am subject to intellect and knowledge. You should ask intellect about it. 
But intellect excused himself by saying he was a lamp only and does not 
know who lighted it. Knowledge maintained that it was simply an 
inscription on the tabula rasa of mind, inscribed after the lamp of reason 
had been lighted. Thus he could not be considered the author of the 
inscription which may have been the work of some invisible pen. Then at 
that time doubt arose in devotee's mind regarding the intellect's answer, 
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He said I have passed many stages and every one attributed responsibility 
on the others. Nevertheless, there was pleasure in my quest. I find that 
everyone gives me a plausible reason. But your answer fails to satisfy me. 
As you say that you are a mere inscription recorded by a pen. But I have 
seen pen, ink and tablet. Pen is made of reed, ink is black mixture, tablet is 
wood and iron. I have seen the lamp which is lighted with the fire. But 
here I do not see the tablet, the lamp, the pen and the inscription as you 
talk about them. Then knowledge said to the devotee your means are 
scanty, your horse is fudged. Your provision is little and your conveyence 
is weak. It is better to leave your journey. Further, knowledge said to 
devotee, if you want to go ahead in your journey, then you have to travel 
the three worlds i.e. terrestrial world i.e. the objects which can be known 
through physical senses, the celestial world which is beyond the physical 
senses, and the intermediate world or the world of power. 
• "The celestial world begins when the Pen which records 
Knowledge on the heart becomes visible and man acquires 
unshaken faith of the reality of the unseen world. If you 
can not see the Pen then you better discontinue your 
journey".44 
"What has been created for a man has been made easy for 
him. Know that there are three hurdles in this path, 
material world, spiritual or unseen world and world of 
power and strength".45  
Ghazali says that the material world is easier to travel while the 
spiritual world is more difficult. One who walks upon the ground walks 
upon the material world. He who has a boat and embarks upon water, 
walks upon the world of strength. He who walks upon water without the 
help of any conveyance walks in the spiritual world. 
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The devotee's eyes were opened as he tried to see the celestial pen. 
Knowledge again helped him by giving some further clues to have 
conception of the celestial world which was devoid of physical 
determination and limits. For example, the furniture of the house is 
according to the status of the resident. God does not have physical 
attributes. So His attributes are also transcendental. He is beyond space 
and time. His hand, pen, writing, speaking and so on are not similar with 
physical world of experience. Ghazali says that whoever has the right 
conception about Him, can understand Him and His attributes. You do not 
have right conception about Him. For apprehension of Him, you have to 
understand three categories of men. One is he who conceives Him as 
transcendental and believes that He is not only beyond all material 
limitation but also beyond the metaphor. Second one is he who conceives 
Him as an anthropomorphic being. Third category of men are those who 
believe Him as neither of two and yet both. They adopt middle position. It 
seems that you belong to third category. You believe that He is immaterial 
and yet you cannot have a transcendental conception of His hand, pen and 
Tablet. Then the devotee realized his shortcomings. The curtains from his 
eyes fell and the sight of knowledge dawned upon his heart. Now he asked 
the invisible pen, why you write science on the heart of man, by which will 
is produced and by will the powers and voluntary action come into 
existence? The invisible Pen asked the same question to the hand, which 
was the cause of those activities. Hand, in turn, asked the power. The 
devotee then asked the power, Power replied, I am merely a quality, you 
147 
should better ask the possessor of the quality. Then devotee asked the 
omnipotent and, in reply, he heard the voice of omnipotent, 
"He cannot be asked what He does, and they shall be 
asked".a6 
That means Allah is self-subsisting. All his creatures are responsible 
to Him and dependent on Him. There is no other being to whom He can be 
responsible or on whom He can be dependent. God is not responsible to 
man, but man is responsible to God. 
4. Arguments for Free Will 
From the point of view of having a free will Ghazali divides human 
kind in certain categories. The first one are those whose character is 
unformed. They have no ability to distinguishing between good and evil, 
right and wrong. They are ignorant. They have no self-consciousness and 
no moral character. They have neither will nor belief. The character of 
such type of men can be improved easily. They are in need of some 
guidance, a determination through which they could walk on right path. 
The second kind of men are those who are under the control of 
passions. They possess quality of distinguishing between good and evil. 
They know the rational self is the only true self. Although they realize the 
rational self is real self yet they follow their lower self, because they do 
not customarily perform right action. Ghazali says that since they have 
knowledge, they can be reformed of their character by off shuting their 
evil habits, and cultivating the virtuous habits. Such types of men are 
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amenable to good influence, if they have the will to improve their 
character. 
Third type of persons do evil addictively. They think their ways are 
good and to act according to them is absolutely necessary. Their self-
consciousness consists only of the animal desires and their rational self has 
been suppressed. To improve their character is almost impossible. Because 
the way they think is not right. 
Fourth type of people feel proud of their evil doing and of leading 
others astray and regard it as a thing of honour. Improvement of such type 
of persons is not quite possible. They can walk on right path only through 
the divine power. Divine power can bring revolutionary change under 
these circumstances. We find in the holy Qur'an a description about the 
third and fourth type persons. 
"God has a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, 
and over their eyes is a covering, and there is a great 
chastisment for them" .47 
The first type of people is called ignorant. Second type is called 
ignorant and misguided. The third type are ignorant, misguided, and 
wicked. The fourth one is called misguided, wicked and devilish. Ghazali 
holds that the fact that human character can be changed and improved 
shows that man is a free agent. He says that human character is capable of 
improvement. 
Like the four classes of man in this world men can also be divided 
into four classes in the next world. These are: (i) one class for destruction, 
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(ii) one class for punishment, (iii) one class for salvation, (iv) one class for 
success. Ghazali explains the difference between these classes of men with 
the help of an analogy : 
"a certain powerful king in order to establish his kingdom 
on firm basis kills some people and they are the destroyed 
people. He punishes some persons for a certain time but he 
does not kill them. They are those who receive 
punishment. He releases some persons who are recipients 
of salvation. He gives rewards to some persons who are 
successful".48 
Ghazali says that if king is just, he divides classes of the men on the 
basis of justice. He will kill only those who deny his sovereignty. He will 
punish only those who have got defects in their service to him. He will 
praise only those who admit the king's rank and position. He will reward 
only those who spend their lives in his service. From this it would appear 
that free will is in man's hand. But, finally, it is God who will destroy 
people, give punishment, give salvation and give reward. But then the 
question is how to know the nature of man's free will. For the answer of 
this question, Ghazali says that people are like blind men who go beyond 
their powers while trying to understand the reality of freewill. Some 
people say that man has got freedom of will. Some believe that man has 
got freedom of will but that does not play the role in determination of 
action. Some others adopt middle position and hold that man's actions are 
subject to efforts. Ghazali says that if spiritual world would have been 
opened for them, it would have been disclosed to them every opinion is 
true from one standpoint or the other. But God does not want it. God 
knows both open and secret worlds. He has not disclosed His secret even 
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to the prophets with whom He is pleased. A man of spiritual world knows 
only that God is the creator and doer of everything. 
Ghazali next talks of three types of action viz, natural action (al-
fit al-tabi'1), intentional action (al f '1 al-iradi) and voluntary action (alfi '1 
al-ikhtiyari). 
I. Natural action (al fi'l al-tabi'J) : The natural actions are those which 
happen without man's will such as breathing, thinking and so on. In these 
actions man's will does not partake. They happen rather automatically. 
ii. Intentional action (al-fi'l al-iradi) : Intentional actions are those which 
are done in the self-protection or for avoidance of the evil by the 
consciousness. Although they occur with will, they are yet spontaneous 
and sudden i.e. without deliberation. For example, if a man comes toward 
you with drawn sword, your hands will be raised automatically in self-
protection. It is not a blind action but happens with consciousness. When a 
drawn sword, as Ghazali says, comes towards someone, that knowledge 
comes in mind, for the avoidance of the danger the hand rises against the 
sword for the protection of himself. Both natural as well as the intentional 
actions are necessary and involuntary but the difference between these two 
is that intentional action is preceded by perception and knowledge while in 
natural actions perception of the thing is not present. 
iii. Voluntary action (al-fi'l al-ilthtiyari) : Those actions are said to be 
voluntary in which an alternative is possible and reason makes a choice to 
do it in one way rather than the other way. For example, committing 
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suicide or stealing money or giving charity etc. In such cases things are 
presented to the mind in two ways. First one is those actions which are 
presented in - our observation without deliberation agreeable or 
disagreeable. There is no alternative present in our mind. Second one are 
those actions in which alternative is present in the mind and mind has 
capacity to make a selection. For example, if a needle comes towards our 
eyes then for the protection and for the avoidance of danger we close the 
eyelids without hesitation and deliberation. Although this action happened 
with intention, it happened without hesitation or deliberation. So, those 
actions in which we have choice or alternatives are said to be voluntary 
actions. The word 'al-ikhtiyar', is derived from `Khair', which means 
`good'. Hence `al-ikhtiyar' means the choice of a thing which appears to 
be good to the reason. 
Now, here the question is how is man able to do a thing if he 
wishes and cannot do if he does not wish to do it. The answer of this 
question is that in natural and intentional actions man has no power or 
control over them. To explain this point, Ghazali describes three kinds of 
work. 
"(1) The first kind of man's work is natural, for instance if 
he places his foot in water, it becomes separate, (2) The 
second kind of man's work is natural wilful work, such as 
taking breath, passing stool and urine, taking food and drink. 
(3) Third kind of man's work is action of strength and 
power, such as walking, talking etc".49 
Ghazali says man has no power of control over first two types of actions. 
Whenever someone stands in the water it becomes separated. It is a general 
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rule that whenever a thing is heavy it separates the lighter body from its 
own place. Heaviness and lightness is not matter of human will. Similarly, 
man cannot stop his breath after passage of time. The process of breathing 
is going on automatically. Taking breath, heaviness and lightness and so on 
are not subject to man's will. 
"Similarly the wilful acts of man are not subject to 
volition. Similarly the acts of volition are not subject to 
the will of man". '° 
Furthermore, Ghazali says wilful action occurs in accordance to natural 
dictation of God's law. For example, if someone takes a needle and tries to 
pierce that needle into other's eyes, the other person will suddenly close 
his eyes. Although this action happens according to one's will, it also 
happens in accordance to God's natural law. 
The third kind of action occurs with strength or power such as 
writing, walking, talking etc. These actions require strength. These actions 
are matter of one's will. 
"It is said of these actions that a man do these things if 
he wills and does not do them if he does not will"." 
Although it is said about voluntary action that it happens or does not 
happen according to man's will, but, from this, one should not conclude 
that these actions are also subject to volition and are not subject to man's 
will. Ghazali gave the reason of this thinking. He says man's will comes 
from the order of intellect or a'ql which says to will or not to will this 
particular action because it is profitable to you or harmful to you. You do 
this or refrain from this. Intellect's order to the will are of two types. 
"(1) One kind of things inform you openly or secretly 
that a particular action is beneficial to you. (2) Another 
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kind of things informs you after mature thoughts and 
efforts that a particular action is beneficial to you".52 
For example, if anybody pierced a needle into your eye you know that to 
remove it is beneficial to you. The will here makes its appearance along 
with knowledge. You close your eyes and understand that closing your 
eyes is beneficial to you without any thinking. The knowledge ordered will 
to close your eyes and power comes in your eyes to close up them. So this 
is the process through which man knows particular action will be 
beneficial or not. If you understand that particular action is beneficial to 
you then knowledge arouses will. This is called real will through which the 
will power arises. All of these i.e. knowledge, will and power together 
determine whether this action is beneficial or harmful, right or wrong. 
Without knowledge, will does not arise and without will the power remains 
dormant. 
Ghazali's description of action as being of three types was in 
continuation of a similar distinction made earlier by other thinkers. 
Ghazali's own teacher Juwayni maintains that an action produced by man 
is something that is outside his own body. The second type of action which 
Ghazali called intentional action, Asha'ri and Juwayni have described as 
"necessary" action and in the support of this necessary action they gave the 
example of the movements of trembling and shivering. The third type of 
action which Ghazali described as action of choice or voluntary action is 
exactly same as in Asha'ri and Juwayni. They however illustrate it by acts 
of going and coming instead of writing as Ghazali did. Similarly, Ash'ari 
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and Juwayni held that God is the creator of all these three types of actions 
and man is only an acquirer. This is same as Ghazali had thought. 
"Ghazali tries to show that, though all the three types of 
human action enumerated by him are, as he says, "in 
reality the same with respect to necessity (al-idtirar) and 
compulsion (al jabr)" by which he means that they are 
all created by God, still the first of these three types of 
action is due both to compulsion and to choice, that is to 
say, man has a part in it". 3  
"That man is compelled to do an act means that the 
action comes from a foreign strength or power, and not 
from within himself. Action with power means that he is 
an object of will".54 
Ghazali tries to show man's position in performing action. He says that fire 
has power and burns compulsorily. So it can be said to be guided by 
external agency. But we know that God's action is the result of His 
absolute will. Man has got position between these two. That means his 
action is not completely guided by external agency or by some other 
power. Similarly, he does not perform an action the way it is done by God. 
The man has got an intermediary position. God creates power and will 
within man. So for this reason man is not completely guided by others like 
a material object. Ghazali says that man's action cannot completely be 
controlled. 
"Hence man's action is not opposite to man's freedom or 
dependence. God's action is absolutely free and wilful 
with power. But His will and power are not subject to 
thinking and efforts like us".55  
Furthermore, Ghazali says that man's is a part of action of choice by God 
and that action is different from volitional action or intentional action. He 
compares between these two kinds of actions. He says that action of choice 
155 
such as writing, walking etc. is created by God in man. He creates in man 
this action through four things, namely, knowledge (i'Im), will (irada), 
power (quvvah) and movement. Both the action of choice and intentional 
action starts with knowledge. Knowledge gives the judgement that a 
particular action will be beneficial to you or not. Through knowledge will 
arises for doing that action. Ghazali tries to show that, although both types 
of actions start with knowledge and will but the effects are different in 
these two actions. In intentional action like the closing of the eyelids when 
the needle is pierced, knowledge judges that closing of eyes will be 
beneficial to you at the moment. One closes his eyes without perplexity 
and hesitation, without deliberation and cognition. 
"so that this kind of action, he says, "takes place by the 
will", that is to say, simply by the will, for the will acts 
simultaneously with the instantaneous knowledge".56 
Ghazali used the term irada in the sense of an instinctive action. He gives 
the example of lamb's having an instinctive fear of the wolf, and its 
instinctive running away from the wolf without thinking and deliberation. 
In the case of voluntary action or action of choice like an act of writing, on 
the other hand, he says man does not perform that action instantaneously. 
In the former, man does not think immediately whether this action will be 
good or harmful, should give benefit or not, while in voluntary action, the 
action happens slowly, hesitatingly and deliberately. 
"The action of the will in such a case takes place slowly, 
hesitatingly and only when, after "deliberation and 
cognition" with the aid of the "discerning faculty and the 
intellect", man has come to know whether the action will 
be beneficial or harmful".57 
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Hence for Ghazali man's same will acts differently in these two actions. In 
intentional acts it acts without choice while in voluntary actions that same 
will acts with choice. 
About knowledge in the case of voluntary action, he used word 
`knowledge' in the sense of "comprehension" (idrak) and "cognition" 
(ma'rifah). While by irada he means "a strong and decisive inclination 
(mayl kawi yjazim), and calls it intention (kasd). Further, he used the word 
"subservient" in the sense that a thing is conditioned as being subservient 
to the condition of the other. 
"The incitement of the will is made subservient by the 
judgement of the intellect and sense perception, the 
power is subservient to the incitement of the will, and the 
movement is subservient to the power".58 
Further he says that all these things are determined by a divine necessity. 
Though human beings are not aware about these things, man is only an 
abode (mahall) or a channel of these things. When it is said man is an 
abode that means the action is created in him by God. 
"The sense in which man is compelled is that all this is 
indeed produced within him but produced by something 
other than himself and not by himself, and the sense in 
which he is the possessor of choice is that he is the abode 
(mahall) of a will which takes place in him by 
compulsion after the judgement of the intellect that the 
action which is to follow is good, pure, and beneficial, 
the judgement of which, too, having taken place by 
compulsion".59 
Hence man does action under compulsion along with choice. Compared to 
the act of fire burning that is pure compulsive act and the act of God that is 
pure action of choice, man has got intermediary position between two 
extremes. 
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5. Will and Motive (Niyah) 
Related with the question of `will' is the psychological event of 
motive or niyah. According to Ghazali, the motive is not an expression by 
mouth or voice but something that happens in the mind. It is a mental 
occurrence that is fmally expressed by mouth. When we offer the salah 
(prayer) and utter the sacred verses without relating them to mind, they are 
mere verbal utterances and carry no meaning. Such expressions will be 
same as to say, "I love so and so" without knowing the meaning of this 
sentence. Expression of the mouth and intention of the mind should be 
same. If they are not same then the former will be false, Suppose, a man -
marrys a girl for the purpose of satisfying his sexual desire and not with an 
intention to get son. But he says that I marry the girl for the purpose of 
getting son. Naturally, his statement will be false. Here his intention is 
merely an expression of mouth not of mind. Motive determines the course 
and quality of one's actions. Ghazali quotes the great saint Ibn Sirin who 
did not offer the namaz over the dead body of Hauat Hasan Basri. He gave 
the reason that the intention of namaz janaza did not as yet arise in his 
mind. Similarly, when great saint Suflyan Sawri was told that he should 
offer the namaz janaza of Ahmed b. Sulaiman who was a learned man of 
Kufa, he said: "Had I had the intention, I could have performed if'. 
Another example quoted by Ghazali is that of great saint Taus who was 
requested to pray for the people. He replied in the same vein saying "when 
I will, I do it". 
It is clear from the above illustrations that for these saints niyah or 
motive was not only an expression which is expressed by mouth, but it is 
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an expression which is expressed by mouth but is in fact an intention of the 
mind. It is a current flowing from Allah. Sometimes it is easy and 
sometimes it becomes difficult. It is easy for those whose heart inclines 
toward religious matters. He feels easy for doing good deeds. It is difficult 
for those whose minds are inclined towards evil deeds. They have to face 
difficulty for performing good deeds. Moreover, Ghazali says that we find 
different motives in man's service to God. Some peoples do good in order 
to getting happiness in paradise. If they do divine service with the motive 
of pleasing God and no other motive their intention will be said to be pure 
intention. Ghazali says that the most honorable persons are those who 
perform good deed for the sake of Him. 
"Rather they call their Lord morning and evening only for 
His pleasure. They will get rewards according to their 
intentions. When they will be blessed with His sight, they 
will think the sight of the beautiful Hurs very little" bo 
Further, Ghazali says that God gives reward to pure motives of man. If we 
do any work with pure motive, God will help us. In order to explain this, 
he narrates the story of a saint of Israil. When he works for the sake of 
God, devil is unable to overpower him, but when he works to satisfy his 
worldly desires devil overpowers him. 
A saint had to his credit divine service for long long years. One day 
some people were worshipping a tree besides Allah, At this, the saint got 
angry and went to out it with an axe. In the meantime, the devil came in 
the form of an old man and asked him: Where are you going? The saint 
said: I am going to cut off this tree. The devil said: Are you in this 
thought? You have come down to do this leaving a side your Divine 
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service? The saint said: This work is also included in Divine service. The 
devil said: I will not permit you to cut down this tree. At this he fell down 
upon the saint but the latter overpowered him, threw him down on the 
ground and sat upon his chest.61  
The devil said: Desist from this action or I will kill you. At this he 
let off the devil who said to him: 0 saint, Allah has taken over this 
responsibility from you. He has not made it compulsory for you. You 
yourself do not worship this tree and the affairs of others have not 
devolved on you. This is the duty of Prophets. Had He willed, He would 
have certainly sent a Prophet to the inhabitants of this place and ordered 
him to cut down this tree. Then the saint said: To cut down this tree is also 
a part of my duty. The saint then fell upon the devil and threw him away 
and got on his chest. The devil again having been discomfited said to him. 
There is an affair between you and me which is good and beneficial for 
you. The saint asked him what it was. The devil said: Let me be sure and 
then I will tell you of it. Thereafter he let him off and the devil said to him: 
you are a poor man, you have got no property. You are a burden upon your 
friends and relatives. Perhaps you wish to get more honour than your 
brethren, to get more sympathy from your religious men and you do not 
want to depend on the people. The saint said: Yes, I hope for that. The 
devil said: In that case, turn away from this affair. I will place two dinars 
every night near your bed. When you will get up at dawn, you will take 
them and spend them for you and your family and gift a portion to your 
brothers. This act of yours will be more beneficial to you and the Muslim 
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public than the cutting down of this tree. This tree was planted and there 
will be no good if you cut down this tree. At this, the saint begain to 
ponder and said: This old man has spoken the truth. I have not been 
ordered to cut down this tree by God. I will incur no sin if I do not cut 
down this tree. Then he turned his mind from this action of cutting down 
the tree. 
Thereafter the saint went to his place of worship and spent the night. 
At dawn, he found two dinars near his head and took them. Next day also 
this happened. This continued for three days. On the fourth day, he did not 
find the dinars near his head and became very much enraged. He took his 
journey to cut down the tree. The devil came to him in the form of an old 
man and said: where are you going? He said: I am going to cut down the 
tree. The devil said: By God, you will not be able to cut it down, you will 
also not find your way. Thereupon the saint fell upon him but the saint 
became just like a sparrow between his two legs. The devil then sat upon 
his chest and said: if you want to live, get away from here or else I will cut 
you to pieces. The saint being helpless looked to and fro and said: 0 gentle 
man you have defeated me. Let me now go. The devil said: Question me 
now how you have first overpowered me and thereafter I have 
overpowered you. The devil said: At first you became enraged for the sake 
of Allah alone and your sole intention was to get success in the hereafter. 
So God made me subservient to you. But now you have become enraged 
for your worldly propensities and desires and so I overpowered you. 
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From this story we can see that if man has pure motive he can win, 
if he has no pure motive he can not. Ghazali here mentions the case of 
great saint Ma'ruf Karkhi who 
"used to beat himself and say: Take recourse to form 
intention, you will then get salvation".62 
According to Yakub, a man of pure soul is one "who keeps his good deeds 
concealed as he keeps his sins concealed is a man of pure intention".63  
About intention Solaiman said: "He is blessed who takes one step in the 
way of Allah" .64 Ilazrat Omar wrote to Imam Abu Musa Ashari; "Allah is 
sufficient for a man whose intention is pure" .6s 
In order to further clarify the idea of motive, Ghazali takes help of a 
story of a person who traveled for jihad. The man says to himself : 
"I was traveling by sea for a Jihad or holy war. Someone of us 
wanted to sell his bag and I thought that I should purchase this bag and sell 
it for a higher price in a city. Then I purchased it but dreamt in that night 
that two persons got down from heaven and one of them said to the other: 
Write down the names of the warriors in the way of Allah. The other said: 
so and so came out only to take a journey. So and so made jihad only for 
fame. So and so came to make merchandise. So and so came out only for 
the sake of Allah. I at once exclaimed: 0 Allah, I have not come out to 
make merchandise. I have got no such commodities, I have come out for 
jihad. Then the other person reported: 0 man, you intended to make profit 
after purchasing a bag yesterday. Thereafter I wept bitterly and said: Don't 
enrol me among the merchants. The man said to his companion; Write, so 
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and so came out as a warrior in the way of Allah. Then he purchased a bag 
for profit. The result then rest on Allah".66 
Ghazali further discusses about sincere intention (ikhlas). He says 
that everything is mixed with other thing. If one thing is not mixed with 
other thing, it is said to be pure. As St. Yahya b. Muaz said that sincere 
action separates an action from its faults as milk separates itself from urine 
and blood. Some great man said, wisdom is just like a seed, action just like 
crop and ikhlas or sincerity same as water for irrigation. The great Saint 
Susi maintains that among the actions of man Allah desires only his 
sincerity. Ikhlas means purity. Purity is the opposite of mixture. Purity 
means "without share", Purity in oneness of God means there is no partner 
of Allah in his attributes as well as his existence. If one admits his partner 
his action is called shirk. Ghazali says that a person who wants to be near 
to the God, his intention should be pure. If a man wants to work for the 
sake of Allah he has to leave the following intentions: "(1) to have good 
health in fasting, (2) to give relief from labour in setting free a slave, (3) to 
recoup health in journey for Haj, (4) to fight for any other purpose than to 
please God, (5) to pray Tahajjud to guard the family and properties at 
night, (6) to acquire money or fame by education, (7) to acquire money by 
writing books, (8) to make ablution to make oneself pure or to purity the 
bodily limbs, (9) to make I'tigaf in mosque in order to get relief from 
house rent, (10) to give to a beggar so that he may not beg again, (11) to do 
an act to gain name and fame or to have status in society' :69 
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Now, Ghazali describes three kinds of action relating to the 
itention or will, viz., sinful action, pious action and lawful actions. 
t. Sinful actions : Ghazali says that if one's intention is good but he does 
sinful action his sinful action cannot turn into virtuous action. Similarly, if 
one's intention is good while performing an action but the means is not 
good then the action again cannot be considered as pious action. 
"If you backbite a man to please another, if you give to a 
beggar the food of another person, if you make gift of illegal 
property to construct a mosque, bridge or such charitable 
object, you will not absolve yourself from the sinful act 
although your intention is good and pious"68  
So if your intention is good then your means also should be good for 
performing a pious action. 
ii. Pious actions : If one does not have good intention while performing 
good action, then this kind of action is not considered as pious and there is 
no reward for it. If you have a number of good intentions including to 
please God, then the reward increases. 
"For instance, to keep sitting in a mosque is a good act but it 
admits of many intentions — (i) to hope for sight of God as 
mosque is considered as a house of God where God can be 
seen, for the Holy Prophet said : He who keeps sitting in a 
mosque, meets with God, (2) to wait for the next prayer, for 
the Prophet said he who waits for prayer will get the same 
reward as that of a man who has prayed, (3) to keep the 
bodily organs from sinful acts. (4) to concentrate all 
thoughts upon Allah, (5) to be engaged in the remembrance 
of Allah, (6) to enjoin good works andjvohibit evils, (7) to 
get benefit from those who fear Allah".6 
iii. Lawful actions : One can increase reward in lawful action through 
multiplying the number of good intentions. 
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Ghazali says that lawful things are uncountable. A pious man is 
one who has good intentions in everything, even eating, drinking, sleeping 
etc. 
6. Theory of Acquisition 
Ghazali has discussed the problem of free will and acquisition in 
three places in his book Ihya Ulum-id-Din i.e. Kitab Kawaid wal-'Aka'id, 
Kitab al-Taubah and Kitab al-Tauhid wal-Tawakkul. 
He starts the discussion with the statements on which all 
predestinarians are agreed i.e. "that God, who created man and his powers 
and his movements, created also all his actions and that all his actions 
remain dependent upon God's power".70 
In favour of this common belief, he gives two arguments: 
"since the power of God is perfect and unrestricted, it 
can not but be that the actions of man are created by 
God. Second, since man's actions are dependent upon 
the movements of his body and all the movements of 
man's body are by their essence equally dependent 
upon the power of God, there is no reason for 
differentiating in this respect some movements, called 
actions, from other movements".71  
The second argument referred to those libertarians who distinguish 
among actions and maintain that God has power upon certain actions and 
does not have power over certain actions. For example, God has power 
over movements and rests of man. But he has no power over belief and 
unbelief. Further, they distinguish between man's act and God's act. They 
hold that noble acts are created by God and base acts are created by man. 
According to them, "God created at once the power (al-kudrah) and the 
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object of power (al-makdur) and He created at once the choice (al-
ikhtiyar) and the object of choice (al-mukhtar)".72 
According to Ghazali, "power", means the power to move and he 
used the word in the general sense of power of action, and power of 
choice. The latter included the choice between moving and not moving. 
Further, "object of power" and "object of choice", meant according to him 
a movement which is performed by the power to move which is result of 
choice to move and not to move. In other words, we can say that it is a 
voluntary movement or voluntary action. He says that in every voluntary 
action of man three things are involved, i.e., the power to act, the choice 
between moving and not moving, and the action performed by the power 
as a result of the choice. He said that all these three things are created by 
God in man. Ghazali distinguishes between created power to move and 
created movement which is created by God in man. He say: 
"The power is an attribute (wasf) of man and a creation 
of God but is not an acquisition (kasb) of man, whereas 
the movement is a creation of God and an attribute 
(wasf) of man but is also an acquisition of man, for it is 
created as an object of power by [another] power 
[namely, theower to choose]; which is to him [also] 
an attribute". 
The power then is an attribute of man, but not an acquisition of 
man, and movement is an attribute of man but also an acquisition. Both are 
created by God. 
"In short, acquisition is any movement of man 
preceded regressively by a power to move and by a 
power to choose, that is, to will, to use that power to 
move, plus the assumption that the movement itself 
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and the power to move and the will to use that power to 
move are all created by God".74 
Ghazali says that acquisition is regarded as a movement which is 
created by God. It cannot be regarded as compelled act nor can it be said to 
be a free act. It cannot be said to be a compelled act, because how could a 
movement be regarded as compelled act when man has consciousness or 
has a power to distinguishing between a movement which is the object of 
power as the raising of hand and the movement of the uncontrollable 
trembling hand. The movement "raising hand" is non-compulsive while 
the movement that is trembling hand is pure compulsion. Further asking 
how could be a man the author of his free act, Ghazali says that for the 
authorship of one's actions, knowledge and control of every action are 
necessary. But man has neither foreknowledge nor control over his actions 
in different circumstances. Hence these two extremes are not liable to 
acceptance. He therefore adopts the middle position, that is of acquisition. 
"Since both these extremes are untenable, there 
remains only to adopt a middle course with regard to 
the belief under consideration, namely, that the 
movement is determined by the power of God by way 
of creation and by the power of man by way of another 
kind of relationship that which is designated by the 
term acquisition (ik(isab)" 5 
So, according to al-Ghazali, man has two kinds of power i.e. power of 
choosing and power of action and these two powers are created by God. 
Ghazali's view on acquisition is identical with that of Najjar and Asha'ri. 
Ghazali said that man holds the balance between determinism and 
freedom. He says that uniform succession of events is determinant of 
man's action but his choice which is an essential element of will is his 
167 
own. He says that acquisition (kasb) is distinguished from necessity (jabr) 
and freedom (ikhtiyar). He gave the example of fire. Fire burns by 
necessity. Man may acquire fire through appropriate methods but God is 
the ultimate cause of fire. Now the question is if it is said that God is the 
ultimate cause, why should there be causal connection in the orderly 
succession of events? To answer this question, it is necessary first to 
understand the nature of causation. According to Ghazali nothing causes 
anything. Only antecedents have consequents. God alone is the efficient 
cause. Causality can be understood as the relation between two events 
which are conjoined like the relation between the condition and the 
conditioned. Certain conditions one can understand by common 
understanding but there are conditions which are understood only by those 
who see through the light of intuition. Ghazali says that there is divine 
purpose in linking between antecedents and consequents. God does not 
create this world at random. There is a succession of events without any 
break or irregularity. 
"Verily", says the Quran, "we did not create the 
heavens and the earth and what is between them in 
sport. We did not create them both but with truth, but 
most of them do not know".76 
God created this world according to a well arranged plan. The 
uniform succession of events is not at random. Again the question is if 
God is efficient cause how responsibility lies upon man. Does an effect 
have two causes? Ghazali says that the word `cause' can be used in two 
different senses. 
"It is said that the ruler killed a certain man. In another 
meaning it is said that the executioner killed the man. 
The meaning is the same as by order of the ruler, the 
executioner killed the man. In other words, the ruler 
killed the man".77 
God is the efficient cause of action. But, at the same time, man is 
also the cause of action as he is the source of the manifestation of uniform 
succession of events. In the case of executioner killing the man we have 
the real causal connection. While in the case of man being killed by the 
king's order we find the relation holding between antecedent and the 
consequent. This relation can also be described as the relation of condition 
and conditioned. In Qur'an we find several verses with a clear meaning of 
word `cause' that show the word is used in different senses: 
"The angel of death, who is given charge of you shall 
cause you to die: then, to your lord you shall be 
brought back".4e 
`Allah takes the souls at the time of their death".79 
"Have you considered what you sowTs°  
"We pour down the water, pouring it down in 
abandance. The cleave the earth; cleavini is asunder. 
Then we cause to grow therein the grain" .8  
"Fight them; Allah will chastise them by your hand and 
bring them to disgrace".82 
"So you did not slay them, but it was Allah who slew 
them, and thou didst not smite when thou didst smite, 
but it was Allah who smote, that He might confer upon 
the Believers a good gift from Himself'.83  
These verses show that the word cause signifies creative power and 
that cause must be applied to God alone. But man's power is the image of 
God's power. The word is applied to him metaphorically. As the death of a 
man is caused by the hand of the executioner and by the king's order, so 
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the word `cause' has been applied only in its secondary sense for man. 
God alone is the real efficient cause and the word must be applied to Him 
in its root sense, i.e., power. 
Now the question is why man is rewarded for his good deeds and 
punished for evil deeds, Ghazali says that before this discussion it is 
necessary to understand the nature of reward and punishment. He says 
everything possesses particular natural properties. For example, in the 
science of medicine a certain medicine possesses a certain quality. If a 
man takes poison, by its natural property it will kill the man. Then he has 
no right to ask the question, why poison kills him. Similarly, good and bad 
actions are invariably followed by pleasure and pain respectively. Man 
gets reward of pleasure for good actions and is punished for evil action. 
The good action is like nectar and evil works like elixir. The properties of 
actions have been discovered, as discoveries are made in medicine. The 
saints and prophets are the physicians of the heart. So man should listen 
them for the discovery of good and bad action. If one does not listen them 
he will suffer. Ghazali explains this idea with the help of a parable. 
"A certain king sent a horse, a robe of honour, and 
traveling expenses to one of his suzerains in a distant 
land. Although the king had no need of his services, the 
royal gift was a favour shown to his suzerain, so that he 
might come to king's court and be happy in his 
presence. If the suzerain understands the king's 
intention from the nature of the gift and utilizes it 
properly with a grateful heart, he will wait on the king 
and live happily, but if he misuses the gift or takes no 
heed of it, he will prove an ungreatful wretch"," 
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The aim of this parable is to tell that we should recognize the mercy 
of God and should not misuse it. God bestowed the gift i.e. life with bodily 
organs and mental and moral faculties. So we should utilize them properly. 
If we misuse them and do not give due regard to them, then we shall be 
kafirs or ungreatful. As Quranic verses show; 
"Verily", We created man in the best make. Then We 
render him the lowest of the low, except those who 
believe and do good, so they shall have a reward never 
to be cut off".8S 
These verses show that there is no fault in Allah's creation. Allah 
gave to man purest and best nature, and it is man's duty to preserve the 
pattern on which Allah has made him. If man rebels against Allah, and 
follows after evil, he will be abased to the lowest possible position. Those 
who follow Allah's law will reach the high and noble destiny intended for 
them. That reward will not be temporary but unfailing. 
Now the question is if all creation, all good and evil has spruang 
from God, can we still say that man has got freedom of action. The answer 
is yes. 
"Man has got freedom of action but it is not opposed to 
our opinion that everything that is the creation of God 
and man's freedom of will is also the creation of 
God". 86 
He explains this statement with the help of the example of eating. 
"For instance God created hand, tongue and delicious 
food. He created in mind this knowledge that the greed 
will be pacified by this food. He created also the 
contrary thought whether it would be good or injurious 
if the greed for food is satisfied and whether this kind 
of food is agreeable or not. He also created this 
understanding whether it has got any bar or not. If 
these causes are united, there comes the will to take 
that food. As a result of two conflicting thoughts and 
the greed for food, will comes in and that is called 
freedom of will. When all the elements are fulfilled, 
there comes will. When God creates the will and makes 
it firm. He allows his sound hand to extend towards 
food, as the unification of will and strength leads 
compulsorily to action. These two things, will and 
strength, are the creation of God" Y7 
We have seen before that Ghazali explained causality as a 
succession of events. Rather than being due to causal relation between 
them they were due to a custom ('adah). God creates things continuously 
in the same order of succession. He used the term `adoh for the term 
sunnah. 
"These created things, however, follow one another in 
an order of sequence in accordance with which God's 
custom (sunnah) proceeds in His creation, and in this 
procedure of God's custom there is no change".88 
With regard to the problem of free will, he tries to show that this 
conception of continuous creation is a divine custom. He says that divine 
custom means one created thing is the condition of the other created thing. 
One must precede and the other must follow: 
"So everything is created by God and one thing of his 
creation depends upon another thing. For instance, will 
comes after understanding, understanding comes after 
life and body comes before life. So the creation of 
body is necessary for life but not life for body. 
Similarly, creation of life is necessary for creation of 
understanding and not creation of understanding for 
life. Understanding does not come if there is no life. 
Understanding has been created to make will firm and 
not for creation ofwitl. Will does not come without life 
and understanding".89 
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Further, the succession of continuously created things in fixed and 
immutable order is determined by God's generosity. Human being also is 
subject to the same order as the other event of the world. 
Chapter — V 
CONCLUSION 
Freedom of will is one of the oldest problems in many religions as 
well as in philosophy. With regard to this problem number of questions arise 
in human mind. Is man a free agent ? Are his actions predetermined by 
mechanical laws by way of cause and effect relationship? Is man responsible 
for his good and bad actions ? If it were so, then, what would it mean to 
God's supremacy. If men were not free then there would be no 
responsibilities on man such as to reward or punish him for his actions. 
Before solving out these problems it is first necessary to understand 
the meaning of the expression "freedom of will". We can understand free 
will in two senses. In one sense free will is freedom of choice and in the 
other sense it is absence of compulsion and constraint. First meaning of free 
will shows the total freedom of man in doing anything he wants. Such type 
of freedom implies responsibility for the actions that man performs whether 
good or bad. Other meaning of freedom of will shows that one performs 
willingly or voluntarily what is determined for him by God, or some 
supreme power outside him. Freedom of will is here not understood as 
freedom of choice but as voluntary necessity i.e. some determined action 
having been done willingly or voluntarily. 
We see that voluntary necessity has been accepted by most or all 
predestinarian theologians. They hold that these predestined actions are 
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performed by human beings and they do involve responsibility although 
man has no power to choose his action. Such type of necessity has been 
common place in Augustinian Calvinistic theology in Christianity and also 
found in Islamic ideology. 
We can understand freedom of will in different senses viz, physical 
freedom, ideal freedom, freedom as the emergence of novelty and political 
freedom. The word "Freedom" itself has several meanings each distinct 
from other. If we think that our actions occur under the mechanical causal 
laws and if our self-effort cannot affect our actions then it becomes absurd 
to say that we are responsible for our actions. If we consider mechanical law 
as all-pervasive without involving our own choice, the self becomes an 
automatic machine. Just as machines are operated by external power and 
there is no option or choice before machine, similarly man has no option for 
choosing between the alternatives. Morality and ethics then become a fiction 
and delusion. Life would remain without morality. 
We commonly assume that men are capable to perform voluntary 
action. In this sense man is responsible for his action. But on the other hand, 
human behaviour appears to be entirely governed by causal laws. Then 
philosophical problem arises because of conflict between these two views. 
Early Greek and the later Western thinkers had thought freedom as denial of 
all external limitations and also the absence of compulsion or constrain in 
human action. Although every action has cause yet man is free. There is no 
compulsion on man. Socrates, Epicurus, Kant and Berkelay tried to find out 
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the rational basis of freedom in their philosophical writings. Socrates does 
not accept the mechanical theory. He says that mechanism left no room for 
freedom of choice. This theory leads to a world in which there is no 
meaning of morality and there is no use of human effort. After Socrates, 
Plato thought that man is master of his own destiny. While for Aristotle, "to 
be free meant to be rational". He said that if man's will was free then he can 
improve his conduct and character. Man chooses better alternative on the 
basis of his reason. If there is no option before man to choose between 
alternatives, then he cannot improve his character and conduct. 
This problem also has been discussed in modem Western philosophy. 
While Descartes accepts the view that human freedom as well as human 
understanding is limited, Spinoza calls free will as self-determination. He 
says that man is free only when his actions are determined by the inner 
tendencies or inner consciousness of his being. Leibniz, on the other hand, 
believed in physical freedom. He said that every event is determined and 
related with each other by the mechanics of natural law. But Locke does not 
accept this. Against Leibniz he gave preference to cause. He says that 
everything has a cause and that the present effect is the result of the past 
antecedent cause. After Locke, Hume too discussed this problem. According 
to him, free action is one that could have been avoided. That means there is 
a choice before human being. Man chooses this or that and he has the liberty 
to avoid undesirable option. 
For Kant determinism is phenomenal and freedom noumenal. Hegel 
said that freedom and necessity are two sides of the same coin. Moreover, 
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the idealists of nineteenth century are called libertarians. According to them, 
body is causal instrument while self is free from causation. 
This problem has also been discussed in different religions. We know 
that Judaism, Christianity and Islam belong to same Abrahamic family. So, 
most of the tenets of these religions are same. But there are some 
differences, too. The main difference is on the question of man's original 
sin. When God breathed His breath into the nostrile of Adam he become a 
living self. After creation of Adam, He prepared a garden for him. God 
made animals and birds and creeping things and Adam gave them their 
name. The act of naming showed the authorship or lordship of man over 
other things. But these living creatures could not remove loneliness of 
Adam. Then God created the partner of Adam. Adam gave to her the name 
Eve. Adam and Eve lived together in the garden of Eden. God said unto 
them, "you may eat any fruit from any tree, except the tree of the midst. 
From here the problem has started. Man's freedom arose along with God's 
commandments. On the one hand God gave them freedom of will to eat any 
fruit from any tree. But, on the other, He forbade them to eat a particular 
fruit from a particular tree. 
The problem of original sin started after the seduction of Adam and 
eve by Satan. Although God created man in His own image and the form of 
man was faultless, He also gave him free will. Adam and Eve could not 
observe the commandments and they lost their freedom of will and became 
sinners. At this point, the main difference between Christianity and Islam 
started. In Christianity it is believed that through Adam's disobedience of 
God whole humanity became sinner. It also came to be believed that man 
cannot repent sin by his own effort. But according to Islam there was no 
collective sin and man could remove his sin by his own effort and get 
salvation. But in Christianity there is a need for some help for salvation i.e. 
God's grace. 
In Judaism we find the concept of freedom of will in Torah. 
According to Moses Maimonides, this concept is very deep and profound. 
Without this concept what remains is only God's power and, as a corollary, 
the entire world would be impotent and passive. Furthermore, he says that in 
Bible God always scolds peoples. He always directs them to do good and 
improve their character. This means we have power to do good as well as 
evil. Torah tells us we have the ability to do good with the help of God. But 
it does not mean we have power to do whatever we want. Nor does it mean 
God helps us in every deeds either good and evil. Maimonides says that 
from Torah we can infer that we have free will for performing action but 
consequence is not in our hands. He gave the example: I work hard and 
plant a field full of seed by my choice. But it is not necessary that planting 
will be successful. Mostly the result is out of our hand. We can only do 
whatever is necessary for success. 
Maimonides proves man's freedom of will with the help of verses 
from Deut. The verse of Deut shows that man has free choice for choosing 
good and evil action. In spite of this those peoples who obey the 
commandments of God, they will live and flourish and God's blessing will 
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be with them. But those who do not obey the commandments of God, He 
would punish them. So, mankind must choose good. In the next verse of 
Deut God said to Moses, it is my wish the mankind always fears me, as they 
fear today. If they obey me then everything would be good for them. 
Further, He says that there is no guarantee they will always obey me and 
will do only good things. Maimonides holds that these verses prove that God 
gives freedom of will to human being. He says that if God had 
predetermined who shall obey or who shall not obey, then God would not 
say to Moses there is no guarantee they will obey me in future. God could 
have ordered to people of Israel. `Obey Me'. But He does not do so. This 
again shows that man has power to do good and reject sin. 
In Christian theology, St. Aquinas maintains that man's action as well 
as animal's actions are not same as mechanical action. He said man's as well 
as animal's actions are voluntary actions. Like humans animals also have 
voluntary power or freedom of choice. He gave the example when sheep 
sees the wolf, it takes immediate decision that running way is best for her at 
that time. But in the case of man, running away is not the only option. In 
man the choice of action depends upon mode of knowledge. He considers 
human will as "rational appetite". He says that we choose evil will only 
because we understand evil will is desirable. No one can choose evil will 
knowingly. 
Similarly, we find various views about freedom of will in Islam. In 
Qur'an we find both types of verses which show on the one hand supremacy 
of God and, on the other, man's power in making his destiny. On the basis 
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of these two apparently contradictory types of verses, two different schools 
emerged. On the one hand were determinists who said that man's action, 
like other general events, are determined by God's will. On the other hand, 
the liberatarians said that man has absolute freedom of will. He is maker of 
his own destiny. They raised the status of human being by confirming man's 
power vis-a-vis God's power. Islam obviously confirms the God's ultimate 
power and at the same time, accepts the practical liberty and responsibility 
of man. God is supreme sovereign, but human beings also have some power 
in shaping their destiny. They have freedom of choice between good and 
evil, right and wrong. 
The `Jabr' or deterministic school of thought was founded by Jahm b 
Safwan who said that man has no freedom of will. He has no liberty, no 
choice of action. His actions are same as the action of machine. So man is 
not responsible for his action. Against this Jabr school of thought, the Qadr 
school of thought came into existence. The founder of this school was 
Ma'bad al-Juhaini. He expressed the view that man has liberty and has 
freedom of choice. The problem of Qadr and Jabr directly related to the 
problem of god and evil. With regard to this problem the question arose 
who is responsible for creation of good and evil. There are three 
possibilities. Firstly, God is responsible for the creation of good and evil. 
Secondly, good things are crated by God and evil by man. Thirdly, God 
created only things, they become good and bad in given circumstances. But 
these answers are not satisfactory answers. 
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Mutrazilites, who were Qadrites, maintained that reason is the true 
criterion of choosing between good and evil. According to them, through 
reason we can distinguish between the things which are good and 
rewardable and the things which are evil and punishable. Further they said 
that every human action has some inherent merit or demerit. If truth is good 
it is good not because of religion or commandments, but because of the 
merit which is found in the truth. Similarly, falsehood is bad and punishable, 
not because it is condemned by God but because it is prohibited by 
commonsense. Mu'tazilites like Ibrahim al-Nazzam, Abu-al-Hudhyal etc. 
believed in the view that man has free will which is given by God. Man 
performs action according to his freedom of will. God has no power over 
man's action. Because two possessors cannot be there for one object of 
power. 
But Shahham's view is different from the rest of Mutazilites and 
Qadrites. He claimed that God has power over man's action. He maintains 
that every object of power has two possessors i.e. God and man. Further, 
Shahham says that man has power to act which is given by God. But it does 
not mean it is power to will to act. He also says that although both powers 
are ultimately with God and He can deprive or retain this power in man. 
Ash'arite school of thought come into existence to oppose Mutazila 
school of thought. Al-Ash'ari adopted intermediate position between Jabr 
and Qadr. He said that God is the originator of man's action (khaliq), and 
man is the acquirer of that action (muktasib). According to him, there are 
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two kinds of power: one is original and other is derived. The original power 
is effective and derived power cannot create anything. 
The power which man possesses is derived power. Hence God is the 
creator of man's power. Man is only acquirer. He creates the power in 
human being for performing action and also creates the power for choosing 
between two alternatives. Hence human action is created by God. Man is 
free only in making the choice between the alternatives. On the basis of this 
power he gets reward or punishment in the other world. 
Kadi Bakillani who was the follower of al-Asha'ri holds that man's 
action are created by God. He distinguishes between generic subject of act 
and specific form of act. The specific form of effect may assume in any of 
its operation. For example: an act of movement may be generic subject of 
act. But its actual operation such as sitting down, standing up, walking and 
so on is said to be specific form of subject. 
He insists that the essence of the act occurs by power of God, but its 
becoming obedience or disobedience is not power of God but power of man. 
He opened the door for human freedom of action. Hence Bakillani holds that 
God creates directly movements in man but by his own power he determines 
what form of motion should be. That means generic subject of act is created 
by God but its mode of operation is created by man. 
Against this historical backdrop, we can now discuss and compare the 
views of St. Augustine and Ghazali on the problem of free will. St. 
Augustine maintains that this world consists of hierarchy which is called 
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order. In as much as man is part of this natural hierarchy or order, he is also 
governed by this order. But there is a difference between man and other 
worldly things. What distinguishes man from the rest is his reason and will. 
Man's action depends upon his will and is not subject to compulsion. The 
purpose of man's voluntary action is to realizes the divine order. Augustine 
accepts the domination of will over all the faculties either rational or 
empirical. He says that it is not easy to prove will's domination where 
knowledge is concerned. But he says there no doubt about it. He says our 
will is involved in sense organs too, as without will sensation does not take 
place. Sometimes it happens that our sense organ is fixed on a particular 
object. The object gives information about its image. But sense organ does 
not receive the image. This is because the will is not involved in sensation. 
When the will inclines towards object, only then sensation would take place. 
Similarly, sometimes it happens that someone says something but we do not 
take notice of it. Because our will is not fixed on his speech we do not hear 
anything. 
Further, we find will's domination over the memory also. Will's 
domination is also over those things which are beyond sensible order. The 
will is indeed on active force which is the cause of rational knowledge. For 
before gaining any kind of knowledge, we have to first desire it. We know 
because we want to know. We seek knowledge because we want to find it. 
So, any kind of knowledge which we gain originates from the will. Hence 
operation of the will depends upon the voluntary decision. So we can say 
that will is man himself. 
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St. Augustine maintains that as physical things have a weight, the will 
also has a kind of weight which is love. As physical body moves through 
weight, the soul of everybody moves by love. This love is not additional 
quality of man but the essence of man. The quality of action depends upon 
quality of will and quality of will depends upon the quality of love. 
Like Augustine at Ghazali favours the view that man has power for 
performing voluntary action. In this connection, he presents his theory of 
action. According to him, there are three types of action i.e. natural, 
intentional and voluntarily action. He says that for performing any action 
three things are necessary i.e. knowledge, will and power. An action will be 
fruitful only when it is accompanied with will and power. All three things 
are necessary for performing action. He says that natural actions are those in 
which man's will does not take part such as breathing, thinking and so on. 
Intentional actions are those which happen in self-protection or for 
the avoidance of the evil by the consciousness. These occur suddenly and 
without deliberation. For example, if drawn sword comes toward someone, 
he raises his hand in self-protection without deliberation or thinking. Third 
type of actions are those in which alternative is possible. Reason makes a 
choice which action will be fruitful for us. As Augustine had thought the 
purpose is nothing other than to realizes the divine order. In the same way, 
Ghazali says willful action occurs in accordance to natural dictations of 
divine law or God's law. He gave the example: if someone takes a needle 
and tries to pierce that needle into other's eyes, the other person will 
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suddenly close his eyes. Although this action occurs according to one's will, 
it happens in accordance to God's natural law. 
Both Augustine and Ghazali believed that man is creation of God and 
free will was also given by God to man. On the basis of this gift he has 
capacity to choose between good and bad actions. Due to this gift man leads 
a moral life. Man can choose right action in the light of his moral 
conviction. In spite of this it may be possible he chooses evil under some 
temptation. Man has the capacity to choose good as well as evil. But the 
question here is how far is God responsible for man's evil. Because after all 
by giving freedom God gives man the capacity to choose evil. 
St. Augustine says that free will is good as number of other things are 
good. There are number of things which are good as well as necessary. But 
we make them evil through bad use. For example, hands are good and 
necessary organs of the body. But if one has his hand and through his hand 
he commits crime, it would be bad use of his hand. So free will itself is good 
though it may be misused for evil actions by man. 
According to St. Augustine, free will is intermediate good. One has 
freedom of will and is free to turn towards absolute good and get happiness 
and also free to turn away from God and turn towards evil. These are free 
acts. Now, why does the will choose sin. God is cause of everything. So He 
is also cause of sin. If it is not so then where from comes the evil? St. 
Augustine maintains that everything has some good and that good comes 
from God. When we see a thing in proper measure and order, we accept God 
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is cause of it. But we also often find a thing without measure and order but 
still find in it a seed of good. Through this God brings the thing to its 
perfection step by step. God created man thus with free will so that he has 
capacity to separate himself from God. But it is man's duty not to do so. The 
fall of first man is not like the fall of stone. The fall of Adam was a free act. 
So sin is deficiency or lack of order just as silence is merely absence of 
sound and darkness is merely absence of light. The sin in our will is likewise 
the absence in us of love for God. 
The human being has freedom and therefore he is responsible for his 
action and gets reward and punishment according to his deeds. But although 
man has free will he does not always choose the right action. For choosing 
the right action he is in need of God's help. God's help is a necessary factor 
in choosing right action and avoiding evil action. 
But does it mean God debases man's freedom of will. He says `no'. 
St. Augustine proves compatibility of God's grace and man's freedom of 
will in terms of God's foreknowledge? Now, what is meant by God's 
foreknowledge. How is it possible God knows all events and yet we commit 
sin by necessity? How can free will remain when such type of necessity is 
found. St. Augustine's answer is that of all things that happen and do not 
happen some are by necessity some by will. God knows what I shall will but 
does not know what I do. God knows what I shall will before I have willed 
it. But this foreknowledge occurs when our will comes to pass itself. God 
has fore knowledge of what and when I shall will. For example, I know 
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about someone very well that he is going to commit sin. But my knowledge 
does not itself necessitate that sin. My knowledge cannot force him to 
commit sin. If we predict that a person will do such and such a thing it does 
not mean he is bound to do it or he is forced to do it. So God foreknows 
what I shall will, but does not know what I shall do. 
Discussing the same issue from an Islamic mystic perspective, 
Ghazali divides human being into three categories. First one are those whose 
character is unformed. They have no ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong. They are ignorant. They have no self-consciousness and no moral 
character. Such type of character of man can be easily improved. They are in 
need of some guidance and some determination through which they could 
walk on right path. The second type of men are those who are under control 
of passion. They have knowledge and they can be reformed of their 
character by offshuting their evil habits, and cultivating the virtuous habits. 
Such type of men are amenable to good influence. The third type of people 
do evil addictively. They think their ways are good and to act according to 
them is necessary. Their self- consciousness has only the animal desires and 
their rational self has been suppressed. To improve their character is almost 
impossible. Fourth type of people feel proud of their evil doing. 
Improvement of such type of persons is not possible. They can walk on right 
path only through the divine power. We find the description of third and 
fourth types of persons in Qur'an when it says God has put seal upon their 
heart and upon their hearing. The fact however that human character can be 
changed and improved shows that man is free. 
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In order to prove that man has freedom of choice, Ghazali divides 
human action into three kinds. These are natural, intentional and voluntary 
actions. Voluntary action proves man's freedom of will. Ghazali tries to 
show man's position in performing action. He says that fire has power to 
bum compulsarily. And we know that God's action is the result of His 
absolute will. Man has got his position between the two. He is not 
completely guided by external agency and also does not perform action the 
way it is done by God. Man has got intermediate position. God created 
power and will in man. The act of choice such as walking, writing etc. is 
created by God in man. He creates this action through four things namely, 
knowledge, will and power and movement. Both action of choice and 
intentional action starts with knowledge. Knowledge gives the judgement 
that particular action will be beneficial or not. But although both types of 
actions start with knowledge and will but the effects are different in these 
two actions. The example for intentional action is of lamb's instinctive fear 
of the wolf and its running way from the wolf without thinking and 
deliberation. But in the case of voluntary action like an act of writing, man 
does not perform that action suddenly but with deliberation. 
In Ghazalian thinking we also find the concept of Acquisition. 
Acquisition is a position that is between libertarianism and determinism. 
Libertarianists hold that God has power over certain action and does not 
have power over certain other actions. For example, God has power over 
movements and rest of man. But he has no power over belief and unbelief. 
They say that noble acts are created by God while base acts are created by 
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man. According to Ghazali, power means the power to move or, in other 
words, power of action. Man has power to move and not to move. Three 
things are attached with voluntary action i.e. knowledge, will and power. 
These three things are created by God in man. Power is an attribute of man 
but not acquisition of man and movement is an attribute of man but also an 
acquisition. Both are created by God. The acquisition cannot be regarded as 
compelled act nor as free act. Because how could a movement be regarded 
as compelled act when man has consciousness about right and wrong? How 
could be a man the author of this free act? For the authorship of one's 
action, knowledge and control of every action are necessary. But man has 
neither foreknowledge nor control over his action in different circumstances. 
Hence these two extremes are not liable to acceptance. He therefore adopts 
the middle position of acquisition. Ghazali maintains that power of choosing 
and power of action of man are created by God in man. The acquisition is 
distinguished from necessity and freedom. He gave the example of fire. Fire 
bums by necessity. Man may acquire fire through appropriate methods. But 
God is the ultimate cause of fire. Ghazali does not believe in cause and 
effect relationship. According to Ghazali nothing causes anything. Only 
antecedents have consequents. God alone is efficient cause of every effect. 
Causality cannot be understood as the relation between two events 
which are conjoined like the condition and conditioned. God is the efficient 
cause of action, but at the same time man is also cause of action. Does it 
mean one effect has two causes. Ghazali says no. he tries to explain the idea 
with the help of parable of ruler who killed a man. Apparently we see that 
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the executioner kills the man. But in reality he is killed by executioner by 
the order of king. In the same way, one effect has two causes. One is God 
and other is man. This relation also describes as condition and conditioned. 
Now the question is if God is efficient cause of every action why man 
is rewarded for good deeds and punished for evil. Ghazali says that 
everything possesses a natural property. He says that if a man takes 
possession of its natural property, then he has no right to ask question why 
he kills the man. Similarly, good and bad actions are invariably followed by 
pleasure and pain respectively. Men get reward for good action and are 
punished for evil action. The good action is like nectar and evil works like 
elixir. The properties of actions have been discovered as discoveries are 
made in medicine. The saints and prophets are physician of the heart so man 
should listen to them to know good and bad action. 
Now when we compare both thinkers we find that in two thinkers 
there are more similarities than dissimilarities. Augustine proves freedom of 
will with the help of verses of Bible. He says that we find different 
commandment of God which proves man has power to obey or disobey. 
Further he says that there will be no meaning of commandments if we have 
no free will. Similarly, Ghazali also prove man's freedom of will with the 
help of Quranic verses. He also says that man's character is capable of 
improvement and that shows that man is free. If man were not free then how 
could he change or reform his character. In Augustinian thinking great 
attention was paid to God's grace. God's grace was necessary factor for 
leading a good life. Ghazali also accepts God's grace. 
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St. Augustine maintains that man's will is not subject to divine 
compulsion. Man's voluntary action has a purpose. This purpose is nothing 
other than to realizes the divine order. He accepts that man knows the law. 
But to the further question does man also will it? he answers that every 
decision depends upon his will. In other words, it is man's will that allows 
or does not allow man to follow God's order. Man often sees this order as a 
thing which is imposed by God. But he holds that the power which takes 
important decision is man's own will. This power does not take part only in 
taking decision in the practical affairs but covers almost every conative 
decision. It controls man's empirical as well as rational faculty_ 
Like Augustine, Ghazali also accepts the different changing stages of 
man's soul. The journey from nafs ammarah to nafs mutamainna shows the 
movement of the soul. Ghazali divided man in this world into four 
categories viz. ignorant, ignorant and misguided, ignorant, misguided and 
wicked, ignorant, misguided, wicked and devilish. Like the four classes of 
men in this world man can also be divided into four classes in the next world 
viz, one class for destruction, one class for punishment, one class for 
salvation, one class for success. Ghazali explain the difference between 
these class of men with the help of analogy of a powerful king. If king is just 
he will kill only those who deny his sovereignty. He will punish only those 
who have got defects in their service to him. He will praise only those who 
admit king's rank and position. He will reward only those who spend their 
live in this service. The will is thus in man's hand. But ultimately it is God 
who destroyed people, gave punishment, give salvation and give them how 
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to know the nature of free will. Ghazali says peoples are like the blind men 
who do not know the whole reality. 
To conclude, St. Augustine and Ghazali were both theologians and 
saints. Their main tenets are similar as Christianity or Islam belong to same 
Abrahamoic family. Both accepted the reality of free will. Both accepted the 
idea of voluntary necessity. But while St. Augustine said that no one can get 
salvation through his own effort and God's grace was needed in gaining 
salvation, Ghazali presented the idea of acquisition. He also accept that the 
God's grace is necessary but he gave more importance to man's effort. 
APPENDIX - I 
A BRIEF LIFE OF ST. AUGUSTINE 
Aurelius Augustinus, more commonly known as "St. Augustine of 
Hippo" and often simply known as Augustine. Aurelius Augustinus was 
born at Tagaste, a town of Numidia on the 13 November 354 A.D. His 
father, Patricus was a burgees of his town. He was a pagan. His mother 
Monica was not only a Christian but a woman of the most elevated, tender, 
and devoted piety. She early instructed her son in the faith and love of Jesus 
Christ. In the midest of all his youthful he was an earnest student. His father 
observing the early developing his talents. 
The period of St. Augustine known as "decline of Roman Empire".' 
This period was the period of social, political and theological transformation 
and also transformation of St. Augustine from Paganism to Christianity. 
"His life also spanned one of the most important phases 
in the transition from Roman paganism to Christianity".2 
In this period most of the Roman pagan had been adopted 
Christianity, although paganism had not altogether end. 
"Nevertheless, it was during this period that Roman state 
adopted Christianity as the official state religion".3  
His education began in his native town Tageste with the state 
language Latin and Arithmatic. He studied not only at his native town, but 
at Madura and Carthage. Latin and Greek literature has played very 
important role in his life. In his childhood he studied the latin poets such as 
Terrence, Horace, Catullas, Ovid, Juvenal Persius and Martial. His writing 
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bear many traces of his similarity with Latin poets which started from his 
school days. But his acquaintance with Greek literature was limited. He 
went on to study the Hortensius of Cicero. The study of Hortensius 
awakened in him an ardent love of philosophy. He engaged restlessly in 
philosophical study. After basic education, when he was eleven years old, 
his parents send him Madaurus to continue his education. In a continuation 
of his education at the age of 16, he went to Charthage. This period was the 
period of his profligacy or moral dissolute life. In that city he had a love 
affair. He took a concubine and give birth a son. The name of his son was 
Adeodatus. Meaning of Adeodatus is "gift of God". But he referred his son 
as "child of my sin". The pagan atmosphere of this city diverted from 
Christianity. 
"In Carthage, Augustine's education centered primarily 
on his becoming a rhetorician and lawyer — a field in 
which he become highly proficient".4 
His materialistic mind could not found satisfactory answer in 
Christianity therefore he detached himself from Christianity. In this stage he 
came to contract with manichians and become the follower of this sect. 
Manichians sect based on two principles — (i) Ormuzd, (ii) Ahriman. Good 
principle is responsible for good and evil principle for the evil. Near about 
nine years Augustine was strongly attracted towards manichaeism. 
Manichaeism was dualistic religion. This religion had been founded by 
Mani (C. AD 215-76). According to this there are two eternal principle, 
light (spirit) and darkness (i.e. matter). 
"For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, 
as it were, violently moved to give my support to foolish 
deceivers, when they asked me "whence is evil come" — 
and "Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs 
and nails?" ... At which things I, in my ignorance, was 
much disturbed, and retreating from the truth I appeared 
to myself to be going towards it".5 
"This cultural and its educational system were the two 
sources that supplied the initial impulse for Augustine's 
thinking. His sureh for truth and wisdom with his 
reading at the age of 18 of now lost dialogue by Civero, 
the Hortensius".6  
The work Cicero made great impact of St. Augustine. He could not 
forgate this. He mentioned this in his later writings. He wrote in 
confessions, the work of Cicero changed my interest and gave me a new 
direction or purpose of my life. 
"This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned 
my prayers to thy self, 0 Lord, and made me have other 
hopes and desires" .7  
He appointed as a teacher in his native city and later in Milan. In 
Milan he devoted himself. 
"Beginning with autumn of 373 A.D., saint Augustine 
embarked upon a career as a teacher. First in Tagaste, 
than in Carthage, and next in Rome he forged ahead 
with great success".s  
When he could not find satisfactory answer in Manichaemism. There 
was again transformation from Manichaeism to skepticism. He become 
sceptic. During the teaching he was altogether under the spell of 
Manichaeism religion. The spell of Manichaean had finally broken through 
the influence of his new friend in Milan, Bishop ambrose and the Christian 
Neoplatonists around him, 
"And to Milan I come, to Ambrose the bishop, known to 
the whole world as among the best of men".9 
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"And I began to love him, not at first, indeed, as a 
teacher of the truth which I entirely despaired of in thy 
church — but as a man friendly to myself '.10 
The study of Plato's and Neoplatonist's writing gave stability in his 
thought. In Milan he tried to search those questions that had worried him 
about Manichaean religion. He found more satisfactory answers of those 
questions in Christianity rather then Manichaean religion, which he already 
found in his mother Monica. He felt that at that time there was no great 
difference between Christianity and atmosphere of Neo-platonic thought of 
the time. 
"Even in 400, when he wrote his confession he spoke of 
the teachings of the 'Platonists' as preparing his way to 
Christianity". 
He mentioned in his book confessions, Neoplatonism as containing 
the distinguish Christian doctrine about God and his word, the creation of 
the world and so on. At Milan the conflict of his mind in search of truth still 
continued. Ambrose was bishop of Milan, although he had a weak voice, yet 
Augustine was attracted by his reputation and went to here the famous 
Christian preacher in order. St. Augustine said that, the bishop's eloquence 
was more full of knowledge, yet in manner less pleasurable and soothing, 
than that of Faustus. Ambrose had no leisure for philosophic discussion. He 
continued to hear Ambrose preach, and gradually the gospel of divine truth 
and grace was received into his heat. First Plato and then St. Paul opened his 
mind to higher thought. On day he was busy with his friend. Alypius in 
studying the Pauline epistles. His struggle of mind became intolerable. The 
thought of divine purity fighting in his heart with the love of the world and 
the flesh. He brust into an incontrollable flood of tears and rushed out into 
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his garden and he might allow his tears to have full vent, and pour out his 
heart to God. Suddenly he seemed to hear a voice calling upon him to 
consult the divine oracle, "Take up and read, take up and read". He stopped 
off weeping, rose up, and sought the volume where Alypius was sitting, and 
opening it read the following passage. He saw Alypius read the passage of 
Rom viii 13-14 "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and 
wantonness, not in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, 
and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof' (Rom VIII 
1314) St. Augustine said, I had neither desire nor need to read farther and 
said that the light of peace had been poured into my heart. All the shadows 
of doubt dispersed. 
After his conversion in 386 A.D. Augustine gave up his profession as 
a teacher of rhetoric, he returned to Rome for a short time and then returned 
to his native city. He lived according to monantic rules and under popular 
pressure, he become bishop of Hippo as a priest. Now the work of St. 
Augustine was served to church such as preaching administration travel and 
so on. 
During his Bishophood he had to face many opponents of 
manichaeanism, Donatists and Pelagians. In spite of these objection he 
never ceased to be a thinker and scholar. According to St. Augustine the 
status and role of the bishop is not only as administrator but a teacher 
interpretor and defender of pure doctrine. According to him a priest is 
responsible for determining orthodoxy, through use of the pronouncement 
of council as well as scripture and for eradicating heresies. As a church 
father and theologian Augustine was the person who defined Christian 
heresy. He defined most three prominent heresy (1) Donatism, (2) 
Polagianism, (3) Manichaeanism. When he became priest of hippo, he did 
not wait to attack on his moral enemies. 
"The ponatists accused the Catholics of having a 
blamished priesthood and thus no true sacraments".12 
Augustine gave his view against to Donaticism. He clearly argued 
that the efficacy or the quality of sacraments does not depends upon the 
worthness of the priest. At the end of sixth century north African church had 
divided. Donaticism is the name of that sachism. The reason behind this 
schism were both theological and non-theological issues. The members of 
Donaticism believed in holy spirit not to authority of priest or to be under 
the continuous guidance of holy spirit. They does not believe in authority of 
priesthood. 
"Under cyprian's guidance, the church had decided that 
a valid sacrament could not be administered by a cleric 
in a state of sin or to one who was outside the church".13 
They hold that priest could not governed the state because he also a 
sinner. So people should separate themselves from a priest who is sinner. 
Again Donaticism Augustine gave his view. 
"The efficacy of the sacraments does not depends upon 
the worthness of the priest".14 
That means according to St. Augustine the validity or authority of 
sacraments does not depends upon the priest. According to St. Augustine, 
my root is Christ, he claimed which I was born is the word of God. He 
further said I don't believed in authority of priesthood or priest by whom I 
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was baptized, but I believed in Christ who justifies the sinner and he can 
forgive sin of human being. According to St. Augustine church is not found 
in personal character, but in the Union of whole church with Christ. He 
holds — 
"The church is not made up of saints as the donatists 
hold but of a mixed body of saints and more or less 
repantants sinners. Augustine insisted that weak 
members must be patiently born by the church — as in 
the parable of the wheat and tares". 1 s  
Hence Augustine ask the question how can there be a full separation 
of saints and sinners prior to final judgement? 
Next cheresy which have to face Augustine was pelagianism. 
Pelgious was Christian layman. According to him, man has in their own 
power to avoid sin and achieve righteousness. He criticized on this point is 
that, he derogate grace of God. Although he did not deny this fact. That the 
power to avoid sin is given by God. But he denied the need for cooperative 
grace or divine assistance to avoid sin and achieve righteous action. 
"Pelagious claimed that what one does, either laudable 
or blameworthy, depends upon individual".'b 
That means man has inherent capacity for avoidance or achievement. 
St. Augustine does not accept this view he insisted that God's grace alone 
enables fallen humanity to achieve anything worthy. According to him 
freedom of will does not linked with the humanity nature, but links with 
God's grace. In De Gratia et Libero Arbitro (On grace and Free will). 
"Augustine asserts, "No man.,.. when he sins, can in his 
r 	 heart blame God for it, but everyman must impute the 
fault to himself... Nor does it detract from man's own 
freedom of will when he performs any act in accordance 
with the will of God"." 
According to saint Augustine man cannot save himself and salvation 
can be got with the grace of God or in other words salvation is God's doing 
not human being. Next heresy which he has to face is Manichaeism. The 
founder of Manichaeism is the Mani, was born in southern Babylonia about 
AD 216. The Manichaeism myth based on two principles light and 
darkness. 
"Mani taught the existence of two principles of things, 
both eternal and perpetually in opposition, namely Light 
and Darkness. Light is identical in essence with God, 
while Darkness is evil and the world's history is merely 
the history of the struggle between these two 
principles".'s 
Maniehaeism used to explain the problem of evil through two 
ultimate principle (i) Ormuzd (ii) Ahriman. Good principle is responsible 
for good evil principle for evil. 
"He denounced the manichaein cosmology, the view of 
man and man's sin, and especially the concept of God as 
having human attributes and anatomical features".19 
He does not accept manichain's view that the attribution of evil to 
deity. He reject the dualistic manichaun's claimed that good and evil had 
their origin in two distinct deities. According to Augustine there is only one 
true God. Now I twin towards the discussion of St. Augustine's morality or 
free will. Morality lies at the centre of Augustine's thought. 
The modem concept of the will is often said to originate with 
Augustine. Certainly the idea of will is central to his philosophy of mind, as 
well as to his account of sin and the origin of evil. 
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Man is the God's creation and free will is the gift of God. That means 
he has capacity to choose. But this gift of God of free will to the man is not 
only the capacity to do good but also evil. So, is God is responsible for evil 
what man does? That means evil would not be in this world if God did not 
give free will. Augustine in his book tried to himself to answer this 
question. 
Augustine holds that man has the freedom to choose between good 
and evil, so he is responsible for their good and evil actions. Hence their 
actions deserve praise and blame, reward and punishment. Although man 
has capacity to choose good action never the less he does not do right, 
without God's grace. Another question arises, Is this does not derogate 
man's freedom. That means man's freedom and God's grace are 
compatiable. 
These are some of the questions which St. Augustine try to set out in 
his book De Libero Arbitrio. 
Hence we see that there are lot of changes come in his life. After 
three years spent in retirement he took a journey to Hippo, to see a Christian 
friend. There Christian community has a bishop, but they want presbyter 
Augustine being chooses as a prespyter by the people. He would fail have 
escaped, but the cureh could not give up his services. He become a 
presbyter and finally become bishop of Hippo. He served the catholic 
church until his death 28th of August 430 AD. When he was receiving the 
pertial parlam. 
Appendix —II 
A BRIEF LIFE OF AL-GHAZALI 
Abu Haid Mohammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn 
Mohammad ibn Taus Ahmad al Taus al-Shafi was known as al-Ghazali. He 
was born in 450/1058 at Tabran. His father was pious dervish. Unfortunately 
he was illiterate. His father died in his early life. Al-Ghazali and his brother 
became orphan. At the time of his death he said to his sufi friend, 
"unfortunately I could not get education, so its my great wish my both 
children become literate". Then Ghazali and his brother brought up and 
educated by a pious sufi friend. At the young age Ghazali began the study of 
theology and law first in his native town from Shaikh Ahmad ibn 
Muhammad al Radhkhani al-Tusi and then at Jurjan under the Imam abu 
Nasr al Isma'ili. When he was about twenty years where he started study 
under al-Juwaini known as Imam al Haramain. He was Ash'arite theologian 
of the day. In this academy there were various subjects such as, theology, 
Sufism, canon law, philosophy, logic, dialectics, natural sciences etc. Imam 
al-Haramain gave full freedom to his peoples for the discussion and freedom 
for expression of their ideas. He encouraged to his puple for all kind of 
discussion. Al-Ghazali gave proof his philosophical understanding and 
learning. 
"Imam al-Haramain described him as a plenteous ocean 
to be drowned".' 
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After sometime he started to give lecture his fellow students. When 
he was in Nizamiyyah Academy he become restless or impatient about 
dogmatic teaching and here he showed the sign of skepticism. During this 
period he became disciple of the sufi abu `Ali al Fad] ibn Mohammad ibn 
'Ali al-Famadhi al Tusi. He practiced of sufistic exercises under his 
guidance but his desire could not be satisfied. As he himself said, "he could 
not attain that stage where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from 
"high above". "So he did not feel quite settled down in his mind" .2  
Al-Ghazali was on the one hand dissatisfied with speculative systems 
of the scholastic theologians on the other he could not satisfied with sufistic 
experience. Nizam al-Mulk was very inspired of his knowledge of Muslim 
law, theology, and philosophy. So he appointed him chair person of 
theology in the Nizamiyyah Academy at Baghdad in 484/1091. Al-Ghazali 
got complete success as professor. He is known as the greatest theologian in 
the Ash'arite traditional that time. But old doubt arised him again. He 
became again sceptic. The quest search for truth increases more and more. 
He says that from the period of my young age when I was fiftieth year old I 
have ventured into this vast ocean. I have searched out all the faith and 
believe of every sects, and tried to remove error from truth. He says that 
there was no philosopher whose system remain from me in order to 
understanding nor theologian whose doctrine I did not followed out. Further 
he says that no secrets are remain which I have not penetrated. He says that 
quest for truth was insight me from the early age. I broken the traditional 
belief and freed myself from heresy. He started search for truth from the 
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sense perception. He says that may be our sight is the source of knowledge. 
He observed movement of the shadow. 
"Observation and experience, however, show 
subsequently that a shadow moves not suddenly, it is 
true, but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is never 
really motionless".3  
Further he observed our eye perceive a star, it is large same as piece 
of gold. But mathematically star is more time larger than piece of gold. So, 
from this, he says that this type of notion which senses declare true does not 
accepted as true by reason. These notions are contradicted. Then he could 
not trust on sense perception. He thought that this surety may be found in 
intellectual inquiry, which is based on fundamental principles, "such as: ten 
is greater than three; the same thing cannot simultaneously be affirmed and 
denied; nothing here below can be both created and eternal, existent and 
non-existent, necessary and impossible".4 
He said that a doubt arises insight me, what is guarantee reason is 
more reliable source of knowledge than of sense perception. He said, my 
senses claim that when you trusted me, but reason contradicted me, 
otherwise you trust me till now. So may be possible third thing come would 
be over and above of reason, who refuted reason as reason refuted us. 
"Then the difficulty appeared to resemble the problem 
of sleep. I told myself that when one is asleep our 
believes all sorts of things and finds oneself in all sorts 
of citations; one believes in them absolutely, without the 
slightest doubt. When one wakes up, one realizes the 
inconsistency and inanity of the phantasm of the 
imagination".5 
204 
So, from this he conclude that reason also is not reliable source of 
knowledge. When you awake no guarantee of the motion which derive from 
senses and reason are real. This condition may be fmd in Sufism which sufi 
call "ecstasy". In this state sufi claim that they reached in that state where 
they become totally absorbed in themselves. In that state they looses their 
consciousness, his mind does not agree with what is given by reason that 
state may be called death. As prophets says: 
"Men are asleep; when they die, they wake"6  
From this Ghazali' faith on reason may end. 
"This unhappy state lasted about two months, during 
which I was not, it is true, explicitly or by profession but 
morally and essentially a thorough going sceptic".7 
After two months God guided me and I come out this mental malady. 
When I cured from this disease from the God's mercy. I realized there are 
four categories of seeker of truth. 
"I. the scholastics (mutakallimun), who claim 
discernment and speculative capabilities. 
2. The interiorists (batiniyya), who claim to be the 
masters of teaching (ta'lim) and are characterized by 
their belief in the need for an infalliable Imam. 
3. The philosophers (Falasifah), who consider 
themselves exponents of logic and proof. 
4. The mystics (sufiyya), who seek the privilege of 
Divine Presence (Ahl al-Hadra), vision and 
inspiration".8 
He said that, I realized truth does not hide from these four groups of seekers. 
Further he says that if one does not find out truth, one should be give up 
hope for gaining truth. 
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"I soon set myself to follow these four paths and to 
examine what there groups hold, beginning with 
scholasticism, passing through philosophy and 
interiorism, and finishing with the mysticism of the 
sufis' 9 
As Ghazali maintained that there are four category seeker of truth, 
similarly he divided philosophers into three categories. One is materialists, 
second one is naturalists and third one theists. 
Materialists (dahriyyun) : This group had denied the existence of creator. 
They holds that this universe has existence eternally without creator. It is 
self subsisting system. This world developed by itself and by its own laws 
and can be understood by itself. These groups are atheist (zandiqa). 
"In their view the world exists from all eternity and had 
no author. The animals comes from semen and semen 
from the animal; so it has always been and will always 
be; those who maintain this doctrines are atheists".1° 
The Naturalist (taba'iiyun) : The naturalists believed in wonder creation 
and admitted the existence of a wise creator, but they does not admitted the 
spirituality and immortality of the human soul. They deny heaven, hell, 
resurrection, and day of judgement. 
"There also ought to be called atheists, for the true faith 
depends riot only on the acknowledgement of God, but 
of His apostle and of the Day of Judgment. And they 
acknowledge God and His attributes, they deny a 
jdugement to come"." 
The theists (ilahiyyun) : It is supposed Socrates who was the teacher of 
Plato and Plato who was the teacher of Aristotle consider as theists 
philosophers. This group explain the rules of logic for his pupils, illustrated 
what was formerly obscure. This group refuted the former two system i.e. 
r M. 
the materialists and naturalists, but they made argument which should not be 
make. Aristotle goes against the theories of Plato and Socrates. He separated 
himself from them. But he could not escape himself from the stain of 
infidelity and heresy. So Ghazali consider them as unbeliever. Ghazali holds 
that muslim philosopher i.e. Ibn Sina and Farabi who adopted their 
philosophy also unbeliever. After spending eleven year as a wandering 
dervish and scholar, finally he returned to his native town. Tus in 499/1105. 
After coming back Tus, he spended his life as retire person. He spended his 
time in meditation and contemplation. But very soon Faith al-ulk, the son of 
Nizam al-Mulk, who as the vizier of Sultan Sanjar, requested him to accept 
the chair of theology at the Maimunah Nizamiyyah college at Nishapur. He 
accepted this offer after some hesitation. But he did not stay their long time. 
He come back his native town and established a madrasah. He teaches both 
theology and tasawwuf. He lived in Madrsah with some personal disciples. 
He spended his life with study and devotion till his death on the 19th  of 
December 1111. 
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